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ABSTRACT 
Essays in Health and Labor Economics 
Beliyou Haile 
 This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay analyzes the causal effect of 
HIV education and incentives (home-based HIV testing and conditional cash transfer) on HIV 
testing decision. The second essay analyzes the short- and medium-term causal effects of HIV 
testing on HIV infection expectations and sexual behavior. These two essays are based on data 
from a randomized controlled trial in Ethiopia. The third essay examines effects of wrongful 
discharge protections adopted by U.S. state courts on employment and job loss for workers with 
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Chapter 1 . What are the Effects of HIV Education and Easier Access to HIV Testing 
Service on Testing Decision? Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial in Ethiopia 
1.1 Introduction 
 Voluntary HIV counseling and testing as a gateway for treatment and preventive strategy 
has been an integral part of the global response to the AIDS epidemic. HIV testing is also said to 
play an important role in promoting acceptability of HIV as a community problem, in mitigating 
stigma and discrimination against people with HIV, and in promoting antiretroviral therapy 
uptake (WHO 2003, UNAIDS/WHO 2004,WHO/UNAIDS/UNICEF 2010).   
 Despite these potential benefits, testing rates worldwide are still low and many 
individuals infected with HIV are unaware of their status. For example, only 11% of adults in 45 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa received HIV testing in 2009.1 Also, only one-fourth of the 125 
million pregnant women in low- and middle-income countries in 2009 received HIV testing 
(WHO/UNAIDS/UNICEF 2010). Low testing rates mean not only that many people infected 
with HIV are unaware of their HIV infection status but may unknowingly transmit the virus to 
                                                 
1
 The percentage of HIV testers is computed by dividing the total number of HIV testers 15 to 49 years of age by the 
total size of the population in the same age group. Data on the number of HIV testers is from World Health 






others.2 Low perceived personal risk of HIV infection, limited awareness about the need for and 
the benefits of HIV testing, limited access to counseling and testing services, fear of stigma and 
discrimination, and limited access to HIV and AIDS treatments are among the leading factors 
responsible for low HIV testing uptake.  
 Although the influence of each of these factors on testing decision varies from place to 
place, they are expected to have a stronger influence in information- and resource-poor settings. 
For example, individuals with little formal education, limited access to up-to-date HIV-related 
information and misconceptions about HIV may not fully understand their susceptibility to HIV 
infection and the benefits of learning about their HIV status. The relationship between HIV-
related information and testing can be conceptualized within the framework of psychological 
model known as the Health Belief Model (HBM) (Rosenstock 1966). The HBM proposes that 
individuals’ health-related behavior depends on their perception of: (1) the severity of a health 
problem, (2) their susceptibility to the health problem, (3) the benefits of trying to avoid the 
health problem, and (4) the barriers to taking an action to avoid the health problem. In this 
                                                 
2
 For example, Demographic and Health Survey data from six countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for 2003 and 2004 
show that on average, only 19% and 18% of HIV-positive adult women and men, respectively, knew their HIV 






framework, health information from mass media campaigns, health professionals, or others 
sources can affect individuals' likelihood of taking a health action based on their perceived threat 
of the health problem.  
 With regard to testing, HIV education can affect testing decision if new information 
learned affects an individual’s perception of their susceptibility to HIV infection, the severity of 
the AIDS epidemic, the benefits of HIV testing, and/or (perceived) barriers to testing. As such, 
education about HIV transmission mechanisms, the benefits (and potential risks) of testing, 
availability of AIDS treatments, HIV prevalence, as well as places to get HIV counseling and 
testing service can affect testing decision. These pieces of information can be particularly 
important for individuals with limited formal education, little access to HIV/AIDS information 
through the mass media, and/or misconceptions.  
  On the other hand, filling HIV/AIDS-related ‘knowledge gap’ may only be a necessary 
condition to induce appropriate health behavior. When the socioeconomic cost of receiving 
testing is high, testing uptake can be quite low even among health-literate individuals.3 Although 
HIV counseling and testing is currently offered free of charge in many poor and highly impacted 
                                                 
3
  In fact, one limitation of the HBM is that it does not take into consideration the influence of other factors, such as 





countries, long and arduous hours of travel to a testing clinic can increase the (direct and 
indirect) cost of testing and reduce the incentive to learn one’s HIV status. From the public 
health policy perspective, quantifying and disentangling the effects of information and cost- 
considerations on testing decision is necessary to generate information that can feed into the 
designing of appropriate policy interventions to promote testing.   
 In this essay, I estimated the causal effect of HIV education, home-based HIV testing, 
and conditional cash transfers on testing decision using experimental data from Ethiopia. Using 
testing uptake data from two rounds of intervention where I offered subjects incentives to learn 
their HIV infection status, I examined persistence in the effect of incentives on test-seeking 
behavior. During the first round of intervention, I randomly assigned one group of study 
households to HIV education treatment, a second group to HIV education and home-based HIV 
counseling and testing treatment, a third group to HIV education and cash incentive to a facility-
based testing treatment, and a fourth group to a no-treatment. I conducted a follow-up survey 
around three months after intervention and gathered detailed information about HIV-related 





study households (including those in the control group) were randomly assigned to home-based 
testing treatment and the other half were assigned to the cash incentives treatment.  
 Intention to treat effect estimates show improvement in knowledge of and correct belief 
about HIV transmission mechanisms for subjects offered HIV education when compared to those 
in the control group. Subjects offered HIV education are found to be 7 percentage points more 
likely to report learning their HIV infection status than those in the control group. I found a 
significant increasing in testing uptake for the group to whom HIV education is combined with 
an easier access to testing service either through home-based testing or conditional cash transfer.   
 While subjects offered HIV education and home-based testing were 64 percentage points 
more likely to learn their HIV status, those offered HIV education and cash incentives were 57 
percentage points more likely to learn their HIV status than those in the control group. I found 
heterogeneous treatment effect on testing decision with higher testing uptake for females (versus 
males), married subjects (versus singles), and those without formal education (versus those with 
some formal education). Around 87% of first round testers repeated testing after eight months 





 Although no previous study examined the effect of HIV education on testing decision in 
the context of a developing country4, a number of studies examined the effect of sex and AIDS 
education on high-risk sexual behavior (Dupas 2009, Duflo et al. 2006, Tremblay and Ling 
2005).5 Dupas (2009) finds that provision of age-disaggregated information about HIV 
prevalence to Kenyans reduces teenage pregnancy by older men, a group with high HIV 
prevalence. In another experimental study in Kenya, Duflo et al. (2006) find that encouraging 
students to debate about the role of condoms and other ways of reducing the risk of HIV 
infection increases practical knowledge and self-reported condom use. In the context of a 
developed country, Tremblay and Ling (2005) find that AIDS education increases the likelihood 
of condom-protected sexual intercourse among youth in the U.S. 
 As mentioned earlier, health information may only be a necessary condition in bringing 
about appropriate health-seeking behavior. Individuals with all knowledge of all the relevant 
health-related issues may not take an individually- and socially-desirable health action for 
various socioeconomic and environmental reasons. In this regard, geographic access to health 
                                                 
4A study by McOwan et al. (2002) found that a multimedia HIV testing campaign aimed at gay and bisexual men in 
United Kingdom increased HIV testing uptake.   





services is identified to play a crucial role in determining health service utilization and health 
outcomes (Arcury et al. 2005, Buor 2003, Joseph and Phillips 1984). With regard to HIV testing 
in particular, previous studies have found access to a testing facility to have a significant effect 
on testing decision (Mutale et al. 2010, Thornton 2008, Yoder et al. 2006, Wolff et al. 2005, 
Fylkesnes and Siziya 2004).  
 Mutale et al. (2010) and Yoder et al. (2006) find a more than 75% testing acceptance rate 
among survey participants who are offered home-based HIV testing in Zambia and Uganda, 
respectively. In a randomized controlled trial in Zambia, Fylkesnes and Siziya (2004) find testing 
uptake under home-based testing to be almost five times higher than that under a facility-based 
testing. With regard to home-based voluntary HIV counseling and testing in particular, testing 
uptake can be very high since home-based testing effectively eliminates barriers of cost, time, 
and inconvenience associated with a trip to a testing clinic (Wolff et al. 2006). Home-based 
testing can also increase testing by mitigating social costs of visiting a publicly located testing 
clinics or intra-couple bargaining power differences that may discourage women from visiting 





reaching groups with low rates of prior testing and promoting couple HIV counseling and testing 
(Menzies et al. 2009).  
 While home-based testing can promote testing by effectively eliminating cost barriers 
and inconveniences, cash incentives can increase testing uptake by compensating individuals for 
transportation cost and the opportunity cost of taking time off to get to a remote testing clinic. In 
a pioneering randomized controlled trial in rural Malawi, Thornton (2008) finds a significant 
positive effect of small cash incentives on the demand for testing. Unlike the relatively abundant 
evidence on the effect of conditional cash transfers on educational and health outcomes, the 
evidence on the effect of cash transfers on testing decisions is scanty.6 Notwithstanding the 
evidence on the effect of home-based testing on uptake, the evidence on the relative 
effectiveness of home-based testing compared to other testing service provision models is also 
limited (Bateganya et al. 2010). 
 To my knowledge, this essay is the first to credibly explore, in a similar setting, the 
relative effectiveness of alternative methods of increasing testing uptake (home-based testing 
verses conditional cash transfer) as well as the impact of HIV education on testing decisions. By 
                                                 
6
 See Mylene et al. (2009) for a review of studies on the effect of conditional cash transfers on health service 





designing an experiment with multiple (overlapping) treatments, I was able to identify the causal 
effects on testing decision of a single factor (such as HIV education) as well as the effect of a 
combination of factors (such as HIV education and home-based testing). This essay also 
contributes to the literature on HIV testing by examining persistence in the effect of incentives 
on test-taking decision, a behavior necessary for early detection of infection for individuals with 
repeated episodes of risky sexual encounters.  
 The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides background 
information on HIV and AIDS in Ethiopia and describes the study setting. Section 1.3 details the 
randomized controlled trial. Section 1.4 summarizes experimental data used in the empirical 
analysis. Section 1.5 outlines statistical models used to identify treatment effects on testing 
decision. Section 1.6 discusses internal validity. Section 1.7 presents empirical results and 
Section 1.8 concludes the essay.  
1.2 Background 
1.2.1 HIV and AIDS in Ethiopia 
  Ethiopia is the second largest country in Africa and one of the countries that is highly 
affected by the AIDS epidemic.7 Since the first evidence of HIV infection in 1984, the virus has 
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spread rapidly and had a devastating impact on its people and the economy (FHAPCO 2009). 
Although HIV was initially highly concentrated among high-risk groups, it has now become a 
generalized epidemic.8 According to antenatal clinic-based surveillance estimates, there were 
around 1.3 million people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), 128,000 new HIV infections, and 
135,000 AIDS-related deaths in 2005. The HIV prevalence rate was estimated at 3.5% with 
higher rate in urban areas (10.5%) than in rural areas (1.9%) (FMOH and NHAPCO 2006).  
 Although HIV prevalence in Ethiopia has been relatively moderate, there is potential for 
the virus to erupt into an epidemic if HIV spreads into rural areas where more than 85% of the 
population resides.9 Such concern looms large when considering strong rural-urban interaction, 
the presence of bridging populations, and the unique socioeconomic and cultural conditions of 
rural communities (Bishop-Sambrook et al. 2006). Ethiopia is also one of the five countries, 
along with Nigeria, China, India, and Russia, identified as the ‘next wave countries’ with a large 
                                                 
8
 According to UNAIDS definitions, an HIV epidemic is considered as ‘generalized’ when more than one per cent of 
the general population is HIV-positive. 
9
 For example, estimates based on comparable data from Demographic and Health Surveys show that national HIV 
prevalence among adults 15 to 49 years of age was 1.4% in Ethiopia (in 2005), 6.7% in Kenya (in 2003), 7% in 
Tanzania (in 2003-2004), 6.4% in Uganda (in 2004), 26% in Swaziland (in 2006-2007), 24% in Leseto (in 2004), 





number of people at risk of HIV infection (National Intelligence Council, 2002). Unprotected 
heterosexual intercourse with an HIV-infected partner is the main mode of transmission followed 
by mother-to-child transmission.   
 With support from the donor community, the government of Ethiopia has taken various 
HIV prevention and control measures to curb the spread of the virus. Establishment of a national 
HIV/AIDS control program in 1987, drafting of a national AIDS policy in 1998, introduction of 
a free antiretroviral therapy roll-out program in 2005, incorporation of life-skills based HIV 
education into school curricula, and devising of a social mobilization strategy in 2005 are among 
the major policy responses to the AIDS epidemic. Curricula revision and social mobilization 
were specifically aimed at promoting HIV/AIDS-related awareness and safe sexual behavior 
among in-school and out-of-school populations, respectively.  
 Social mobilization is hoped to be achieved through community conversations about 
HIV/AIDS.10 Ethiopia's HIV control and prevention strategy identifies testing as a crucial part of 
                                                 
10
 For example community conversations have been undertaken in 16,034 Kebeles (of the 17,454 Kebeles in the 
country) in 2008/2009 (FHAPCO 2009). Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is composed of nine regional 
states (Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz, Southern Nations Nationalities and People 
Region (SNNPR), Gambella and Harari) and two administrative regions (Addis Ababa City administration and Dire 
Dawa city council). Each regional state is divided into zones and each zone is divided into Woredas (equivalent of 





the HIV prevention effort. The national guideline on HIV counseling and testing notes that “ … 
[HIV testing] as a crucial intervention component of the HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and support 
program shall be promoted and made widely available, affordable and accessible to all 
individuals and communities.” (FHAPCO and FMOH 2007: 3).  Although repeated cross-section 
and nationally representative surveys11 show improvement with regard to HIV-related 
knowledge and testing uptake, latest waves of these surveys show lack of a comprehensive HIV-
related knowledge, widespread misconception, considerable stigma against PLWHA, and low 
testing rates, especially in rural areas.12 These surveys also show that formal and informal 
community meetings are still an important source of HIV-related information for the majority of 
the country’s population (85%) of the population that resides in rural areas.  
 According to the 2005 Ethiopian Demographic and Health Survey (EDHS), for example, 
only 10% of rural women and 25% of rural men have a comprehensive knowledge about HIV 
                                                 
11
 These surveys are Ethiopian Demographic and Health Survey (2000, 2005) and Ethiopian Behavioral Surveillance 
Survey (2002, 2005). 
12
 It is important, however, to note that there has been a significant improvement in recent years. For example, HIV 
testing rate more than doubled between 2007 and 2008 from 51 to 121 HIV testers per 1000 population (WHO, 





transmission.13 In addition, 70% and 22% of rural and urban respondents, respectively, did not 
know where to get HIV counseling and testing service.  There is also a significant heterogeneity 
in HIV/AIDS knowledge, with rural residents, women, and those with little formal education 
being more likely to have an HIV ‘knowledge gap’.14 Only 5% of respondents in the 2005 EDHS 
were ever tested for HIV while 8.4% (5.6%) adult males (females) infected with HIV had ever 
received an HIV test (CSA and ORC Macro 2006).  
 Due to the country’s weak health sector infrastructure, many (especially in rural areas) 
have limited access to health services in general and HIV/AIDS-related services in particular and 
distance is found to be an important barrier to primary health care utilization (Mekonnen, 1998). 
A recent study by the Ethiopian Public Health Association (EPHA) concluded that very little is 
known about: (1) the impact of information, education, and communication on appropriate HIV-
                                                 
13
 An individual is said to have a comprehensive knowledge if she: (1) knows that both condom use and limiting sex 
partners to one uninfected partner are HIV prevention methods, (2) knows that a healthy-looking person can have 
HIV, and (3) rejects the two most common local misconceptions - that HIV can be transmitted through mosquito 
bites and by sharing food (CSA and ORC Macro 2006). 
14
 Inter-group variation in HIV/AIDS related knowledge has been found in other African countries as well (Glick 





related health-seeking behavior, (2) determinants of the demand for testing, and (3) the effect of 
testing on sexual behavior in Ethiopia (EPHA, 2004).  
1.2.1 Study Setting 
 The randomized controlled trial implemented for this essay was conducted in Hetosa 
district of Arsi zone in central Ethiopia. According to the 2007 Population and Housing Census, 
Arsi zone is the second most populous zone of the most populous region in Ethiopia (Oromia 
region) with around 2.6 million people. Oromos and Amharas are the main ethnic groups in the 
area accounting for 84% and 14% of the population, respectively.  Hetosa district has a 
population around 124, 000 residing in 23 rural and 2 urban Kebeles. While 45% of the 
population of Hetosa is Orthodox Christian, 54% is Muslim. The district has two farming 
seasons, Kiremt (June to September) and Belg (February to May) and agriculture is the main 
source of livelihood. Forty-three percent of the residents (5 years or older) have never attended 
school and the average birth rate among women aged 20 to 49 is 4. 
 Health services coverage in general and coverage of HIV/AIDS services in particular is 
limited in the district, especially in rural Kebeles.15 The district has two high schools and 
                                                 
15
 Hetosa district has 23 Health Posts (HPs), 3 Health Centers (HCs) and no hospital. HPs are the lowest units in the 





students from rural Kebeles of in the district need to either commute or temporarily move to the 
two urban Kebeles or nearby towns to pursue secondary education. The district is characterized 
by temporary migration to nearby towns during off-farming seasons (for young men) and to the 
Middle East (for young women) with a strong rural-urban interaction due to agricultural 
marketing. HIV-positive rate in the district was 2.5% based on data collected from HIV testing 
clinics in 2008.16 
1.3 Research Methodology 
 The empirical analysis in this essay is based on a randomized controlled trial conducted 
in Ethiopia.17 Recruitment of subjects for this study is from subjects who participated in a family 
                                                                                                                                                             
provision). In charge of each HP are two female Health Extension Workers (HEWs). HCs are one level higher than 
HPs and are better equipped (both in term of medical equipment and human resource) and are engaged mainly in 
providing treatment. HEWs are at the core of Ethiopia's Health Extension Package, an innovative community-based 
program introduced in 2003 with the aim of creating healthy environment and healthful living through provision of 
community-level health information and services. All HEWs are females 18 years or older and with at least 10 years 
of education and they are given appropriate training by the Federal Ministry of Education (See Argaw 2007 for 
detail). 
16
 Figures about Hetosa district are obtained from unpublished documents from Arsi zone and Hetosa district health 
bureaus. 
17As a health-related study involving human subjects, the randomized controlled trial is approved by the Ethiopian 
National Health Research Ethics Committee (RDHE\76-92\2010), the Ethics Committee at Oromia Regional Health 
Bureau (BEFO\HBJFG\1-38\155), Columbia University Institutional Review Board (IRB-AAAE0507) and Yonsei 





planning study by Yonsei University School of Nursing. At the onset of the Korea Ethiopia 
Yonsei Family Planning (KEYFP) project in May 2009, a survey was conducted to gather 
baseline information on knowledge, attitude, and practice on family planning.18 The survey 
involved 1009 households and 1850 residents between the ages of 15 and 59. Data collected by 
KEYFP survey team is used as a baseline survey in this essay. Subjects for KEYFP survey were 
selected through two stage cluster sampling from six rural and one urban Kebeles. Section A of 
Appendix A discusses the sampling frame for KEYFP survey. All KEYFP survey subjects 18 
years or older were eligible to participate in this research study (959 households and 1658 
individuals).19 Members of my research team conducted door-to-door visits to recruit eligible 
KEYFP survey subjects into this research study using a recruitment flyer. A written informed 
consent was obtained from subjects during each contact with members of my research team 
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 KEYFP project is an initiative of the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and Yonsei University 
College of Nursing. The project is aimed at promoting access to family planning services, enhancing the capacity of 
providers of family planning services, improving quality of family planning services, and strengthening community 
education on family planning. 
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 KEYFP survey subjects who were 15 to 17 years of age were excluded from this study for the following reason. 
Given the relatively large number of visits my research team was going to make and the need for obtaining a written 
informed consent from parents or legal guardians of minors, including them in the study would have been 





(before HIV education, before voluntary home-based HIV counseling and testing, and before 
each follow-up interview).  
 The randomized controlled trial consisted of an offer of HIV education and two rounds of 
home-based HIV testing and cash incentives to a facility-based HIV testing to encourage study 
participants to learn their HIV status. A first round follow-up survey was conducted around three 
months after first round intervention to gather detailed information on HIV/AIDS-related 
knowledge, sexual practices, and HIV testing status.  A second round follow-up survey was 
conducted around eight months after first intervention as part of a different survey (of the same 
subjects) conducted by KEYFP team. During each follow-up interview, subjects were offered up 
to ten pieces of free male condoms to get an indirect measure of the demand for protected sex. 
Table A2 in Appendix A presents a chronological summary of the field experiment and the 
sections below describe the field experiment in detail. 
1.3.1  First Round Intervention 
 Before the field work, eligible KEYFP households were randomly assigned to one of 
three treatment groups (of 20% of eligible households each) and a control group (40%). The first 
treatment group (hereon “G1”) was offered HIV education. The second treatment group (hereon 





third treatment group (hereon “G3”) was offered HIV education and cash incentives to a facility-
based voluntary HIV counseling and testing. The fourth group (hereon “G4”) was not contacted 
during first round intervention and served as a control.  
A. HIV Education 
 The main purpose of the HIV/AIDS information session is to provide subjects with basic 
scientific facts about HIV transmission mechanisms, ways of reducing the risk of HIV infection, 
and the benefits and potential risks of getting an HIV test. Subjects were also offered information 
about where to get HIV counseling and testing service in and around the study area, the 
availability of HIV treatments for individuals and pregnant women with HIV, what HIV 
treatments can and cannot do, as well as HIV prevalence in Ethiopia, in the study area, and 
among different demographic groups. Section B in Appendix A outlines contents of the 
HIV/AIDS information session.  
 Fourteen trained community-based Health Extension Workers (HEWs) from Hetosa 
district recruited and offered eligible subjects HIV education. The information session was 
conducted through door-to-door visits between March and April of 2010.20 The information 
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session was conducted in the local language (Oromiffa) and lasted 30 to 45 minutes. Educators 
had a chance to address HIV-related questions at the end of the information session as they 
arose. If more than one eligible household member was present during a home visit by a HEW, 
the information session was conducted as a group inside residence homes (Picture A1, Appendix 
A) or residence compounds (Picture A2, Appendix A) whichever was better to ensure privacy. 
HEWs made up to three home visits to recruit and educate as many eligible subjects as possible.  
 At the end of the information session, HEWs handed out a poster (per household) that 
promotes voluntary HIV counseling and testing and placed it at a visible place inside residence 
homes (Picture A3, Appendix A). For subjects assigned to home-based testing group, HEWs 
informed them the fact that they were eligible to receive free home-based HIV testing if they 
would like to learn their HIV status and made appointments with interested subjects. 
 Appointments were made at any time (between 9am and 5pm) in the following ten days 
and starting right after the end of the HIV information session. For subjects eligible to receive 
cash incentive, HEWs informed them that they would receive cash compensations if they wish to 
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learn their HIV status at an assigned testing clinic. HEWs then handed out coupons to interested 
subjects and explained conditions for coupon redemption.  
B. Conditional Cash Transfer to a Facility-based HIV Counseling and Testing 
 Cash incentives were given to compensate the cost of round transportation and a day of 
lost farm wage due to a trip to a local testing clinic (Iteya Health Center). This clinic is located in 
one of the seven study villages (Iteya Kebele) and there was no testing facility in the other (six) 
study villages.21 To compute transportation cost, I then gathered information on bus and horse 
carriage fares from each study village to assigned testing clinic. I clustered the seven study 
villages into three groups of villages located at a comparable (odometer) distance away from 
Iteya Health Center.  
 The first cluster (Cluster 1) consisted of two villages that are 32 kilometers (kms) and 28 
kms away from assigned testing clinic. The second cluster (Cluster 2) consisted of two villages 
located at 20 kms and 18 kms away from assigned testing clinic. The third cluster (Cluster 3) 
consisted of three villages lying 6 kms, 4 kms, and 1km away from assigned testing clinic. 
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 A new health center that also provides HIV testing service has been opened in one of the rural study villages (Sibu 
village) after the end of first round intervention. In addition, although testing service was available on regular basis 
only in Iteya Kebele, Hetosa district health bureau occasionally conducts HIV counseling and testing outreaches into 





Transportation cost (round trip) for villages in each cluster was then computed by taking the 
average for the respective cluster. Compensation for transportation cost was set at 20 Birr (1.5 
U.S. dollars) for eligible subjects in Cluster 1, 15 Birr (1.2 U.S. dollars) for those in Cluster 2, 
and 4 Birr (0.3 U.S. dollars) for subjects in Cluster 3.22 
 Adding the cost of a day of farm labor in the area, which was estimated at 15 Birr, 
coupons offered to subjects in Clusters 1, 2, and 3 were worth 2.7 dollars, 2 dollars, and 1.5 
dollars, respectively. Coupons were non-transferable and redemption was conditional on subjects 
learning their HIV status at assigned testing clinic before coupons expire in ten days. HIV 
counseling and testing service at the clinic was given in the usual manner and free of charge. 
C. Voluntary Home-based HIV Counseling and Testing 
 For subjects randomly assigned to home-based testing treatment, Community Counselors 
(CCs) from nearby districts visited them at the appointment time for voluntary home-based 
counseling and testing.23 CCs conducted HIV testing in line with Ethiopia's guidelines for HIV 
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 Birr is the local currency and the exchange rate was 13 Birr to 1 U.S. dollar at the time of first round intervention. 
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 Community Counselors are community-based health professionals recruited from within the community by 
regional health bureaus and are given theoretical and practical trainings on HIV counseling and testing. They play an 
important role in the country's effort to increase testing service coverage in communities that otherwise would have 





counseling and testing and under the condition of the “Three Cs”: informed Consent, 
Confidentiality, and Counseling.24 Pre-test counseling, HIV testing, and post-test counseling (and 
test results) were all done in a single visit and in private (to couples). Testing was done using 
rapid test kits and finger-prick blood samples and no subject was given a written HIV test result. 
HIV seropositive subjects were referred to the nearest hospital for follow-up.25  
1.3.2  First Follow-up  
 Around three months after first round intervention (June 2010 - July 2010), a follow-up 
survey was conducted to gather detailed data on HIV-related knowledge, sexual practices, and 
HIV testing status. The survey was conducted using a structured questionnaire adapted from the 
2005 EDHS. Trained data collectors who conducted KEYFP baseline survey, who were familiar 
with the local culture, and who were not aware of the HIV test status of subjects conducted 
follow-up interviews through door-to-door visit and using the local language.  
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 See FHAPCO and FMOH (2007) for Guidelines on HIV Counseling and Testing in Ethiopia. 
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 The antiretroviral therapy clinic at the nearest hospital (Assela referral hospital) provides screening and HIV 
treatment (if necessary) free of charge with support from Columbia University’s International Center for AIDS Care 





 Data collectors made up to three visits to interview as many eligible subjects as possible 
and offered up to ten pieces of free male condoms for each subject who completed follow-up 
interview. Questionnaires were administered by same-sex interviewers and in private in view of 
the sensitivity of the issues being addressed during the interview session. 
1.3.3  Second Round Intervention 
 Second round intervention was conducted between December 2010 and January 2011 and 
involved the offered of home-based HIV testing or cash incentives to a facility-based HIV 
testing. For this purpose, we re-randomized study households in each of the four research groups 
from first round randomization into two groups of 96 households each (for G1, G2, and G3) and 
192 households each (for G4). 
 Second-round home-based testing was conducted using similar procedures described in 
Section 1.3.1 (Subsection C). Second-round cash incentives were adjusted upwards to account 
for a 20% devaluation of the local currency that took place in September 2010. Thus, eligible 
subjects in Clusters 1, 2, and 3 were offered coupons worth 2.9, 2.5, and 1.8 U.S. dollars, 






 This section summarizes the experimental data used in the empirical analysis. Table A3 
(Appendix A) reports means of selected baseline variables for the whole sample. The average 
age in the sample is 31.5 years and males account for roughly half the sample. Seventy-four 
percent of subjects were married and 80% were involved in an income generating activity in the 
one month prior to baseline interview. While 34% of study subjects have no formal education, 
53% have 8 or fewer years of formal schooling. Sixty-one percent of the sample is Orthodox 
Christian and around 38% is Muslim. 
 The average age at first sexual encounter was 16.5 and 6% reported using condom during 
their first sexual encounter. More than 90% of sexually active respondents believed that their 
sexual encounters had been “Very safe” or “Somehow safe.” For a sub-sample of subjects for 
whom baseline information is available about the first sexual partner, one in five reported to have 
had their first sexual encounter with someone they had a casual acquaintance or with a 
commercial sex worker. Of these respondents, 1.7% reported to have used a condom during their 
first sexual encounter.  
 With regard to baseline HIV/AIDS-related knowledge, 61%, 68%, and 47% knew about 





HIV during pregnancy, and knew about the availability of special medication to reduce the risk 
of mother-to-child transmission during pregnancy, respectively. Regarding household 
characteristics, 90% and 75% own land and at least one ox, respectively, 75% own a radio and 
6% own a television. Twenty-eight percent of study households had electricity at baseline. The 
average number of eligible study participants per household is 1.7. 
 To estimate the effect of the information session on HIV-related knowledge, I 
constructed various knowledge measures using detailed data collected during first round follow-
up. During first follow-up interview, study subjects were read out a series of correct or incorrect 
sentences about various HIV/AIDS-related issues and were asked if they would “agree”, 
“disagree”, or “do not know.”26 Five measures of HIV knowledge are constructed based on 
responses to these prompted questions. Indices constructed in this essay are in line with those 
developed by UNAIDS to measure cross-country differences in knowledge of HIV prevention 
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 The following are some of the sentences that were read out to study subjects: “Someone who abstains from sexual 
intercourse has less chance of being infected with HIV”, “Individuals who use condom correctly and every time they 
have sex have less chance of being infected with HIV”, “Being in a faithful relationship with only one individual 
(who does not have HIV/AIDS) reduces one’s chance of being infected with HIV”, “A healthy-looking person 
cannot have HIV/AIDS”, and “Eating uncooked egg laid by a hen that swallows a used condom can cause HIV”. 





methods (or lack of it), attitude towards people living with HIV, and local misconceptions about 
HIV transmission mechanisms.  
 The first outcome is knowledge of the “ABC” of HIV prevention - Abstinence, Being 
faithful to one uninfected partner, and using Condom correctly and consistently. The second 
outcome is misconception about HIV transmission mechanisms - belief that a healthy-looking 
person cannot have HIV, HIV can be transmitted through mosquito bite, and HIV can be 
transmitted through eating uncooked egg laid by a hen that swallowed a used condom. The third 
outcome measure is knowledge of mother-to-child transmission of HIV during pregnancy, 
delivery, and breastfeeding.  The fourth outcome is knowledge of availability of special 
medications for individuals and pregnant women living with HIV. The fifth outcome is 
stigmatizing attitude towards people with HIV- that people with HIV should not be allowed to 
mix with others, that they should keep their HIV status a secret, and that the respondent would 
not take care of a sick person who she knows has HIV/AIDS.  
 In constructing these knowledge measures, responses to each sentence about HIV 
transmission mechanisms (sexual or mother-to-child) and availability of HIV treatments are 





if otherwise. Responses to each sentence about misconceptions regarding HIV transmission 
mechanisms and stigmatizing attitudes towards people with HIV are rescaled into an indicator 
that takes a value of one if respondent disagrees with a wrong sentence and zero if otherwise. 
This rescaling is made on the assumption that having wrong information (disagreement to a right 
sentence or agreement to a wrong sentence) and not knowing about a right or a wrong sentence 
have similar implications for HIV prevention.   
 For each domain of knowledge outcome, I then constructed an index by taking the 
fraction of correct responses and standardize each index by subtracting its control group mean 
and dividing by its control group standard deviation. In addition to these five indices, I also 
constructed an overall knowledge index combining the five knowledge measures and an index 
for comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV transmission mechanisms combining the first two 
knowledge measures - ABC of HIV prevention and correct belief about HIV transmission 
mechanisms. 
1.5 Statistical Models 
 Identification of the causal effect of HIV education and easier access to HIV testing in 
this essay is based on post-treatment comparison of various outcomes of interest for groups with 





randomly, and absent a systematic attrition, comparison of post-treatment outcomes across 
research groups produces results that are free from selection bias. If all subjects assigned to a 
given treatment do not receive the assigned treatment, post-treatment comparison of outcomes 
based only on a sub-sample of compliers will be misleading (Angrist and Pischke 2009).  
 Since HIV testing is voluntary and not everyone is going to volunteer for testing, I 
employ intention-to-treat (ITT) analysis and compare post-intervention outcomes of subjects 
randomly assigned into different treatment and who completed follow-up interview, regardless of 
their adherence to assigned treatment. HIV education is expected to affect testing decision 
through its effect on subjects' perception of their susceptibility to HIV infection, the severity of 
the AIDS epidemic, and the benefits of and barriers to getting an HIV test. To estimate the effect 
of HIV information session on HIV-related knowledge, I fit the statistical model in equation 
1.5.1 using ordinary least squares estimator. 
    			
 	  																									 1.5.1 
where  indexes individuals,  is a standardized index for knowledge outcome k, 
 
	1 if individual is assigned to any of the three treatment groups offered HIV education during 





squared, sex, marital status, religion, schooling, employment status, area of residence, and 
household asset ownership: electricity, radio, television, mobile phone, land, and livestock), and 
	is a random error term. 
 Although all the three treatment groups are offered HIV education, motivating the 
specification in equation 1.5.1, assessing the effect of HIV education on each of the treatment 
groups may also be of interest. If pre- and post-test counseling session increase HIV-related 
knowledge, subjects assigned to home-based testing and cash incentives treatments, for whom 
testing was made easier, may have better HIV knowledge than those in the HIV education 
treatment. Thus, I also estimate a version of equation 1.5.1 using three indicators for assignment 
into the three treatment groups (G1, G2, and G3), instead of 
 as a regressor. I estimate 
treatment effect on individual knowledge indices simultaneously through feasible generalized 
least-squares (the two-step method).27   
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estimates than equation-by-equation application of least squares (Zellner, 1962). In my case, disturbance terms in 





 I estimate treatment effect of incentives on testing decision in two different ways. First, I 
use self-reported testing status from first round follow-up and fit the linear probability model in 
equation 1.5.2. 
    			
 	   !    " 										 1.5.2 
where  indexes individuals,  = 1 if individual reports to have learned her HIV status 
within the three months preceding first follow-up, 
 = 1 if individual is assigned to 
HIV education group,  = 1 if individual is assigned to the HIV education and home-based 
testing group,  !	= 1 if individual is assigned to the HIV education and cash incentive group, 
the control group is omitted category, 	is as defined under equation 1.5.1, and " is a random 
error term.  
 To the extent the information session affected subjects' perception of their susceptibility 
to HIV infection, the severity of the AIDS epidemic, and/or the benefits of testing, #	 will be 
significant and positive.	If cost consideration were preventing individuals from learning their 
HIV status, then we would expect #		and		#	 to be positive and significant with magnitude 





 Second, I use testing acceptance data from second round intervention and fit the linear 
probability model in equation 1.5.3. 
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where  indexes individuals,  = 1 if individual learns HIV status during second 
intervention, 
 ! = 1 if the individual is assigned to HIV education treatment in the 
first round and to cash incentives treatment in the second round,  = 1 if individual is 
assigned to home-based testing treatment in both rounds,  ! = 1 if individual is 
assigned to home-based testing and cash incentives treatment in the first and second round, 
respectively,  ! = 1 if individual is assigned to cash incentives and home-based testing 
treatment in the first and second round, respectively,  ! ! = 1 if individual is assigned to 
cash incentives treatment in both rounds,  '( = 1 if individual is assigned to control 
group in the first round and home-based testing treatment in the second round,  '( ! = 1 
if individual is assigned to control group in the first round and cash incentives treatment in the 
second round, 		is as defined under equation 1.5.1, *	is a random error term, and the omitted 
category is the group offered HIV education during first intervention and home-based HIV 
testing during second intervention. 
 Comparison of		+’s in equation 1.5.3 will allow me to examine persistence of the effect 





in the effect of incentives on test-taking behavior, we expect testing uptake for groups offered 
incentives during both rounds (captured by 	+	,  = 2, 3, 4, 5) to be at least as high as uptake for 
groups offered incentives  only during second round intervention (captured by 	+	,  = 0, 1, 6, 7). 
For example, non-economic factors such as convenience and privacy are important determinants 
of testing decision, we may observe a higher incidence of repeat test for the group offered home-
based testing in both rounds than for the group offered cash incentive in both rounds resulting in 
+ > +%.  
 Alternatively, I can also examined persistence in the effect of incentives on test-taking 
behavior by estimating equation 1.5.3 using two indicators for repeat testing as a regressand. 
First, I use an indicator that takes a value of one if subject accepts testing during second round 
intervention and reports to have learned her status during first follow-up. Second, I use an 
indicator that takes a value of one if subject accepts testing during both rounds and estimate 
equation 1.5.3 on a sub-sample of individuals assigned to either home-based testing or cash 
incentives treatments during both rounds.  
 It worth noting that the foregoing specifications assume homogeneous treatment effects 





groups. For example, if information is indeed the reason for low testing uptake, all else equal, we 
expect a stronger effect of HIV education for subpopulations that are more likely to have a 
‘knowledge gap’. In Ethiopia in particular, population based surveys show a significant 
heterogeneity in HIV/AIDS-related knowledge and misconceptions based on gender, area of 
residence, as well as education level. Evidence from other countries also shows that women are 
in general at a disadvantage with respect to access to HIV-related information (UNAIDS 2007). 
The effect of the information session may also depend on education level as the latter may affect 
individuals' ability to access and/or process HIV-related information.  
 When there are intra-household bargaining power differences testing uptake under home-
based testing and cash incentives can also vary by sex. Yoder et al. (2006) for example found 
higher testing uptake among Ugandan women than men who were offered home-based HIV 
testing. They noted that “Given the unequal gender and power relations that often exist within 
households, women often find it difficult to go on their own for an HIV test, even if they are 
willing,” Yoder et al. (2006: 35). In a cross-country randomized study, Sweat et al. (2011) found 
a higher testing uptake for men under community-based counseling and testing than under 





 In this essay, I examine treatment effect heterogeneity based on marital status, sex, 
education level, and age by estimating equations 1.5.1 for different subpopulations and equation 
1.5.2 by including interaction terms between treatment assignment indicator and an indicator for 
the relevant subpopulation. Apart from identifying subgroups for whom treatments are more 
effective, such analysis can provide insights on the validity of the hypothesized cause-effect 
relationship between HIV information and access to testing services on the one hand and 
HIV/AIDS knowledge and testing decision on the other. Least squares standard error estimates 
from all regressions are adjusted using Huber-White correction and are cluster at household level 
to account for intra-household error correlation of an unknown form. 
1.6 Internal Validity  
 With correctly designed and implemented randomized trial, identification of average 
treatment effects through comparison of outcomes for groups with different treatment status 
produces internally valid estimates. This is due to the fact that randomization removes any 
systematic correlation between treatment status and observed as well as unobserved 
characteristics (Burtless 1995, Duflo et al. 2008). In order to check whether the two rounds of 
randomizations were done correctly, I compared mean of selected baseline variables for various 





A5 (for second round randomization) in Appendix A suggest that baseline covariates are fairly 
balanced across various research groups.   
 On the other hand and regardless of initial random assignment, the sample of individuals 
who completed follow-up interviews may represent a self-selected group of non-identical 
populations. This can happen if there is differential attrition rate or a systematic inter-group 
attrition of subjects with certain characteristics. In such circumstances, identification of average 
treatment effect estimation through post-treatment comparison of outcomes will be prone to 
selection bias.  
 As shown in Figure A1 (Appendix A), around 80% of the initial sample completed first 
round follow-up interview and there is no significant difference in attrition rate based on first 
round treatment assignment.28 In addition, comparison of baseline characteristics of non-attritors 
at first follow-up does not suggest a significant systematic inter-group attrition (Table A4, 
Appendix A). Although singles were less likely to complete a follow-up interview, with 
implications on external validity, this pattern is observed across all research groups. This pattern 
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may be explained by the fact that singles, who are more likely to be young, who are also more 
mobile than their married counterparts for school or work-related reasons as discussed in Section 
1.2.1. 
1.7 Empirical Results 
1.7.1 Effect on HIV Testing  
 Although analysis of the effect of HIV education on HIV-related knowledge is in itself 
interesting, the main focus of this paper is to examine the effect of HIV information and 
incentives on testing decision. If information affects subjects' belief of their susceptibility to HIV 
infection, the severity of the AIDS epidemic, or the benefits of testing, we expect an increase in 
testing uptake for groups offered HIV education. If cost consideration is preventing subjects 
from learning their HIV status, we may find an increase in testing uptake for subjects offered 
home-based testing or cash. In this section, I present treatment effect estimates on testing uptake.  
 Figure 1.1 summarizes testing rate during first round intervention and first follow-up. 
Around 65% and 61% of subjects assigned to home-based testing and cash incentives treatment 
accepted testing during first intervention, respectively (Figure 1.1, Panel A). Of the home-based 





facility-based testers learned an HIV-negative result. I found one case of discordant couples 
among home-based testers with an HIV-positive husband.  
 Figure 1.1 (Panel B) shows that 26%, 82%, and 74% subjects assigned to HIV education, 
HIV education and home-based testing, and HIV education and cash incentives treatments, 
respectively, reported receiving HIV testing in the three months preceding first follow-up 
interview.  Approximately 18% of subjects in the control group also reported receiving HIV 
counseling and testing during the same period.29 
 Table 1.1 presents covariate-adjusted intention to treat effect estimates of HIV education 
and first round incentives on testing decision. My preferred specification controlling for baseline 
covariates and village fixed effects shows that subjects in HIV education group are 7.2 
percentage points more likely to report learning their HIV infection status than those in the 
control group (Table 1.1, Column 3). The largest increase in testing uptake is observed among 
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 Thirty subjects who were assigned to home-based testing treatment (11%) and 21 subjects assigned to conditional 
cash transfer treatment (8%) did not accept home-based testing and did not visit assigned testing clinic, respectively, 
but reported to have learned their HIV status during follow-up. When asked where they got tested, 22 responded 
they were tested at a health facility in one of the urban study villages, 18 responded they were tested during an HIV 
testing outreach service in their village, and 11 responded they were tested at a health facility in another town. There 





subjects with improved access to HIV counseling and testing service either through home 
delivery of the service (G2) or through cash compensations (G3).  
 Specifically, I find that subjects in G2 and G3 are around 64 and 57 percentage points 
more likely to learn their HIV status in the three months after intervention than those in the 
control group, respectively. The fact that the increase in testing uptake for G1 is only one-eighth 
of the increase in uptake for G2 and G3, in spite of comparable improvement in HIV knowledge 
for all the three treatment groups, shows the importance of cost barriers in affecting testing 
decision. Testing uptake for the home-based group is marginally higher than that for the cash 
incentives group (p = 0.0567).30 
 Figure 1.2 summarizes HIV testing acceptance rate during second round intervention for 
groups with different treatment status at first and second randomization. More than 75% of 
subjects assigned to cash incentives or home-based testing treatment learned their HIV status and 
there does not appear to be a significant difference in testing acceptance rate by treatment status. 
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subjects in the control group reported learning their HIV status may suggest spillover effects and/or self-reporting 






Seventeen testers (9 home-based and 8 facility-based) learned an HIV-positive result during 
second round intervention.31 
 Regression-adjusted intention to treat effect estimates of second round incentives on 
testing uptake are reported in Table 1.2. Based on test results of linear constraint from equation 
1.5.3, I could not reject treatment effect homogeneity for groups with different treatment 
assignment (Table 1.2, Columns 1-2). This finding, coupled with the significant increase in 
testing uptake for subjects initially assigned to home-based testing or cash incentives treatment, 
suggests persistence in the effect of incentives on test-taking behavior. I also failed to reject the 
linear restriction on the equality of second round test acceptance rate for subgroups offered 
incentives during both rounds of intervention. This find once again suggest the importance of 
incentives as opposed to the type of incentive (home-based testing versus conditional cash 
transfer) on testing decision.  
 Subjects offered incentive at both rounds of intervention are found to be 40% - 50% 
(depending on the mix of incentives in the two rounds) more likely to accept testing during 
second intervention and to report learning their HIV status at first follow-up than those offered 
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incentives only during second intervention (Table 1.2, Columns 3-4). A little over half of the 
subjects offered incentives during both rounds accepted testing at both times with no significant 
difference among groups with different mix of incentives (Table 1.2, Columns 5-6). Of those 
subjects who were offered home-based testing or cash incentives during first round intervention 
and who accepted testing, 87% repeated the test during second round intervention.  
1.7.2 Effect on HIV Knowledge 
 HIV education is expected to affect testing decision through its effect on subjects’ 
perceived threat of HIV infection. As outlined in Appendix A (Section B), the information 
session provided to study participants addressed various aspects of HIV/AIDS including 
mechanisms of HIV transmission, advantages (and potential problems) of HIV testing, 
alternative ways to learn one’s HIV status in the study area, and access to AIDS and other 
medication that can reduce the risk of mother-to-child HIV transmission.  
 In this section, I present regression results on the effect of the information session on 
various dimensions of HIV knowledge and attitude. Table 1.3 presents ITT effect estimates of 
the effect of HIV education on overall HIV/AIDS knowledge (Columns 1-3) and on 





from my preferred specification (controlling for baseline covariates and village fixed effects) 
show a significant positive effect of HIV education on overall HIV knowledge (0.57 standard 
deviations unit) and on comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV transmission (0.52 standard 
deviations unit) (Table 1.3, Columns 3 and 6). Based on probability values from Wald tests of 
equality of effect estimates for the three treatment groups (reported at the bottom of Table 1.3) I 
could not reject treatment effect homogeneity. Considering the significant increase in testing 
uptake for subjects offered home-based testing or cash incentives reported in Section 1.7.2, the 
evidence in Table 1.3 (Panel B) suggests insignificant effect of pre- and post-test counseling 
session on HIV knowledge, at least along the dimensions considered in this essay. 
 Table 1.4 reports feasible generalized least squares estimates of the information session 
on the five HIV knowledge indices defined in Section 1.4. Results show a significant positive 
effect on all the five knowledge measures: knowledge of the ABC of HIV prevention (Column 
1), correct belief about HIV transmission mechanisms (Column 2), knowledge of mother-to-
child HIV transmission (Column 3), knowledge of the availability of HIV treatments (Column 
4), and accepting attitudes towards people with HIV (Column 5). A relatively stronger positive 





can have HIV and HIV cannot be transmitted through mosquito bite or by eating uncooked egg 
(Table 1.4, Panel A, Column 2). 
 The effect of HIV education on accepting attitude towards PLWHA is found to be 
relatively small (0.17 standard deviation units). This may suggest the relative difficulty involved 
in trying to change stigmatizing attitudes towards PLWHA. As part of the information session, 
subjects are taught that HIV cannot be transmitted through shaking hands, hugging, casual 
kissing, sharing of dishes, drinking glasses, food, cloth, or toilet seats, as well as by being around 
someone who has HIV. To the extent that the source of stigmatizing attitudes is something other 
than factors directly addressed during the information session, the information session may not 
result in a significant improvement in attitude.   
 With regard to the effect of the information session on individual measures of HIV 
knowledge, results in Table 1.5 show a relatively strong positive effect on subjects’ belief that 
HIV cannot be transmitted through eating uncooked egg (0.47 standard deviation units) and 
through mosquito bite (0.33 standard deviation units). On the other hand, effect on the 
knowledge that consistent and correct use of condom reduces the risk of HIV infection is 





1.7.3 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
  This section presents treatment effect estimates on HIV knowledge and testing uptake 
for subsamples defined by marital status (married versus single), sex (male versus female), 
education (no formal education versus some education), and age (18-25 years old versus 26-60 
years old).  Intention to treat effect estimates of HIV education, home-based testing, and cash 
incentives on testing decision are reported in Tables 1.6 and 1.7. Results based on marital status 
suggest that married subjects are more likely (18% for home-based testing group and 22% for 
cash incentives group) to report learning their HIV status during first round follow-up than 
singles (Table 1.6).  
 Results based on sex suggest two important points. First, testing uptake is higher for 
women than for men in both the home-based testing group (71% versus 57%) and cash incentive 
group (62% versus 52%). Second, testing uptake for women is higher under home-based testing 
than under cash incentives (p = 0.0425) (Table 1.6). Since women in developing countries in 
general and in the study area in particular are responsible for household chores (cooking, 
washing, childcare, et cetera), they might have been able to fit home-based testing into their daily 





 Differential treatment effect on testing is also found based by educational attainment with 
higher uptake observed for subjects without formal education than for those with some education 
(76% versus 58% in home-based testing group and 72% versus 48% in cash incentives group) 
(Table 1.7). This could be explained by the fact that subjects with some education might have 
already been informed about the benefits of testing and hence the intervention had a relatively 
weaker effect on them. I did not find a significant heterogeneity with regard to the effect on 
incentives on test-taking decision for the different subgroups considered in this essay.  
 With regard to effect on the information session, intention to treat effect estimates, Chow 
test results show no significant differential effect of the information session on overall HIV 
knowledge and on comprehensive correct knowledge about HIV transmission mechanism 
(Tables 1.8 and 1.9, the first two rows). On the other hand,  effect estimates on individual 
knowledge measures provide some evidence of effect heterogeneity. For example, effect on 
knowledge of the ABC of HIV prevention for singles is more than twice that for married subjects 
(Tables 1.8, Columns 1 and 2, the third row). Also, on accepting attitude towards PLWHA is 
significantly higher for females and for subjects with no education than for males and those with 






 Voluntary HIV counseling and testing is considered as an important prevention strategy 
in the fight against the AIDS epidemic. In spite of improvements in testing rate in recent years, 
however, the number of HIV testers is still low in many countries that are highly impacted by the 
epidemic. Low perceived personal risk of infection, limited awareness about the need for and the 
benefits of HIV testing, limited access to testing service, fear of stigma and discrimination, and 
limited access to HIV treatments are among the factors that are believed to have contributed to 
the low testing uptake worldwide. 
 In this essay, I provided empirical evidence on the causal effect of HIV education and 
easier access to testing services on testing decision using experimental data from Ethiopia. As 
part of the experiment, randomly selected subjects were offered HIV education and two rounds 
of incentives to encourage them to learn their HIV status. During first round intervention, one 
group was offered HIV education, a second group was offered HIV education and home-based 
HIV counseling and testing, a third group was offered HIV education and cash incentives to a 
facility-based testing, and a fourth group served as control. During second round intervention, 
half of all eligible study participants were offered home-based testing and the other half were 





 The information session was meant to provide subjects basic scientific facts about HIV 
transmission mechanisms, the benefits of HIV testing, and to inform them about various HIV-
related facts pertinent to the study area. Cash incentives were given to compensate (round) 
transportation cost and a day of lost farm wage due to a trip to a local testing clinic. Home-based 
HIV testing was offered to examine potential influence of non-economic factors (such as privacy 
and convenience) on testing decision.  
 Results showed that HIV information session had a significant positive effect on 
knowledge of and correct belief about various HIV transmission mechanisms, of knowledge of 
availability of HIV/AIDS medications, as well as accepting attitude towards people with 
HIV/AIDS. HIV education also resulted in a modest (7%) increase in testing uptake. A 
significant increase in testing uptake was found when HIV education was combined with home-
based testing (64%) or cash incentives (57%). I found evidence of treatment effect heterogeneity 
with higher testing uptake observed among the married, females, and subjects with no education. 
Testing uptake was found to be higher, especially for females, for subjects offered home-based 





 The fact that: (1) the increase in HIV testing uptake for subjects offered HIV education is 
only one-eighth of the increase in testing uptake for those offered HIV education along with 
incentives and (2) 87% of subjects offered incentives repeated testing about eight months after 
learning their HIV status suggest the importance of cost barriers in affecting testing decision in 
an African setting. This in turn implies that in such settings, HIV testing promotion campaigns 
should be accompanied by efforts to improve geographic access to HIV counseling and testing 
















































Home-based testing Cash-incentive 
Research Group 
Mean Acceptance Rate Confidence Interval (95%) 




























HIV Education Home-based testing Cash-incentive Control
Research Group 
Mean Testing Rate Confidence Interval (95%) 
Panel B. Testing Rate at Follow-up
Figure 1.1 HIV Testing Rate at First Round Intervention and Follow-up (By Research Group) 
Notes: Figure 1.1 shows HIV testing rate (along with error bars for the 95% confidence interval) for 
groups with different treatment status during first round randomization. Panel A summarizes HIV testing 
acceptance rate for subjects assigned to home-based testing or cash incentives treatments. Panel B 
summarizes testing rate for the four research groups based on self-reported testing status data collected 








































HIV Education Home-based testing Cash-incentive Control
Research Group 
Mean Acceptance Rate (Home-based testing)
Mean Acceptance Rate (Cash-incentive)
Confidence Interval (95%) 
Notes: Figure 1.2 shows HIV testing acceptance rate (along with error bars for the 95% confidence 
interval) during second round intervention for groups with different treatment status at first and second 
round randomization. During second round intervention, half of the households in each of the four 
research groups from first round randomization (HIV education, HIV education and home-based testing, 
HIV education and cash incentives, and control) are assigned to home-based testing while the other half 
are assigned to cash incentives treatment. 






Dependent variable equals one if 
subject reports learning her HIV 
status in the three months preceding 
first follow-up and zero otherwise  
 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3)  
 
HIV education (Edu) 0.076** 0.072** 0.072** 
 
(0.034) (0.033) (0.032)  
HIV education and home-based testing (Home) 0.635*** 0.635*** 0.639***  
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030)  
HIV education and cash incentive (Cash) 0.563*** 0.559*** 0.567***  
(0.034) (0.034) (0.033)  
Constant 0.179*** -0.067 -0.023  
(0.017) (0.136) (0.142)  
 
Controls  No Yes Yes  
Village fixed effects  No No Yes  
R-Squared 0.33 0.34 0.36  
Observations 1471  
F tests (Prob > F)  
Edu=Home  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
Edu=Cash (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
Home=Cash (0.0551) (0.0464) (0.0567)  








Notes: Table 1.1 reports intention to treat effect estimates on HIV education, home-based testing, 
and cash incentives on HIV testing. Controls include age, age-squared, sex, marital status, religion, 
education, employment status, area of residence, household asset ownership (indicators for 
ownership of land, electricity, radio, television, mobile phone, and a measure of scaled livestock 
units). Reported at the bottom of Table 1.1 are probability values from Wald tests of the equality of 
effect estimates for various pairs of treatment groups. Cluster-robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. 
Table 1.1 Intention to Treat Effect Estimates of HIV Education, Home-based Testing, and Cash 
Incentives on HIV Testing Decision at First Follow-up 
  






Table 1.2 Intention to Treat Effect Estimates of Home-based Testing and Cash Incentives on HIV Testing during Second Round Intervention 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HIV education in the FR and cash incentive in the SR (EduCash) 0.034 0.020 0.042 0.042
(0.053) (0.052) (0.056) (0.056)
Home-based testing in both rounds (HomeHome) 0.053 0.055 0.486*** 0.493*** 0.051 0.056
(0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.063) (0.059)
Home-based testing in the FR and cash incentive in the SR (HomeCash) -0.006 -0.008 0.481*** 0.493*** 0.010 0.038
(0.057) (0.056) (0.058) (0.056) (0.065) (0.060)
Cash incentive in the FR and home-based testing in the SR (CashHome) -0.004 -0.006 0.403*** 0.404*** -0.001 -0.001
(0.056) (0.054) (0.060) (0.059) (0.065) (0.058)
Cash incentive in both rounds (CashCash) 0.008 0.008 0.438*** 0.450***
(0.055) (0.054) (0.063) (0.062)
Control group in the FR and home-based testing in the SR (ControlHome) -0.005 -0.014 -0.070 -0.065
(0.052) (0.052) (0.045) (0.044)
Control group in the FR and cash incentive in the SR (ControlCash) 0.018 0.011 -0.021 -0.029
(0.049) (0.048) (0.046) (0.046)
Constant 0.754***0.680*** 0.208*** -0.029 0.531*** 0.343
(0.042) (0.144) (0.039) (0.144) (0.047) (0.272)
R-Squared 0.00 0.06 0.24 0.28 0.00 0.14
Observations 1658 1656 1471 1469 669 668
F tests (Prob. >F)
EduCash=HomeHome=HomeCash=CashHome=CashCash=ControlHome
=ControlCash (0.8393) (0.8228) (0.0000) (0.0000)
HomeHome=HomeCash=CashHome=CashCash (0.5839) (0.5456) (0.4759) (0.3969)
HomeHome=HomeCash=CashHome (0.6626) (0.6120)
subject accepts 
testing during SR 
intervention
 subject reports learning 
HIV status during first 
follow-up and accepts 
testing during SR 
intervention 
subject accepts 
testing both during 
first and SR 
intervention
Dependent variable is an indicator that takes a value of one if…
Notes: Table 1.2 reports ITT effect estimates of second round incentives on testing decision. Regression in even columns include 
village fixed effects and controls listed under Table 1.1. Reported at the bottom of Table 1.2 are probability values from Wald tests 
of the equality of effect estimates for various pairs of treatment groups. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. In the 
explanatory variable column, ‘FR’ stands for ‘first round intervention’ and ‘SR’ stands for ‘second round intervention’. * Significant 







  Dependent Variable 
Overall HIV Knowledge  Comprehensive Correct 
Knowledge 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A. Aggregate Effect 
HIV Education  0.567*** 0.577*** 0.568*** 0.524*** 0.522*** 0.516*** 
(0.053) (0.050) (0.049) (0.052) (0.049) (0.049) 
R-Squared 0.085 0.219 0.230 0.068 0.213 0.218 
Observations 1445 1466 
Panel B. Differential Effects 
HIV education (Edu) 0.562*** 0.582*** 0.569*** 0.568*** 0.591*** 0.582*** 
(0.069) (0.064) (0.064) (0.070) (0.067) (0.067) 
HIV education and 
home-based testing 
(Home) 0.533*** 0.535*** 0.531*** 0.464*** 0.444*** 0.441*** 
(0.068) (0.065) (0.064) (0.066) (0.064) (0.063) 
HIV education and cash 
incentive (Cash) 0.607*** 0.614*** 0.606*** 0.544*** 0.533*** 0.527*** 
(0.064) (0.060) (0.059) (0.065) (0.061) (0.061) 
R-Squared 0.085 0.219 0.231 0.069 0.215 0.220 
Observations 1445 1466 
Controls  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Village fixed effects  No No Yes No No Yes 
F tests (Prob > F) 
Edu=Home (0.6951) (0.5031) (0.5883) (0.1738) (0.0423) (0.0521) 
Edu=Cash (0.5282) (0.6253) (0.5692) (0.7489) (0.4113) (0.4393) 
Home=Cash (0.2911) (0.2306) (0.2512) (0.2665) (0.1831) (0.2005) 














Notes: Table 1.3 reports intention to treat (ITT) effect estimates of HIV education on overall HIV 
knowledge (Columns 1 to 3) and on comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV transmission 
mechanisms (Columns 4 to 6). The respective dependent variable is standardized by subtracting its 
control group mean and dividing by its control group standard deviation. Controls include variables 
listed under Table 1.1. Panel A reports combined effect estimates for the three treatment groups 
offered HIV education and Panel B reports effect estimates for each of the three treatment groups 
offered HIV education.  Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** 
Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. 
 




































Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
 Panel A. Aggregate Effect 
HIV education 0.275*** 0.480*** 0.307*** 0.238*** 0.166*** 
(0.038) (0.046) (0.038) (0.039) (0.033) 
R-Squared 0.096 0.190 0.059 0.115 0.151 
Observations 1445 
Breusch-Pagan test of independence (Prob.) (0.0000) 
Panel B. Differential Effects 
HIV education (Edu) 0.255*** 0.591*** 0.264*** 0.145** 0.199*** 
(0.050) (0.059) (0.049) (0.052) (0.044) 
HIV education and home-
based testing (Home) 0.250*** 0.391*** 0.304*** 0.291*** 0.146** 
(0.048) (0.061) (0.048) (0.051) (0.043) 
HIV education and cash 
incentive (Cash) 0.320*** 0.461*** 0.355*** 0.278*** 0.154*** 
(0.046) (0.058) (0.045) (0.046) (0.043) 
R-Squared 
 
0.097 0.190 0.060 0.120 0.15 
Observations 1445 
Breusch-Pagan test of independence (Prob)   (0.0000) 
Chi-square tests (Prob > chi2)  
Edu=Home (0.928) (0.003) (0.444) (0.010) (0.285) 
Edu=Cash (0.208) (0.045) (0.062) (0.011) (0.364) 
Home=Cash (0.160) (0.290) (0.286) (0.799) (0.867) 
Edu=Home=Cash (0.295) (0.010) (0.169) (0.015) (0.517) 
Table 1.4 Intention to Treat Effect Estimates of HIV Education on HIV Knowledge: 
Individual Summary Indices 
Notes: Table 1.4 reports intention to treat effect estimates of HIV education on various measures of 
HIV knowledge. Regressions in Columns 1-5 are estimated simultaneously using feasible generalized 
least squares (the two-step method). Dependent variable each column is standardized by subtracting 
its control group mean and dividing by its control group standard deviation. All regressions include 
village fixed effects and controls listed under Table 1.1. Cluster-robust standard errors are in 








Dependent variable is an indicator that takes a value of one if subject knows that … 
Abstinence reduces the chance of HIV infection  0.219*** 
(0.048) 
(R-squared = 0.044) 
Mutually monogamous relationship with an  
uninfected partner reduces the chance of HIV infection 0.113** 
(0.045 
(R-squared =0.068 ) 
Correct and consistent use of condom reduces  
the chance of HIV infection 0.246*** 
(0.043) 
(R-squared = 0.079) 
A healthy-looking person can have HIV 0.136*** 
(0.036) 
(R-squared = 0.099) 
HIV cannot be transmitted through mosquito bite 0.325*** 
(0.048) 
(R-squared = 0.089) 
HIV cannot be transmitted  by eating uncooked egg 0.467*** 
(0.062) 
(R-squared = 0.13) 
Mother to child transmission can happen during pregnancy 0.229*** 
(0.053) 
(R-squared = 0.047) 
Mother to child transmission can happen during delivery 0.265*** 
(0.049) 
(R-squared = 0.043) 
Mother to child transmission can happen during breastfeeding 0.176*** 
(0.044) 
(R-squared = 0.038) 
Breusch-Pagan test of independence (Prob.) (0.0000) 
Table 1.5  Intention to Treat Effect Estimates of HIV Education on Individual HIV Knowledge 
Measures 
Notes: Reported in each row in Table 1.5 is coefficient estimate of an indicator that takes 
a value of one if subject is assigned to either one of the three treatment groups offered 
HIV education. All regressions include village fixed effects and controls listed under 
Table 1.1. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observations is 









Dependent variable equals one if subject reports learning her HIV status in the three months 
preceding first follow-up and zero otherwise 
Married versus Single Male versus Female 
Explanatory Variable Explanatory Variable 
  HIV education (Edu) 0.094 HIV education (Edu) 0.100** 
(0.063) (0.042) 
HIV education and  
home-based testing (Home) 0.507*** 
HIV education and  
home-based testing (Home) 0.713*** 
(0.062) (0.038) 
HIV education and  
cash incentive (Cash) 0.398*** 
HIV education and  
cash  incentive (Cash) 0.617*** 
(0.068) (0.042) 
Married  -0.086* Male 0.053 
(0.045) (0.037) 
EduXMarried -0.029 EduXMale -0.051 
(0.073) (0.053) 
HomeXMarried 0.176** HomeXMale -0.137*** 
(0.070) (0.050) 
CashXMarried 0.219*** CashXMale -0.096* 
(0.076) (0.055) 
Constant 0.010 Constant -0.051 
(0.143) (0.142) 
R-Squared 0.37 R-Squared 0.37 
F tests (Prob > F ) F tests 





Notes: Table 1.6 reports effect of HIV education and incentives on testing decision by marital 
status and sex. “X” in all panels means the relevant treatment assignment indicator "interacted 
with” the respective subgroup indicator. All regression control for village fixed effects and 
covariates listed under Table 1.1. Number of observations in all Panels is 1471. Cluster-robust 
standard errors are in parentheses.  * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 
1%. 
 Table 1.6 Intention to Treat Effect Estimates of First Round Incentives on Testing 
















Dependent variable equals one if subject reports learning her HIV status in the three months 
preceding first follow-up and zero otherwise 
No Education  versus Some Education Young (18-25) versus Old 
Explanatory Variable   Explanatory Variable   
  HIV education (Edu) 0.047 HIV education (Edu) 0.094** 
(0.039) (0.040) 
HIV education and  
home-based testing (Home) 0.577*** 
HIV education and  
home-based testing (Home) 0.650*** 
(0.039) (0.035) 
HIV education and  
cash incentive (Cash) 0.483*** 
HIV education and  
cash  incentive (Cash) 0.596*** 
(0.041) (0.038) 
NoEducation -0.067** Young -0.019 
(0.034) (0.036) 
EduXNoEducation 0.075 EduXYoung -0.066 
(0.062) (0.063) 
HomeXNoEducation 0.182*** HomeXYoung -0.035 
(0.056) (0.061) 
CashXNoEducation 0.242*** CashXYoung -0.085 
(0.060) (0.065) 
Constant -0.008 Constant 0.167* 
(0.140) (0.087) 
R-Squared 0.37 R-Squared 0.37 
F tests (Prob > F ) F tests 





Notes: Table 1.7 reports effect of HIV education and incentives on testing decision by education 
level and age.  “X” in all panels means the relevant treatment assignment indicator "interacted with” 
the respective subgroup indicator. All regression control for village fixed effects and covariates 
listed under Table 1.1. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observations in 
all Panels is 1471. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.  * Significant at 10%, ** 
Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. 
Table 1.7 Intention to Treat Effect Estimates of First Round Incentives on Testing Decision: 







Marital status  Sex  
Married Single  Male Female  
Dependent Variable (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
Overall HIV Knowledge 0.580*** 0.530***  0.549*** 0.622***  
(0.057) (0.100)  (0.069) (0.073)  
 
 
Observations 1101 344  745 700  
Chow Tests (Prob > chi2 ) (0.6499)  (0.4532)  
Comprehensive Correct Knowledge 0.517*** 0.504***  0.517*** 0.578***  
(0.057) (0.104)  (0.071) (0.076)  
 
 
Observation 1116 350  760 706  
Chow Tests (Prob > chi2 ) (0.9137)  (0.5498)  
Knowledge of the “ABC” of HIV 




(0.047) (0.062)  (0.059) (0.059)  
Correct belief about HIV transmission 




(0.054) (0.097)  (0.069) (0.072)  
Knowledge of mother-to-child 




(0.042) (0.083)  (0.055) (0.059)  
Knowledge of the availability of HIV 




(0.045) (0.078)  (0.052) (0.057)  
Accepting attitude towards people with 




(0.038) (0.066)  (0.052) (0.063)  
 




Breusch-Pagan test of independence (Prob.) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  
Notes: Reported in each row of Table 1.8 are coefficient estimates of an indicator that takes a value 
of one if subject is assigned to either one of the three treatment groups offered HIV education. 
Regressions in the first two rows are from separate ordinary least squares estimation while those in 
the third row are estimated simultaneously using feasible generalized least squares (two-step 
method). Single in Column 2 refers to individuals who were not married at baseline (singles, 
separated, or widowed). All regression control for village fixed effects and covariates listed under 
Table 1.1. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 
5%, *** Significant at 1%. 
        Table 1.8  Intention to Treat Effect Estimates of HIV Education on HIV Knowledge by 








Education (Edu)  Age 
No Edu Some Edu  Young (18-25) Old 
Dependent Variable (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Overall HIV Knowledge 0.639*** 0.583***  0.544*** 0.597*** 
(0.092) (0.065)  (0.090) (0.059) 
Observations 493 952  503 942 
Chow Tests (Prob > chi2 ) (0.6117)  (0.6146) 
 
Comprehensive Correct Knowledge 0.555*** 0.522***  0.523*** 0.528*** 
(0.088) (0.065)  (0.086) (0.061) 
Observation 498 968  510 956 
Chow Tests (Prob > chi2 ) (0.7572)  (0.9649) 
 
Knowledge of the “ABC” of HIV 
prevention 0.291*** 0.253*** 
 
0.388*** 0.213*** 
(0.067) (0.049)  (0.062) (0.053) 
Correct belief about HIV transmission 
mechanisms 0.504*** 0.509*** 
 
0.404*** 0.546*** 
(0.094) (0.063)  (0.073) (0.061) 
Knowledge of mother-to-child transmission 0.183*** 0.373***  0.186** 0.366*** 
(0.066) (0.050)  (0.079) (0.043) 
Knowledge of the availability of HIV 
treatments 0.271*** 0.242*** 
 
0.274*** 0.245*** 
(0.072) (0.048)  (0.060) (0.050) 
Accepting attitude towards people with HIV 0.384*** 0.071*  0.108* 0.192*** 
(0.078) (0.042)  (0.059) (0.039) 
Observations 493 952  503 942 
Breusch-Pagan test of independence (Prob.) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Notes: Table 1.9 reports intention to treat effect estimates of HIV education by education and age. 
Reported in each row are coefficient estimates of an indicator that takes a value of one if subject is 
assigned to either one of the three treatment groups offered HIV education. Regressions in the first two 
rows are from separate ordinary least squares estimation while those in the third row are estimated 
simultaneously using feasible generalized least squares (two-step method). All regression control for 
village fixed effects and covariates listed under Table 1.1. Cluster-robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. 






Chapter 2 . Does HIV Testing Affect Infection Expectations and Sexual Behavior? 
Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial in Ethiopia32 
2.1 Introduction 
 Voluntary HIV counseling and testing is an integral part of the global response to the 
AIDS epidemic, and is considered as an important element of an effective HIV prevention and 
control strategy (WHO 2003, Alagiri et al. 2001). With the scaling up of antiretroviral treatment 
and advent of Rapid testing kits, alternative HIV testing service delivery methods are being 
promoted to increase access to testing and counseling services. With support from the donor 
community, many highly-impacted resource-poor countries have launched major HIV promotion 
campaigns and are offering testing free of charge (De Cock 2006).33 
 An important assumption about HIV/AIDS- related development interventions in general 
and HIV testing in particular is that testing will lead to declines in risky sexual behavior and 
subsequent HIV infection (World Bank, 2011). The link between testing and sexual behavior can 
be conceptualized within the standard theory of decision making under uncertainty (Willson 
2008, Mechoulan 2007). In this framework, the optimal level of risky behavior is determined by 
the tradeoff between perceived benefits and expected cost of risky sexual behavior. In addition, 
testing can affect risky behavior if subjects update their prior belief of HIV infection upon 
learning their HIV infection status and act on it.   
                                                 
32
  This essay is written jointly with Hyuncheol Kim (Economics Department, Columbia University) and Taewha 
Lee (College of Nursing, Yonsei University).  
33
 For example the government of South Africa, a country with one of the highest HIV prevalence rate in the world, 
launched a major campaign in April 2010 with an overarching goal to “...mobilise all South Africans to get tested 





 Theoretically, the effect of testing on high-risk sexual behavior is indeterminate a priori. 
Boozer and Philpson (2000) hypothesize that testing affects sexual behavior if it is informative 
and if sexual behavior is information elastic. They predict that testing will have a significant 
behavioral consequence for negative testers with high prior belief of HIV infection and for 
positive testers with low prior belief of HIV infection. Learning an HIV-negative test result can 
encourage safe sexual behavior if it results in a downward revision of (own and partners') chance 
of HIV infection thereby increasing expected longevity. It can also make testers, especially those 
with a history of high-risk sexual encounters, downplay the risk of HIV infection and can 
increase the incentive for high-risk (and high-utility) sexual behavior (Delavande and Kohler 
2009). For HIV-positive testers who revise their HIV infection expectation upwards after 
learning their HIV status, effect on high-risk sexual behavior can be negative (for altruistic 
testers) or positive (for self-interested testers). De Paula et al. (2011:12) notes that “...if one is 
already infected, sexual behavior poses no further risks while still providing utility.” 
 The empirical evidence on the effect of testing on sexual behavior is mixed and, for 
negative testers, mostly inconsequential and sometimes even unintended. In one of the earliest 
randomized controlled trials, Coates (2000) finds that learning an HIV-positive result reduces the 
incidence of unprotected sex with non-primary and primary (for men) partners. Using 
experimental data from Malawi, Thornton (2008) finds a higher likelihood of condom purchase 
for positive testers who learned their test result than for those who did not and an insignificant 
effect of testing on condom purchase for negative testers and for sexually inactive testers. 
  Delavande and Kohler (2009) find a higher incidence of condom use and reduced 





those who did not. In another randomized trial in Malawi, Gong (2010) finds that testing 
increases (decreases) the chance of contracting a sexually transmitted infection for HIV-positive 
(negative) testers with low (high) prior belief of HIV infection expectation. Simulation results in 
this study suggest an unintended consequence of testing with a net 26% increase in HIV 
infection rate with testing than without testing. 
 The evidence on the effect of testing on high-risk sexual behavior based on observational 
studies is also mixed with some (Corbett et al. 2007, Matovu et al. 2005) finding insignificant 
effect and others (Bunnell et al. 2008, Arthur et al. 2007) finding a negative effect.34 An 
unintended positive association between testing and high-risk sexual behavior is reported in a 
cohort study in Zimbabwe (Sherr et al. 2007) and in a life history study in Kenya (Kabiru et al. 
2010). The former study found that testing reduced (increased) number of sexual partners 
(condom use) for positive testers and increased the incidence of multiple concurrent sexual 
partnerships for negative testers. The latter study found a higher incidence of unprotected sex 
and intercourse with non-primary partners (for never-pregnant females) and an increase in 
concurrency of sexual partners (for males) testers within the six months after learning their 
status. Statistical inference in these latter groups of observational studies may be prone to 
selection bias due to potential omitted variables, however.   
 In this essay, we estimate the short- and medium-term causal effects of testing on HIV 
infection expectations and sexual behavior. The empirical evidence in this essay is based on 
experimental data described in the first essay in detail. As part of the experiment, we offered 
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randomly selected study participants two rounds of home-based HIV counseling and testing and 
conditional cash transfer to encourage them to learn their HIV infection status. We conducted 
two follow-up interviews around three and eight months after intervention and gathered various 
self-reported measures of sexual behavior. We offered subjects up to ten pieces of free male 
condoms during each follow-up visit to get an indirect measure of the demand for protected sex.  
 To estimate the effect of testing on expectations and sexual behavior, we employed a 
number of strategies. First, we employed intentions to treat (ITT) technique. Since treatment was 
randomly assigned, ITT effects have a casual interpretation and they tell us the effect of offer of 
a particular treatment. However, if many subjects offered treatments decline the offer, ITT effect 
can be small relative to the average causal effect on those who accepted the offer. Thus, our 
second identification strategy involved instrumental variables (IV) method where we 
instrumented HIV testing decision with treatment assignment indicator to estimate the effect of 
treatment on the treated.  
 When behavioral responses to testing depend on actual test result, as has been reported in 
the after mentioned empirical studies, ITT and IV estimates will be prone to confounding bias 
and may be misleading to the average tester. To examine potential treatment effect heterogeneity 
by HIV test result, therefore, our third identification strategy involved Difference-in-Differences 
technique where we exploited two rounds of treatment assignment and HIV testing data. 
Specifically, we estimated the effect of learning a HIV-positive (HIV-negative) test result by 
comparing outcomes for first round HIV-positive (HIV-negative) testers in the home-based 





control group and who eventually tested HIV-positive (HIV-negative) during second round 
intervention. 
 We find that learning an HIV-negative result has insignificant effect on HIV infection 
expectation both in the short- and medium-term. For HIV-positive testers, while testing increases 
infection expectation in the short-term, this effect tends to dissipate over time. Both ITT and IV 
estimates suggest a positive causal effect on the likelihood of having multiple sexual partnerships 
and sex with a non-primary partner (high-risk behavior).  When we analyze treatment effect by 
HIV test result, we find an insignificant (negative) effect of testing on high-risk behavior 
(incidence of sex with a non-primary partner) for HIV-negative (HIV-positive) testers in the 
short-term.   We did not find a significant effect of testing on self-reported condom use as well as 
on uptake of free male condoms both in the short- and medium-term, except for a negative effect 
for home-based negative testers in the short-term. Surprisingly enough, we found some evidence 
of high-risk sexual behavior among subjects we were offered incentives but did not receive 
testing. This essay contributes to the small but growing empirical literature on the causal effect 
of testing on HIV infection expectations and subsequent sexual behavior. 
 The remainder of the essay is organized as follows: Section 2.2 summarizes experimental 
data used in the empirical analysis. Section 2.3 presents statistical models. Section 2.4 discusses 
regression results and Section 2.5 concludes the essay. 
2.2 Data   
 As discussed in detail in the first essay, we randomly assigned one group of study 
households to HIV education treatment (hereon “G1”), a second group to HIV education and 





incentives to a facility-based testing treatment (hereon “G3”), and a fourth group to a no-
treatment (hereon “G4”) during first round intervention in April 2010. For the second round 
intervention (December 2010 - January 2011), we randomly assigned half of the study 
households in each of these four research groups to home-based testing treatment and the other 
half to cash incentives treatment.  
 We offered subjects in G3 cash incentives to compensate the cost of round transportation 
and a day of lost farm wage due to a trip to the local testing clinic. We handed out coupons to 
eligible subjects in different villages that were worth 2.7 U.S. dollars, 2 dollars, and 1.5 dollars 
during first intervention and 2.9, 2.5, and 1.8 dollars during second intervention.35 The amount of 
cash incentives depended on (odometer) distance between subject's village and the village in 
which the assigned testing clinic is located. Two follow-up surveys were conducted around three 
and month after first intervention and subjects were offered up to ten pieces of free male 
condoms per follow-up visit to get an indirect measure of demand for protected sex. 
 Table 2.1 (Panel A) shows that around 63% of subjects offered incentives during first 
intervention (65% in G2 and 61% in G3) learned their HIV status. Based on self-reported testing 
status data collected during first follow-up interview, around 44% of subjects who completed the 
interview (25% in G1, 82% in G2, 74% in G3, and 18% in G4) reported learning their HIV status 
in the three months preceding interview date (Table 2.1, Panel B). Around 77% of subjects 
assigned to home-based testing or cash incentives group during second round intervention 
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accepted HIV testing (Table 2.1, Panel C). Seven first round home-based testers and 17 second 
round testers (nine home-based and eight facility-based) learned an HIV-positive result. 
 Although we do not have baseline data on prior of HIV infection, subjects were asked the 
following question at baseline: “Given your sexual behavior in the past, how safe do you think 
have your sexual encounters been?” Around 63% and 28% of respondents who were (ever) 
sexually active at baseline reported “Very safe” and “Somewhat safe” sexual encounters, 
respectively.36 Also, less than 1% thought their sexual encounters to have been “Somewhat 
unsafe” or “Very unsafe” (Table 2.2, Panel A, Column 1). As would be expected from a random 
assignment, there is no significant variation in the distribution of responses across groups with 
different treatment status (Table 2.2, Panel A, Columns 2-5).  
 When asked “Do you think your chance of being exposed to HIV is high, small, or 
none?” during first follow-up, 65% thought zero chance of infection while 28% and 5% thought 
a small and high chance of infection, respectively (Table 2.2, Panel B, Column 1).37 A summary 
of changes in HIV infection expectations between first and second follow-up shows that 
expectations did not change for 53% of the respondents while it declined (increased) for 22% 
(25%) (Table 2.2, Panel C, Column 1).38  In this essay, HIV infection expectation is said to have 
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increased between the two follow-ups if response to the aforementioned question changes from 
“None” to either “Small” or “High” OR from “Small” to “High.” HIV infection expectation is 
said to have declined between follow-ups if response to the same question changes from “High” 
to either “Small” or “None” OR from “Small” to “None.” 
 Figure 2.1 summarizes HIV infection expectations at first follow-up for a sub-sample of 
individuals initially assigned to home-based testing or cash incentives treatment and whose 
testing status was known by the time first round HIV infection expectations data was collected.39 
All (seven) home-based positive testers, 2% of negative testers, and 5.5% of non-testers reported 
a “High” chance of HIV infection at first follow-up. The overwhelming majority of negative 
testers (96%) and non-testers (92%) thought a zero or small chance of infection while around 2% 
of negative testers and non-testers did not know their chance of infection (Figure 2.1, Panel A). 
Figure 2.2 depicts a decline in HIV infection expectations between the two rounds for 80%, 19%, 
and 28% of the HIV-positive testers, HIV-negative testers, and non-testers, respectively, while 
infection expectation remained the same for 20% of HIV-positive testers, 57% of HIV-negative 
testers, and 47% of the non-testers. Infection expectation increased for 23% and 25% of negative 
testers and non-testers, respectively. 
 Considering the fact that unprotected sexual intercourse with an infected partner is the 
main mode of HIV transmission in the study area, subjects who have unprotected sex with 
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multiple partners are, all else equal, faced with a higher risk of HIV infection. To examine the 
effect of testing on high-risk sexual behavior, therefore, we collected various measures of (high-
risk) sexual behavior during each follow-up survey. Our outcome measures include whether 
subject was sexually active, had more than one sexual partner, had sex with a non-primary 
partner, reported using condom, and collected free condom. The reference period for the first 
three outcomes is the three months prior the respective follow-up interview. Condom use at first 
follow-up refers to whether the respondent used condom (either all the time or sometimes) in the 
preceding three months. Condom use at second follow-up refers to whether subject used condom 
during last sexual intercourse. In this essay, a respondent is said to have a non-primary sexual 
partner if she reported having sex with someone who was not her spouse, cohabiting partner, or 
boyfriend (live-in or otherwise).  
 A summary of data about participants’ sexual behavior is shown in Table 2.3. Around 
77% reported being sexually active at each follow-up interview. While 1.5% and 1.9% of 
respondents reported sex with multiple partners and a non-primary partner at first follow-up, 
respectively, 1% reported sex with multiple partners at second follow-up. Finally, while 5% and 
10% reported using condom, 42% and 34% collected at least one free male condom at first and 
second follow-up, respectively, with the average number of condoms collected being around 
seven during each follow-up interview. 
2.3 Statistical Models   
 In this section, we outline the different statistical models used to estimate effects of HIV 





2.3.1 Intention to Treat Method 
 First, we employ intention to treat (ITT) analysis and compare post-treatment outcomes 
of all randomized subjects with different treatment status, irrespective of their actual testing 
status. When treatment assignment is random and outcomes of a subject are unrelated to 
treatment status of other subjects, ITT analysis provides an unbiased estimate of the overall 
causal effect of treatment assignment (Jo 2002). To proceed with the ITT analysis, we specify 
the reduced form statistical model in equation 2.3.1. 
    			
 	   !    " 								 2.3.1 
where  indexes individual, 
 = 1 if individual is assigned to HIV education treatment, 
 = 1 if individual is assigned to HIV education and home-based testing treatment,  ! = 
1 if individual is assigned to HIV education and cash incentive treatment, 	 is a vector of 
observable baseline characteristics (age, age squared, sex, marital status, religion, schooling, 
employment status, area of residence, and household asset ownership: electricity, radio, 
television, mobile phone, land, and livestock) and village fixed effects, " is a random error term, 
and control group is the omitted category. 
 When  is an indicator for a self-reported measure of sexual behavior, we estimate 
equation 2.3.1 through ordinary least squares. When  is a multiple-outcome measure of HIV 
infection expectation (zero, small, and high or increased, unchanged, and reduced infection 
expectations), we estimate equation 2.3.1 through maximum-likelihood ordered logit.40 For ease 
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of interpretation, we also estimate effect of testing on infection expectation as well as the effect 
of testing on change in infection expectation between follow-ups by fitting equation 2.3.1 
through ordinary least squares estimator. When we estimate short-term effect of testing,  equals 
negative 1 if response to the aforementioned HIV infection expectations question is “None”, zero 
if response to the same question is “Small”, and one if response to the same question is “High”. 
When estimating effects on change in HIV infection expectations, the value of   ranges from 
negative two to two.  When 	 measures uptake of free male condoms, we estimate equation 
2.3.1 through maximum-likelihood two-way censored Tobit. Tobit estimator accounts for the 
existence of a lower (at zero) and upper (at ten) bound on the value of the dependent variable and 
produces unbiased and consistent estimates (Green, 1981). We report both Tobit coefficient 
estimates and marginal effects on the unconditional expected value for	.  
2.3.2 Instrumental Variables Method 
 Parameter estimates from equation 2.3.1 (	67 67 89:		61		tell us the causal effect of 
offer of the respective treatment on  and, as such, they do not represent the effect of getting 
tested. In addition, and as discussion in the first essay, a relatively large number of subjects 
assigned to the three treatments in general and to HIV education treatment in particular did not 
learn their HIV status during first round intervention. Therefore, the second strategy we employ 
to estimate the effect of testing on sexual behavior is instrumental variables (IV) method where 
we use randomly assigned treatment status as an instrumental variable for actual testing status. 
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The instrumental variables method solves non-compliance problem in randomized trials and 
produces treatment effect estimates for subjects who comply with the offer but are not treated 
otherwise (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Formally, we estimate the statistical model in equation 
2.3.2 using two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator.  
     		  " 								 2.3.2 
where  is an endogenous (dummy) variable that equals one if subject learned HIV status 
and zero if otherwise. Other variables are as defined earlier. Using the index function model, we 
can model testing decision as shown in equation 2.3.3   
 ;   	<		' 	=							 2.3.3 
where ; is the latent variable with an observable counterpart  such that: 
   >?		@	
; 	5 ?		A		@	; 	B ?	 2.3.4 
where ' is treatment assignment indicator that equals one if subject is assigned to treatment 
and zero if subject is assigned to control group. Under the assumption that: (1) ' appears 
only in participation equation 2.3.3 and not in outcome equation 2.3.2 and, (2) covariance 
[', =] = covariance [', "] = covariance [, "] = 0 and covariance [', C 	D  
0, 2SLS estimation of equation 2.3.2 yields consistent estimates of (7 ) (Cameron and Trivedi 
2005).41  
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2.3.3 Difference-in-Differences Method 
 To examine potential heterogeneity in the distribution of  based on actual test result, we 
use data from two rounds of interventions and employ Difference-in-Differences (DD) strategy. 
On assumption that outcomes for first round HIV-positive (HIV-negative) testers in home-based 
or cash incentives group would not be systematically different from outcomes of subjects in the 
control group who eventually tested HIV-positive (HIV-negative) in the absence of our 
intervention, we specify the double-differencing model in equation 2.3.5. 
 
      E 	E	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where   indexes individual,  , 	, , and  ! are as defined before, 	FGHIJ = 1 if: (1) 
subject is initially assigned to home-based (G2) or cash incentives (G3) group and tested HIV-
positive during first intervention or (2) subject is initially assigned to control group (G4) and 
eventually tested positive during second intervention and zero otherwise, 	FGKLM = 1 if: (1) 
subject is initially assigned to either G2 or G3 and tested HIV-negative during first intervention 
or (2) subject is initially assigned to G4 and eventually tested HIV-negative during second round 
intervention and zero otherwise. 	NFGHIJ is an interaction term between 	FGHIJ	and 
, 	NFGKLM	is an interaction term between 	FGKLM	and , 	 !NFGHIJ is an 





	FGKLM	and  !,  is a random error term, and control group and non-testers are the two 
omitted categories.42  
 The specification in equation 2.3.5 will allow us to analyze the effect of learning an HIV-
negative result for home-based testers and facility-based testers separately. Such separate 
analysis is necessary to explore possible interactions between the type of incentive (home-based 
testing versus conditional cash transfer), testing decision, and subsequent behavioral responses. 
We estimate equation 2.3.5 using ordinary least squares or maximum likelihood depending on 
the outcome variable of interest. 
 Coefficient estimate EQ% captures the effect of learning an HIV-positive result on   for 
first round home-based testers. Estimates  EQ& and  EQ)  capture the effect on  of learning an HIV- 
negative test result for home-based and facility-based testers, respectively. Since data on  was 
collected before second round intervention, we would not expect  EQ and  EQ$  (which captures the 
“effect” on   of being an eventual HIV-positive and HIV-negative tester in the control group, 
respectively) to be significant. Standard error estimates from all regressions in this essay are 
adjusted using Huber-White correction and are clustered at household level to account for 
potential intra-household error correlation of an unknown form. 
 A few notes about data we used for the empirical analysis. First, statistical inference 
based on equation 2.3.5 can be difficult due to the small number of positive testers and attrition.43 
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Second, due to overlapping treatments, estimates of behavioral response to testing can be over- 
or under-estimated depending on the interaction between HIV education, testing, and sexual 
behavior. For example, if HIV education (about condom use) and learning an HIV-positive result 
both have a positive effect on condom use, EQ% can overestimate the effect on condom use of 
learning an HIV-positive test result for positive testers who also received HIV education. On the 
other hand, if learning an HIV-positive test result increases condom use but HIV education 
(about availability of HIV/AIDS medications) makes subjects perceive HIV as less of a deadly 
virus, EQ% can underestimate the effect of learning a positive test result on condom use. 
 Third, expectations data may be prone to measurement error, especially considering the 
setting under which the study is conducted. Subjects may intentionally under-report their risk of 
HIV infection if there is stigma against people with HIV, something that is documented in the 
first essay, or against those who report high chance of HIV infection. Also, infection 
expectations by subjects with no formal education and limited access to health information 
through the mass media may not accurately reflect actual risk level due either to limited access to 
all the relevant information or inability to effectively process available information. With 
incorrectly measured subjective outcome variables and correlation between measurement error 
and regressors, parameter estimates can be biased (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001).  
 For example, around 50%  and 30%  of second round HIV-positive testers thought “Very 
safe” and “Somewhat safe” sexual encounters while 22% did not even know how “Safe” their 
sexual encounters have been at baseline. Also, for a sub-sample of second round HIV-positive 





50% and 33% thought their risk of HIV infection to be “None” and “Small”, respectively, while 
one subject did not know her chance of HIV infection at first follow-up.  
 Fourth, self-reported measures of sexual behavior and HIV testing status (at first follow-
up) may be prone to “social desirability” bias (Geary et al. 2003, Plummer et al. 2006). Subjects 
may under-report socially unacceptable behavior (such as sex with a non-primary partner) and 
over-report socially acceptable behavior (such as HIV testing) and such bias can be particularly 
important in culturally and socially conservative communities. In a study in Zambia, Allen et al. 
(2003) find sperm in 15% of the cases where female subject did not report unprotected sex and a 
2% (2.6%) pregnancy rate (HIV seroconversion) among subjects who reported no unprotected 
sex. Although we were not able to assess the validity of most of the self-reported measures of 
sexual behavior, we attempted to verify self-reported condom use using data on uptake of free 
condoms we offered study participants.44  Interpretation of results in this essay should therefore 
be made with all these caveats in mind. 
2.4 Empirical Results 
2.4.1 Short-term Effects of HIV Testing   
 If individuals who learned their HIV status revise their prior of HIV infection, testing 
would be a good predictor of changes in infection expectations. In this section, we first present 
estimation results on the effect of testing on HIV infection expectation three months after 
learning one’s HIV status. Reduced form estimates for groups with different treatment status 
(and testing rates) show statistically insignificant effect on HIV infection expectations (Table 
2.4, Panel A). In terms of magnitude, however, while subjects in the cash incentive group (in 
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which all testers learned an HIV-negative result) tend to be more likely to report a small chance 
of infection, those in the HIV education and home-based testing group (in which 3% tested 
positive) are less likely to report a small chance of HIV infection. A similar (and stronger) effect 
is found based on ordinary least squares estimation of equation 2.3.1 (Appendix B, Table B1, 
Columns 1-2).  
 Comparison of infection expectations based on actual HIV testing status shows that 
testers who learned an HIV-positive result three months prior are more likely to report high (as 
opposed to zero or small) chance of HIV infection than eventual HIV-positive testers in the 
control group (Table 2.4, Panel B and Table B2, Columns 1-2).  For example, HIV infection 
expectation for HIV-positive testers was, on average, 1.5% higher than subjects in the control 
group who eventually tested HIV-positive.45 This effect is robust to inclusion of a number of 
baseline covariates and village fixed effects (Table B2, Columns 1-2). As depicted in Figure 2.1, 
all of the HIV-positive testers reported “High” chance of HIV infection when asked their belief 
of HIV infection three months after they learned their HIV status. It is worth noting that this 
finding for HIV-positive testers is based on a relatively small number of observations, however.  
 With regard to the short-term effect of testing on sexual behavior, intention to treat (ITT) 
effect estimates show insignificant effects on the likelihood of abstinence, condom use, as well 
as collecting free condoms (Table 2.5, Columns 2, 8 and 10). We find that subjects in the three 
treatment groups were likely to report multiple sexual partners and sex with a non-primary 
sexual partner (high-risk behavior) during the reference period. These effects, especially the 
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latter one, are robust to the inclusion of village fixed effects and a number of individual 
characteristics measured at the beginning of the experiment. As mentioned in Section 2.3.2, ITT 
effect estimates are based on comparison of individuals on the basis of randomly assigned 
treatment status and as such do not tell us the causal effect on sexual behavior for individuals 
who actually learned their HIV test status.   
 Table 2.6  reports 2SLS results on the average effect of testing on sexual behavior. As 
would be expected, local average treatment effect estimates are (marginally) higher than the 
corresponding ITT effect estimates. Two-stage least squares estimates suggest a significant 
positive effect on the incidence of multiple sexual partnerships and sex with a non-primary 
partner for all testers (Table 2.6, Panel A) as well as for testers in each of the three treatment 
group: HIV education (Table 2.6, Panel B), HIV education and home-based testing (Table 2.6, 
Panel C), and HIV education and cash incentives (Table 2.6, Panel D). For example, testers in 
home-based testing (cash incentives) group were about 3% and 4% (3% and 6%) more likely to 
report having multiple sexual partners and sex with a non-primary partner, respectively, than 
those in the control group. Effect estimates in Panel B are imprecisely estimated due to the 
relatively small number of testers in the HIV education treatment group.     
 As mentioned discussion earlier, when behavioral responses to testing depend test results 
(as theorized by Boozer and Philpson 2000 and Delavande and Kohler 2009 for example), ITT 
and IV estimates can hide potential heterogeneity in behavioral response and can be misleading 
to the average tester. In our case, although ITT and IV estimates for testers in the cash incentives 
group (G3) can be interpreted as the effect of learning an HIV-negative result, the fact that the 





estimates even for subjects G3.46 Difference-in-Differences estimation results reported in Table 
2.7 show insignificant effect on the likelihood of abstinence, multiple sexual partnerships, and 
condom use both for HIV-negative and HIV-positive testers, with imprecisely estimated 
parameters for the latter group.  
 Difference-in-Differences estimates suggest a reduction in the likelihood of sex with a 
non-primary partner for HIV-positive testers by around 4% (significant at the 5% level) (Table 
2.7, Column 5). This effect becomes only marginally significant (at the 10% level) when 
controlling for baseline covariates and village fixed effects (Table 2.7, Column 6). When the 
main mode of HIV transmission is unprotected sex with an infected partner, subjects who use 
condom correctly and consistently are, all else equal, less likely to be exposed to sexually 
transmitted infections (including HIV) than those who do not. Analysis of the effect of testing on 
uptake of free condoms at first round follow-up shows that home-based testers who learned an 
HIV-negative result are about 20% less likely to receive free condom than eventual HIV-
negative testers in the control group (Table 2.7, Columns 9-10).   
 Marginal effect estimates after Tobit regression show that home-based HIV-negative 
testers collected 1.3 fewer free condoms, on average. Effect of learning an HIV-negative result 
on condom uptake is also negative for facility-based testers but is no more significant. Although 
Tobit regression results show a positive effect of learning an HIV-positive result on condom 
uptake, effect is not significant (Tables 2.12, Column 2). In a randomized controlled trial in 
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 Note that all first round testers in the cash incentives group learned an HIV-negative test result while 3% of testers 





Malawi, Thornton (2008) found a higher likelihood of condom purchase for positive testers and 
insignificant effect for negative testers.  
 Surprisingly enough, DD estimates show that subjects assigned to home-based testing or 
cash-incentives group but did not volunteer for HIV testing are more likely to report sex with a 
non-primary partner (significant at the 5% level) (Table 2.7, Columns 5-6). Non-testers in the 
home-based group are also more likely to receive free condoms and receive one more condom on 
average (Table 3.12) than eventual non-testers in the control group.  This ‘effect’ for non-testers 
might suggest that test refusal, either through outright refusal, by disappearing during scheduled 
appointment or by failing to show up at a testing clinic, itself might have caused a behavioral 
change.47 It is also interesting to note that although effect was not statistically significant,  non-
testers, like HIV-positive testers, were more likely to report “High” chance of HIV infection at 
first follow-up (Table 2.4, Column 3). Marginal effect estimates on expectation are not 
significant for non-testers, however.  
 To summarize, while subjects who learned an HIV-positive result tend to revise their 
prior belief of HIV infection upwards in the short-term, learning an HIV-negative result does not 
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 Of the 997 individuals assigned to HIV education treatment (G1), HIV education and home-based testing 
treatment (G2), or HIV education and cash incentives treatment (G3) during first round intervention, 152 (15%) did 
not receive HIV education. While outright refusal was the reason for not receiving HIV education for 14% of the 
cases (22 subjects), members of our research team were not able to contact 130 individuals for such reasons as 
subjects not found at home in three visits (21%), subjects being reported to have been away for an extended period 
of time by a family member (16%), and young respondents being temporarily relocated to nearby towns to attend 
high school (20%). Of the 287 subjects assigned to HIV education and home-based testing treatment and who 
received HIV education, around 23% did not volunteer for home-based testing. Of the 280 subjects assigned to HIV 
education and cash incentives treatment and who received HIV education, 28% did not learn their HIV status either 
because they refused to accept a coupon during a home visit by HIV educators or because they did not visit assigned 
testing facility. Of the 341 individuals in G2 who completed first round follow-up interview, 16% are never-
contacted non-testers while close to 20% are non-testers who received HIV education. Of the 328 individuals in G3 
who completed first round follow-up interview, 15% are never-contacted non-testers while 24% are non-testers who 





seem to cause a significant effect on HIV infection expectations. Also, learning one’s HIV status 
does not seem to have a significant effect on most of our measures of sexual behavior, except for 
a negative short-term effect on the incidence of sex with a non-primary partner (for HIV-positive 
testers) and on uptake of free condoms (for home-based HIV-negative testers).  
 Finally, the finding that test refusal increases the likelihood of sex with a non-primary 
partner is puzzling. Previous empirical findings documented that testing either: (1) causes 
appropriate health-seeking sexual behavioral change, or (2) has insignificant effect on sexual 
behavior, or (3) has “unintended” consequence and increases high-risk sexual behavior. Our 
finding of a high-risk behavior for non-testers deserves further research to get a better insight of 
potential transmission mechanisms. 
2.4.2 Medium-term Effects of HIV Testing 
 In this section, we present regression results on the effects of testing on HIV infection 
expectations and sexual behavior using data collected around eight months after testing. 
Difference-in-Differences estimates do not reinforce the significant positive effect that learning 
of an HIV-positive result has on infection expectations in the short-term. If anything, positive 
testers appear to be more likely to report “Small” chance of HIV infection (27%, significant at 
the 1% level) than eventual positive testers in the control group (Table 2.7, Panel B, Column 2). 
Ordinary least squares results suggest a positive but insignificant association between learning an 
HIV-positive result and infection expectation in the medium term (Table B2, Appendix B). 
 Although effect is not statistically significant, analysis of the effect of testing on change 
in infection expectations between the follow-ups suggests a downward revision of infection 





revising her infection expectations downwards between the two follow-ups is 0.15 (-0.08) for 
positive (negative) testers (Table 2.8, Panel B). Least squares estimates, where we measure 
change in infection expectation using a continuous outcome variable that takes values [-2, 2], 
also suggest a downward revision of risk of HIV infection on the part of positive testers (Table 
B2, Appendix B). This trend for HIV-positive testers can also be visualized from Figure 2.2.  
 This change in infection expectation for positive testers may suggest that, perhaps, the 
shock to expectation formation of learning an HIV-positive result dissipated over time. In a study 
in Malawi, Delavande and Kohler (2009) also found that 70% of subjects who learned an HIV-
positive result two years prior reported “no likelihood” or “low likelihood” of being infected 
with HIV. They argued that such behavior by positive testers might be explained by subjects, 
especially those who continued to feel healthy, “forgetting” about the test result over time. 
 With regard to medium-term effects, ITT, IV, as well as DD estimates show insignificant 
effect of testing on the likelihood of abstinence, multiple sexual partnership, and condom use 
during last intercourse (Tables 2.9 and 2.10).48 Tobit regression results suggest a negative and 
significant (positive and insignificant) effect of learning an HIV-positive (HIV-negative) result 
on uptake of free male condoms at second follow-up (Table 2.12). Reduced demand for 
protected sex and HIV infection expectation for positive testers may be consistent with 
Delavande and Kohler’s (2009) explanation of HIV-positive testers “forgetting” test results.  
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 Note that identification of the medium-term effect of learning an HIV-positive result on HIV infection 
expectations is based on ten positive testers - five first round home-based testers and five eventual control group 
testers. Identification of the effect of learning an HIV-positive result on changes in infection expectations is based 
on nine positive testers - five first round home-based testers and four eventual control group testers. Also, 
identification of the medium term effect of learning an HIV-positive result on sexual behavior is based on 11 






 Finally, it is interesting to note that subjects in the control group who eventually learned 
an HIV-positive result were more likely to be sexually active in the three months preceding 
testing (significant at the 1% level) (Table 2.9, Panel B, Columns 1-2). In addition, eventual 
positive testers were less likely to report having used condom during last sexual intercourse 
(marginally significant) than eventual non-testers (Table 2.9, Panel B, Columns 5-6).  
2.5 Conclusion  
 Voluntary HIV counseling and testing is as an integral part of the global response to the 
AIDS epidemic and is considered as an essential element of an effective HIV control, prevention, 
and treatment strategy. Although testing necessarily paves the way for HIV treatment for positive 
testers, the HIV preventive role of testing hinges on the presumption that knowledge of one's 
HIV infection status causes testers to update their prior belief of HIV infection and adopt safe 
sexual practices.  In this essay, we provided empirical evidence on the causal effect of testing on 
HIV infection expectations and sexual behavior around three and eight months after testing 
based on primary data from Ethiopia.  We found that learning an HIV-negative result has 
insignificant effect on HIV infection expectations both in the short- and medium-term while 
receiving an HIV-positive result increases infection expectations in the short-term, although 
effect tends to dissipates over time.   
 With regard to the effect of testing on sexual behavior, intention to treat analysis 
suggested an increase in the incidence of multiple sexual partnerships and sex with a non-
primary partner (high-risk behavior) in the short-term for subjects offered incentives (home-
based testing or conditional cash transfer) to encourage them to learn their HIV status. Our 





behavior for negative testers. For positive testers, we found a negative (and marginally 
significant) effect on the likelihood of sex with a non-primary partner. We found a higher 
likelihood of sex with a non-primary sexual partner among subjects offered incentives but did 
not learn their. This “effect” for non-testers is puzzling and merits further research to better 
under the link between test refusal and subsequent sexual behavior. 
 Lastly, we found that testing had generally an insignificant effect on self-reported 
condom use and uptake of free condoms both in the short- and medium-term, except for a 
negative effect for home-based negative testers in the short-term. By and large, our findings do 
not suggest that testing causes subjects to revise their prior belief of HIV infection (in a sustained 
manner) or that it induces appropriate health-seeking (sexual) behavior, especially for negative 
testers. These findings should be interpreted in light of several limitations discussed in Section 




















Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A. First Round Intervention (March - April, 2010) 
Accepted HIV testing 0.629 0.645 0.613 
(0.483) (0.479) (0.488) 
Observations 669 341 328 
Accepted HIV testing 
(conditional on receiving 
HIV education) 
0.743 0.767 0.718 
(0.438) (0.424) (0.451) 
Observations 567 287 280 
Panel B. First Round Follow-up (June - July, 2010) 
Reported to have learned 
HIV status in the three 
months prior first follow-
up 
0.441 0.255 0.815 0.742 0.179 
(0.497) (0.437) (0.389) (0.438) (0.384) 
Observations 1471 294 308 295 574 
Tested HIV positive 
Number 7 7 0 
Percentage 0.0166 0.0318 (0) 
(0.128) (0.176) 
Observations 669 341 328 
Panel C. Second Round Intervention (December 2010 - January 2011) 
Accepted HIV testing 0.766 0.771 0.780 0.756 0.761 
(0.424) (0.421) (0.415) (0.430) (0.427) 
Observations 1658 328 341 328 661 
Tested HIV positive 
Number 17 5 5 1 6 
Percentage 0.0134 0.0198 0.0188 0.00403 0.0119 
  (0.115) (0.139) (0.136) (0.0635) (0.109) 
Notes: Panel A summarizes testing acceptance during first round intervention when two groups are 
offered home-based testing or cash incentives. Panel B summarizes self-reported testing status in the 
three months preceding first follow-up. Panel C summarizes testing acceptance rate during second 
intervention. Reported are means and standard deviations (in parenthesis). 




















Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A. Prior Belief of Riskiness of Sexual Encounters  at Baseline 
Given your sexual behavior 
in the past, how safe do you 
think have your sexual 
encounters been? 
Very safe 0.628 0.610 0.627 0.627 0.637 
(0.484) (0.489) (0.484) (0.484) (0.481) 
Somewhat safe 0.281 0.278 0.278 0.308 0.270 
(0.450) (0.449) (0.449) (0.463) (0.444) 
Somewhat unsafe 0.009 0.0116 0.0114 0.002 0.008 
(0.092) (0.107) (0.106) (0.062) (0.090) 
Very unsafe 0.002 0 0 0 0.004 
(0.0395) (0) (0) (0) (0.063) 
Do not know 0.0812 0.100 0.0837 0.0608 0.081 
(0.273) (0.301) (0.277) (0.239) (0.273) 
Observations 1281 259 263 263 496 
Panel B. HIV Infection Expectations at First and Second Follow-up 
Do you think your chance 
of being exposed to HIV is 
high, small, or none?  
 
None 
First Follow-up 0.651 0.619 0.653 0.666 0.658 
(0.477) (0.486) (0.477) (0.473) (0.475) 
Second Follow-up 0.601 0.560 0.634 0.586 0.612 
(0.490) (0.497) (0.483) (0.493) (0.488) 
Small 
First Follow-up 0.283 0.316 0.266 0.290 0.271 
(0.450) (0.466) (0.443) (0.455) (0.445) 
Second Follow-up 0.293 0.301 0.260 0.312 0.295 
(0.455) (0.460) (0.439) (0.464) (0.456) 
High 
First Follow-up 0.0450 0.0442 0.0649 0.0205 0.0471 
(0.207) (0.206) (0.247) (0.142) (0.212) 




























Variable (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Second Follow-up 0.0372 0.0270 0.0394 0.0263 0.0464 
(0.189) (0.162) (0.195) (0.160) (0.211) 
Do not know 
First Follow-up 0.0218 0.0204 0.0162 0.0239 0.0244 
(0.146) (0.142) (0.127) (0.153) (0.155) 
Second Follow-up 0.0690 0.112 0.0669 0.0752 0.0464 
(0.254) (0.316) (0.250) (0.264) (0.211) 
Observation 
First Round 1468 294 308 293 573 
Second Round 1318 259 254 266 539 
Panel C. Changes in HIV Infection Expectations between First and 
Second Follow-up 
Reduced prior of HIV 
infection 0.220 0.230 0.240 0.208 0.212 
(0.415) (0.422) (0.428) (0.407) (0.409) 
Prior of HIV infection 
remained the same  0.533 0.521 0.529 0.549 0.533 
(0.499) (0.501) (0.500) (0.499) (0.499) 
Increased prior of infection 0.246 0.249 0.231 0.243 0.254 
(0.431) (0.433) (0.422) (0.430) (0.436) 
Observations 1112 213 221 226 452 
 Table 2.2 Continued 
Notes: Table 2.2 summarizes perceived riskiness of sexual practices and HIV infection expectations 
over time. In Panel C, HIV infection expectation is said to have increased between follow-ups if 
response to interview question “Do you think your chance of being exposed to HIV is high, small, or 
none?”  changes:  (1) from “None” to either “Small” or “High” or (2) from “Small” to “High” between 
follow-ups. HIV infection expectation is said to have declined if response to the same interview 
question changes: (1) from “High” to either “Small” or “None” or (2) from “Small” to “None” between 
follow-ups. HIV infection expectation is said to have remained the same if response to the interview 


















Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A. Sexual Behavior at First Follow-up 
Was sexually active in the last three months 0.765 0.786 0.724 0.773 0.772 
(0.424) (0.411) (0.448) (0.420) (0.420) 
Had more than one sexual partner in the last 
three months 0.0150 0.0204 0.0227 0.0203 0.00523 
(0.121) (0.142) (0.149) (0.141) (0.0722) 
Had a non-primary sexual partner in the last 
three months 0.0190 0.0272 0.0260 0.0373 0.00174 
(0.137) (0.163) (0.159) (0.190) (0.0417) 
Used condom in the last three months (always 
or sometimes) 0.0544 0.0476 0.0487 0.0678 0.0540 
(0.227) (0.213) (0.216) (0.252) (0.226) 
Received at least one free male condom at first 
follow-up 0.424 0.384 0.438 0.403 0.448 
(0.494) (0.487) (0.497) (0.491) (0.498) 
Number of free male condoms received at first 
follow-up (conditional on receiving at least 
one) 6.252 6.965 6.311 6.059 5.996 
Observations 1471 294 308 295 574 
Panel B. Sexual Behavior at Second Follow-up  
Was sexually active in the last three months 0.781 0.806 0.820 0.750 0.767 
(0.413) (0.396) (0.385) (0.434) (0.423) 
Had more than one sexual partner in the last 
three months 0.0119 0.0152 0.0192 0.00735 0.00911 
(0.108) (0.123) (0.137) (0.0856) (0.0951) 
Used condom during last sexual intercourse 0.0952 0.137 0.0728 0.0846 0.0911 
(0.294) (0.344) (0.260) (0.279) (0.288) 
Received at least one free male condom during 
second follow-up 0.344 0.316 0.383 0.353 0.335 
(0.475) (0.466) (0.487) (0.479) (0.472) 
Number of free male condoms received at 
second follow-up (conditional on receiving at 
least one) 7.043 6.807 6.800 7.021 7.293 
Observations 1345 263 261 272 549 
Notes: The reference period for the first four variables in panel A and the first two variables in Panel B is 
the three months preceding the respective follow-up. Reported are means and standard deviations (in 
parenthesis). 
















Figure 2.1 HIV Infection Expectations at First and Second Follow-up: By Type of Incentive and Testing 
Status 
Notes: Figure 2.1 summarizes HIV infection expectations for subjects initially assigned to home-
based testing or cash incentives treatment by different testing status (positive testers, negative testers, 
and non-testers). Panel A summarizes HIV infection expectations at first follow-up (around three 
months after testing). Panel B summarizes HIV infection expectations at second follow-up (around 






Figure 2.2 Change in HIV Infection Expectations between First and Second Follow-up: By Type of 
Incentive and Testing Status 
Notes: Figure 2.2 summarizes changes in HIV infection expectations for subjects initially assigned 
to home-based testing or cash incentives treatment. HIV infection expectation is said to have 
increased between the two follow-ups if response to interview question “Do you think your chance 
of being exposed to HIV is high, small, or none?” changes from “None” to either “Small” or “High” 
OR if it changes from “Small” to “High” between follow-ups. It is said to have declined between 
follow-ups if response to the same interview question changes from “High” to either “Small” or 
“None” OR if it changes from “Small” to “None” between follow-ups. Expectations is said to have 
remained unchanged if response to the aforementioned interview question is the same at both 



















HIV Positive (N=5) HIV Negative (N=308) Non-Tester (N=134) 













Dependent variable (Y) equals one if HIV infection 
expectation is "None", two if it is "Small", and three if it is 
"High" 
Pr. (Y=None) Pr. (Y=Small) Pr. (Y=High) 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. Intention-to-Treat Effect Estimates on HIV 
Infection Expectations 
HIV education -0.046 0.037 0.009 
(0.033) (0.026) (0.007) 
Home-based testing -0.023 0.018 0.004 
(0.035) (0.028) (0.007) 
Cash incentive 0.017 -0.014 -0.003 
(0.033) (0.027) (0.006) 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.020 
Observations 1436 
Panel B. Effect Estimates By HIV Test Status 
Home-based testing -0.083 0.066 0.016 
(0.075) (0.059) (0.016) 
Cash incentive -0.062 0.050 0.012 
(0.070) (0.056) (0.014) 
HIV positive -0.057 0.045 0.011 
(0.204) (0.159) (0.044) 
HIV negative -0.028 0.023 0.005 
(0.053) (0.043) (0.010) 
Home-based testing X HIV positive -0.686*** -0.277*** 0.963*** 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.005) 
Home-based testing X HIV negative 0.104 -0.086 -0.018 
(0.076) (0.064) (0.012) 
Cash incentive X HIV negative 0.109 -0.090 -0.019 
(0.074) (0.062) (0.012) 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.053 
Observations 1148   
 Notes: Table 2.4 shows marginal effects from ordered logit estimation of the effect of testing on HIV 
infection expectations three months after testing. The underlying ordered logit regression controls for 
village fixed effects and covariates listed under Table 1.1. Cluster-robust standard errors are in 
parentheses.   * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. 
         Table 2.4 Estimates of the Effect of HIV Testing on HIV Infection Expectations Three Months 





Dependent variable is an indicator that takes a value of one if subject… 
was sexually 
active in the last 
three months 
 had multiple 
sexual partners 
in the last three 
months 
 had a non-primary 
sexual partner in 
the last three 
months 
 used condom in 
the last three 
months 
 received at least 
one free male 
condom at 
follow-up 
Mean of dependent 
variable 0.765 0.0150 0.0190 0.0544 0.424 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10) 
HIV education 0.014 0.025 0.015 0.016* 0.025*** 0.029*** -0.006 -0.001 -0.063* -0.043 
(0.030) (0.023) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.037) (0.035) 
Home-based testing -0.048 -0.022 0.018* 0.019** 0.024*** 0.025*** -0.005 -0.001 -0.009 0.009 
(0.034) (0.023) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.036) (0.034) 
Cash incentive 0.001 0.003 0.015* 0.017* 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.014 0.017 -0.044 -0.042 
(0.034) (0.025) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.018) (0.036) (0.033) 
Constant 0.772*** -0.024 0.005* -0.026 0.002 -0.007 0.054*** -0.074 0.448*** 0.137 
(0.019) (0.116) (0.003) (0.044) (0.002) (0.052) (0.010) (0.086) (0.022) (0.152) 
R-Squared .0026 .42 .0042 .031 .011 .06 .001 .036 .0027 .12 
Controls  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 





Table 2.5  Intention to Treat Effect Estimates of HIV Testing on Sexual Behavior in the Short-term 
Notes: Table 2.5 shows intention to treat effect estimates of HIV testing on various measures of sexual behavior. A non-primary sexual partner 
(Columns 5-6) refers to someone who is neither a spouse nor a cohabiting partner or a boyfriend/girlfriend. Controls in even columns include 







Dependent variable is an indicator that takes a value of one if subject… 
was sexually 









partner in the 
last three months 
used condom 
in the last 
three months 
received at least 




variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A. Treated group (HIV education, home-based testing, and cash-incentives groups combined) 
versus control group 
Tested 0.004 0.040*** 0.069*** -0.059 0.011 
(0.041) (0.015) (0.015) (0.060) (0.028) 
Constant -0.045 -0.025 -0.024 0.010 -0.058 
(0.120) (0.049) (0.057) (0.156) (0.080) 
Observations 1471 
Panel B. HIV education group versus control group 
Tested 0.337 0.201 0.364* -0.547 0.021 
(0.340) (0.157) (0.206) (0.521) (0.208) 
Constant -0.011 0.017 0.042 0.206 0.079 
(0.161) (0.065) (0.082) (0.225) (0.106) 
Observations 868 
Panel C. Home-based HIV testing group versus control group 
Tested -0.032 0.030** 0.038*** 0.003 0.003 
(0.036) (0.015) (0.014) (0.053) (0.023) 
Constant -0.120 -0.021 -0.005 0.144 0.085 
(0.139) (0.056) (0.054) (0.204) (0.103) 
Observations 882 
Panel D. Cash incentive group versus control group 
Tested 0.004 0.028* 0.063*** -0.070 0.029 
(0.044) (0.016) (0.020) (0.058) (0.031) 
Constant 0.003 -0.062** 0.009 0.089 0.073 
(0.151) (0.029) (0.055) (0.197) (0.108) 
Observations 869 
Table 2.6 IV Estimates of the Effect of Testing on Sexual Behavior in the Short-term 
Notes: Panel A in Table 2.6 reports 2SLS estimates from equation 2.3.2 where HIV testing status 
(measured by indicator variable Tested) is instrumented by an indicator that equals one if subject is in 
either one of the three treatment group and zero if subject is in control group.  Panel B reports 2SLS 
estimates where HIV testing status is instrumented by an indicator that equals one if subject is assigned in 
HIV education treatment group and zero if subject is assigned in the control group.  Panel C reports 2SLS 
estimates where HIV testing status is instrumented by an indicator that equals one if subject is assigned to 
home-based HIV treatment group and zero if subject is assigned in the control group. Panel D reports 
2SLS estimates where HIV testing status is instrumented by an indicator that equals one if subject is 
assigned to cash incentive treatment group and zero if subject is assigned to control group. All regressions 
control for village fixed effects and covariates listed under Table 1.1. Cluster-robust standard errors are 
in parentheses.  * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. 
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Dependent variable is an indicator that takes a value of one if subject… 
was sexually 
active in the last 
three months 
 had multiple 
sexual partners 
in the last three 
months 
 had a non-primary 
sexual partner in 
the last three 
months 
 used condom in 
the last three 
months 
 received at least one 
free male condom at 
follow-up 
Mean of dependent variable 0.765   0.0150   0.0190   0.0544   0.424 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10) 
Home-based testing -0.047 -0.005 0.014 0.017 0.042** 0.044** -0.009 0.001 0.152** 0.147** 
(0.066) (0.047) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.028) (0.074) (0.066) 
Cash incentive -0.054 -0.002 0.011 0.016 0.047** 0.048** 0.024 0.030 -0.045 -0.034 
(0.063) (0.048) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.035) (0.034) (0.068) (0.062) 
HIV positive -0.085 -0.058 -0.017 -0.013 -0.000 0.014 -0.051** -0.032 0.115 0.191 
(0.213) (0.084) (0.012) (0.018) (0.000) (0.013) (0.020) (0.026) (0.174) (0.213) 
HIV negative 0.026 -0.005 -0.015 -0.014 0.002 0.010* 0.004 0.020 0.079 0.086* 
(0.047) (0.035) (0.012) (0.013) (0.002) (0.006) (0.023) (0.023) (0.055) (0.051) 
Home-based testing X HIV 
positive 0.094 -0.037 0.128 0.122 -0.042** -0.048* 0.009 -0.007 0.062 0.078 
(0.284) (0.160) (0.139) (0.139) (0.021) (0.025) (0.029) (0.032) (0.234) (0.272) 
Home-based testing X HIV 
negative 0.002 -0.020 -0.002 -0.003 -0.025 -0.026 0.007 0.002 -0.232*** -0.202** 
(0.077) (0.056) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.034) (0.034) (0.086) (0.079) 
Cash incentive X HIV 
 negative 0.091 0.004 0.002 -0.003 -0.018 -0.017 -0.016 -0.019 0.021 0.009 
(0.072) (0.055) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.041) (0.041) (0.080) (0.074) 
Constant 0.752*** -0.063 0.017 -0.026 0.000 0.006 0.051** -0.043 0.385*** 0.082 
(0.042) (0.132) (0.012) (0.046) (0.000) (0.047) (0.020) (0.101) (0.050) (0.177) 
R-Squared .0076 .42 .015 .037 .017 .062 .0018 .039 .013 .14 
Observations 1177 
Notes: Table 2.7 shows ordinary least squares estimates of the effect of HIV testing on various measures of sexual behavior for subjects with different 
HIV testing status. A non-primary sexual partner (Columns 5-6) is as defined in Table 5. Regressions in even columns controls for covariates listed 
under Table 1.1 and village fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observations is 1177.    
* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. 








Dependent variable (Y) equals 
one if HIV infection expectation 
is "None"(N), two if it is "Small" 
(S), and three if it is "High" (H) 
Dependent variable (Z) equals one if HIV 
infection expectation declined between first and 
second follow-up (D), two if it is unchanged 
(U), and three if it increased (I) 
Pr. (Y=N) Pr. (Y=S) Pr. (Y=H) Pr. (Z=D) Pr. (Z=U) Pr. (Z=I) 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A. Intention-to-Treat Effect on HIV Infection Expectations 
HIV education -0.018 0.015 0.003 0.006 0.000 -0.006 
(0.040) (0.034) (0.006) (0.029) (0.002) (0.031) 
Home-based testing 0.034 -0.029 -0.005 0.024 0.001 -0.025 
(0.039) (0.034) (0.006) (0.028) (0.002) (0.027) 
Cash incentive -0.017 0.014 0.003 -0.009 -0.001 0.010 
(0.037) (0.032) (0.006) (0.025) (0.003) (0.028) 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.044 0.021 
Observations 1227 1112 
Panel B. Effect Estimates By HIV Test Status 
Home-based testing 
(Home) 0.058 -0.049 -0.009 0.098 -0.007 -0.092* 
(0.070) (0.060) (0.010) (0.070) (0.016) (0.055) 
Cash incentive (Cash) 0.018 -0.015 -0.003 0.065 -0.001 -0.064 
(0.071) (0.060) (0.011) (0.057) (0.008) (0.050) 
HIV positive 0.120 -0.104 -0.016 0.347 -0.170 -0.176*** 
(0.232) (0.205) (0.027) (0.221) (0.169) (0.053) 
HIV negative 0.034 -0.029 -0.005 0.035 0.005 -0.040 
(0.055) (0.046) (0.009) (0.035) (0.008) (0.043) 
Home X HIV positive -0.404 0.267*** 0.137 0.152 -0.042 -0.110 
(0.358) (0.093) (0.268) (0.275) (0.143) (0.132) 
Home X HIV negative -0.026 0.022 0.004 -0.084 -0.028 0.113 
(0.090) (0.076) (0.015) (0.055) (0.034) (0.089) 
Cash X HIV negative -0.055 0.046 0.009 -0.087* -0.030 0.117 
(0.089) (0.073) (0.015) (0.048) (0.032) (0.080) 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.055 0.031 
Observations 997 899 
Table 2.8 Effects of HIV Testing on HIV Infection Expectations in the Medium-term: Marginal Effects 
after Ordered Logit Regression 
Notes: Table 2.8 shows marginal effects from ordered logit estimation of the effect of HIV testing on 
infection expectations around eight months after testing.  The underlying ordered logit regression controls 
for village fixed effects and all covariates listed under Table 1.1. Cluster-robust standard errors are in 








Dependent variable is an indicator that takes a value of one if subject… 
was sexually active in the 
last three months 
had multiple 
sexual partners 
in the last three 
months 
used condom 
during last sexual 
intercourse 
received at least one 
free male condom at 
follow-up 
Mean of dependent 
variable 0.781 0.0119 0.0952 0.344 
Explanatory 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A. Intention-to-Treat Effect of HIV Testing on Sexual Behavior 
HIV education 0.039 0.020 0.006 0.005 0.046* 0.046* -0.020 -0.011 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.009) (0.009) (0.026) (0.026) (0.035) (0.035) 
Home-based 
testing 0.053* 0.050* 0.010 0.011 -0.018 -0.013 0.048 0.060* 
(0.030) (0.029) (0.009) (0.009) (0.021) (0.022) (0.037) (0.036) 
Cash incentive -0.017 -0.028 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.004 0.018 0.027 
(0.032) (0.031) (0.007) (0.006) (0.022) (0.023) (0.037) (0.038) 
Constant 0.767*** 0.051 0.009** 0.035 0.091*** 0.111 0.335*** 0.352** 
(0.018) (0.155) (0.004) (0.037) (0.013) (0.103) (0.022) (0.158) 
R-Squared .0041 .1 .0017 .018 .0054 .029 .0022 .065 
Panel B. Effect Estimates By HIV Test Status 
Home-based 
(Home) 0.015 0.040 0.004 -0.000 -0.030 -0.026 0.059 0.033 
(0.062) (0.055) (0.015) (0.015) (0.036) (0.037) (0.073) (0.069) 
Cash incentive 
(Cash) 0.013 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.011 -0.058 -0.037 
(0.063) (0.062) (0.014) (0.014) (0.038) (0.037) (0.070) (0.068) 
HIV positive 0.265*** 0.213*** -0.009 -0.016 -0.080*** -0.065* -0.083 0.004 
(0.041) (0.055) (0.009) (0.014) (0.026) (0.039) (0.214) (0.217) 
HIV negative 0.038 0.013 0.000 -0.002 0.016 0.022 -0.102** -0.071 
(0.046) (0.044) (0.010) (0.011) (0.028) (0.028) (0.051) (0.050) 
Home X HIV 
positive -0.015 -0.028 -0.004 0.016 0.230 0.244 -0.192 -0.131 
(0.062) (0.073) (0.015) (0.019) (0.192) (0.195) (0.259) (0.246) 
Home X HIV 
negative 0.059 0.022 0.010 0.016 0.014 0.012 -0.026 0.032 
(0.072) (0.068) (0.019) (0.019) (0.042) (0.043) (0.085) (0.081) 
Cash  X HIV 
negative -0.034 -0.046 -0.005 -0.005 -0.015 -0.025 0.094 0.095 
(0.074) (0.074) (0.016) (0.016) (0.047) (0.046) (0.081) (0.079) 
Constant 0.735*** 0.110 0.009 0.007 0.080*** 0.036 0.416*** 0.360** 
(0.041) (0.160) (0.009) (0.040) (0.026) (0.106) (0.046) (0.170) 
R-Squared .0099 .11 .0027 .031 .0031 .025 .0098 .1 
 
Table 2.9 Intention to Treat Effect Estimates of the Estimates of the Effects of HIV Testing on Sexual 
Behavior in the Medium-term  
Notes: Table 2.9 reports intention to treat effect estimates of the effect of testing on various (self-reported) measures 
of sexual behavior around eight months after testing.  Regressions in even columns control for village fixed effects 
and all covariates listed under Table 1.1. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observations in 






Dependent variable is an indicator that takes a value of one if subject… 
was sexually active 
in the last three 
months 
had multiple sexual 
partners in the last 
three months 
used condom in the 
last three months 
received at least one 
free male condom at 
follow-up 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A. Treated group (HIV education, home-based testing, and cash-incentives) versus control 
group 
Tested 0.035 0.011 0.026 0.069 
(0.055) (0.014) (0.043) (0.066) 
Constant 0.050 0.036 0.108 0.363** 
(0.154) (0.036) (0.102) (0.154) 
Observations 1345 
Panel B. HIV education group versus control group 
Tested 0.240 0.115 0.777 -0.064 
(0.509) (0.159) (0.608) (0.559) 
Constant -0.053 0.010 0.146 0.141 
(0.201) (0.043) (0.190) (0.181) 
Observations 812 
Panel C. Home-based testing group versus control group 
Tested 0.082* 0.017 -0.028 0.109* 
(0.045) (0.015) (0.035) (0.057) 
Constant 0.090 0.027 0.208 0.229 
(0.194) (0.049) (0.128) (0.185) 
Observations 810 
Panel D. Cash incentives group versus control group 
Tested -0.053 -0.003 -0.019 0.059 
(0.057) (0.011) (0.041) (0.067) 
Constant 0.081 -0.001 0.040 0.287 
(0.205) (0.022) (0.121) (0.189) 
Observations 821 
Notes: Table 2.10 reports 2SLS estimates of the effect of testing on self-reported sexual behavior and 
condom uptake around eight months after testing. Panel A repots 2SLS estimates from equation 2.3.2 
where HIV testing status (measured by indicator variable Tested) is instrumented by an indicator that 
equals one if subject is in either one of the three treatment group and zero if subject is in control group. 
Panel B repots 2SLS estimates where HIV testing status is instrumented by an indicator that equals one if 
subject is assigned in HIV education treatment group and zero if subject is assigned in the control group.  
Panel C repots 2SLS estimates where HIV testing status is instrumented by an indicator that equals one if 
subject is assigned to home-based HIV treatment group and zero if subject is assigned in the control group. 
Panel D repots 2SLS estimates where HIV testing status is instrumented by an indicator that equals one if 
subject is assigned to cash incentive treatment group and zero if subject is assigned to control group. 
Regressions control for village fixed effects and all covariates listed under Table 1.1. Cluster-robust 
standard errors in parentheses.  * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. 






Dependent variable (Y) in Columns 1-4 is the number of free condoms subjects collected [0, 10] 
at the respective follow-up. Dependent variable in Column 5 is the difference in the number of 
free condoms subjects collected at first and second follow-up [-10, 10] 




Marginal effects on the 
(unconditional) expected 




Marginal effects on the 
(unconditional) 




Mean of dependent 
variable 2.65 2.42 -0.23 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) 
HIV education -0.315 -0.092 -0.511 -0.097 -0.164 
(1.005) (0.290) (1.501) (0.284) (0.414) 
Home-based testing 0.391 0.115 1.399 0.274 0.317 
(0.919) (0.273) (1.488) (0.296) (0.417) 
Cash incentive -1.250 -0.357 0.885 0.172 0.409 
(0.892) (0.248) (1.513) (0.298) (0.421) 
Constant -12.677*** -7.282 2.210 
(4.114) (6.436) (1.851) 
(Pseudo) R-square 0.039 0.036 0.036 
Observations 1471   1345 1250 
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2.11 report Tobit estimates of condom uptake at first follow-up. Columns 3 and 4 show Tobit estimates of 
condom uptake at second follow-up. Column 5 shows ordinary least squares estimates of the change in condom uptake between first and second 
follow-up. Regressions in columns 1, 3, and 5 controls for village fixed effects and all covariates listed under Table 1.1. Cluster-robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. 







Dependent variable (Y) in Columns 1-4 is the number of free condoms 
subjects collected [0, 10] at the respective follow-up. Dependent variable 
in Column 5 is the difference in the number of free condoms collected at 
first and second follow-up [-10, 10] 




















Mean of dependent variable 2.65 2.42 -0.23 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) 
Home-based testing 3.493** 1.133** 0.690 0.135 0.024 
(1.611) (0.541) (2.627) (0.518) (0.837) 
Cash incentive -0.156 -0.048 -1.401 -0.268 -0.348 
(1.690) (0.520) (2.714) (0.509) (0.860) 
HIV positive 7.554 2.729 4.452 0.945 -1.082 
(6.865) (2.638) (10.615) (2.422) (0.754) 
HIV negative 2.908** 0.860** -2.004 -0.397 -1.117* 
(1.320) (0.369) (2.025) (0.407) (0.627) 
Home-based X HIV positive 1.057 0.338 -13.168 -1.756* -2.811 
(7.905) (2.603) (11.975) (0.913) (1.896) 
Home-based  X HIV negative -4.534** -1.258*** 0.998 0.197 0.383 
(1.981) (0.482) (3.126) (0.625) (0.956) 
Cash incentive X HIV 
negative -0.902 -0.273 3.557 0.727 0.939 
(1.978) (0.586) (3.232) (0.688) (0.982) 
Constant -13.662*** -1.119 3.713* 
(4.534) (7.500) (2.157) 
(Pseudo) R-square 0.040 0.039 0.035 
Observations 1177   1082   1000 
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2.12 report Tobit estimates of condom uptake at first follow-up. 
Columns 3 and 4 show Tobit estimates of condom uptake at second follow-up. Column 5 shows ordinary 
least squares estimates of the change in condom uptake between first and second follow-up. Regressions 
in columns 1, 3, and 5 controls for village fixed effects and all covariates listed under Table 1.1. Cluster-
robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. 





Chapter 3 . The Effect of U.S.’s At-Will Employment Exceptions on Job Loss and 
Employment: Was There a Compositional Effect? 
3.1 Introduction 
An important prediction of theoretical models of firing restrictions in an imperfect labor 
market is that they reduce both hiring and firing rates making the net effect on employment stock 
indeterminate a priori. If legislations and collective agreements restrict employers’ discretion at 
firing stage, they may act as a tax on firing and may help improve job security (Verkerke 2008). 
On the other hand, if firing restrictions increase the cost of labor force adjustment significantly, 
they may discourage job creation and negatively affect employment (Bentolila and Bertola 
1990).  With incomplete information and worker heterogeneity, across-the-board firing 
restrictions can have differential labor market effects on different groups of workers. If firing 
restrictions make employers reluctant to hire more workers than is absolutely necessary, labor 
market entry can become more difficult for workers in general and for those with lower 
observable productivity correlates and/or who are (perceived to be) risky hires in particular 
(Addison and Teixeira 2003).  
 Employment relationships in the United States have historically been characterized by the 
common law doctrine of at-will employment. According to this doctrine, indefinite-term 
employment contracts can be terminated by either party and at any time for a good cause, bad 
cause, or no cause at all (Muhl 2001).49 In the second half of the 20th century, however, state 
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 This is except for limitations imposed by federal and state laws or courts that prohibit firings for “bad cause”. 
Such limitations include, for instance, the 1967 Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the 1990 Americans 
with Disabilities Act that prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of age and disabilities, respectively. 
Important is also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (1964) that prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of 




courts recognized “exceptions” to this general rule of at-will employment. These exceptions can 
be grouped into three broad categories based on their legal provisions: breach of contract (hereon 
“implied contract” exception), violation of public policy (hereon “public policy” exception), and 
breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (hereon “good faith” exception).  
 States recognized the implied contract exception to protect workers from losing their jobs 
when there is an implied contract of employment and a promise of job security by the employer 
made orally or in writing. If an employer makes an explicit or implicit assurance that 
employment may be terminated only in the event of poor performance or business misconduct 
but fires a worker for no good reason, he may be held liable for violation of an implied contract 
in states that recognize this exception. In states that recognize the public policy exception, an 
employer may be liable for wrongful discharge if he fires a worker for reasons that violate the 
doctrine of public policy of a state, a state statute, or a federal statute. In these states, firing a 
worker who refuses to commit an unlawful act on behalf of the employer, who misses work for a 
jury duty, or who reports violations of workplace safety laws will be considered as a violation of 
public policy to mention some.  
 Unlike the implied contract and public policy exceptions that apply to firings made under 
specific circumstances, the good faith exception to at-will employment reads a covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing into all employment relationships. In states that recognize this exception, 
employers may be held liable for wrongful discharge laws if they make work place decisions 
(such as firing) under “bad faith”. This exception represents the most dramatic departure from 
the general rule of at-will employment and poses the greatest increase in employer liability 




financial benefit or as a retaliation may be held liable for violation of good faith in states that 
recognize this exception to at-will employment.  
 In this essay, I estimate aggregate and compositional effects of these exceptions on job 
loss and employment for workers with different racial and ethnic background as well as 
educational attainment. Like other forms of restrictions on employer's ability to dismiss workers 
without delay or cost (such as mandatory severance payments), the effect of at-will exceptions 
on employment is theoretically ambiguous and depends on their impact on firing and hiring 
rates.50 While firing restrictions can reduce job separations by acting as a tax on discharge, they 
can impact job creation by employers who anticipate additional firing costs negatively (Verkerke 
2008). Thus, if firing restrictions increase the total cost of labor, their net effect on employment 
stock would be negative (Hamermesh 1993). On the other hand, if restrictions prevent firing 
more than they do hiring, they will increase average employment (Bentolila and Bertola 1990).  
 In one of the earliest empirical studies of the employment effect of at-will exceptions, 
Dertouzos and Karoly (1992) find a reduction in aggregate employment in states that recognize 
tort and contract damages to wrongful terminations.51 Besides aggregate employment stock, 
firing restrictions can affect the composition of the employed by changing the relative 
adjustment cost of workers on different employment contracts. If restrictions make firing of a 
worker on a long-term employment contract more difficult than firing of a worker on short-term 
employment arrangements, employers may find a repeated use of open-ended or temporary 
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 See Lazear (1990), Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Bertola (1992) for thorough theoretical discussions. 
51
 In a related study, Miles (2000) finds insignificant effect of at-will exceptions on employment or unemployment, 
however. The difference between these two studies may have results from differences in their coding of the timing 




employment arrangements more attractive than long-term employment contracts. In connection 
with at-will employment exceptions, Miles (2000) and Author (2003) found a significant 
increase in temporary help services in states that recognize the implied contract exception.  
 With worker heterogeneity and the possibility of substitution between different types of 
workers, a firing restriction can have “unintended” consequences. When employers face a 
liability for wrongfully discharging one type of worker, they may try to circumvent potential 
liabilities by not hiring workers from the protected group in the first place. Jolls and Prescott 
(2004) and Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) find evidence on the worsening of labor market 
outcomes among the disabled following the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act that 
prohibited discrimination against qualified workers with disabilities. Oyer and Schaefer (2000) 
find a reduction in firing rate for Black workers after the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act 
with no significant effect on the overall involuntary job displacement rate for Blacks. Their 
results suggest that employers may have substituted the less costly mass layoff for firing after the 
passage of the statutory limitation that prohibited firings based on, among other things, race.  
 With incomplete information about workers underlying productivity, a firing restriction 
can encourage the use of better and tougher screening techniques to reduce the likelihood of 
“bad” job matches ex post. When this happens, labor market entry can become more difficult for 
groups with lower observable productivity correlates (merit-based failure to hire) or for those 
whose productivity signals are (perceived to be) more noisy (screening discrimination).52 In a 
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 Screening discrimination occurs when employers are less able to evaluate the ability of workers from one group 
than from another (Pinkston 2006). Pinkston (2006) find that workers underlying ability (measured by the Armed 
Forces Qualification Test scores) has less influence on entry wages of black men than that of white men, although its 




firing cost model with adverse selection, Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) find that unjust dismissal 
provisions in the U.S. reduced the probability of finding a job for the unemployed relative to the 
employed.  
 In her analysis of the effect of employment protection laws in France, Suk (2007) found 
that protections exacerbated racial inequality and amplified employer incentives to discriminate 
against workers of North African descents. She argued that “…when a law broadly limits 
employers’ discretion over firing…[it] does not eradicate the discriminatory tendency: it simply 
moves discrimination to decisions over which employers retain discretion, namely hiring 
decision” (Suk, 2007:108). MacLeod and Nakavachara (2007) and OECD (2004, 1999) find 
evidence of differential effect of across-the-board firing restrictions on workers in occupations 
with varying level of skill intensity and in different demographic groups, respectively.  
 When there are inter-group differences in labor market responses to firing restrictions, 
focusing on labor market aggregates will hide important group-specific trends.53 With regard to 
the employment effect of at-will exceptions, the main focus of previous studies has been on 
state-level aggregate employment. To the best of my knowledge, there is also no evidence on 
potential compositional effects of these exceptions on U.S. workers with different racial and 
ethnic background.54 Besides, although these exceptions were introduced to protect workers from 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2003) find lower interview callbacks for resumes with an African-American sounding name than for those with 
White sounding name. 
53
 Many empirical works on the effects of employment protections, however, examined aggregate labor market 
effects and did not analyze potential compositional effects. See Addison and Teixeira (2003) for a review of related 
studies. 
54
 Autor et al. (2006) examined compositional employment and wage effects of at-will exceptions based on age, 




wrongful discharges, there is limited evidence on the (first stage) effect of at-will exceptions on 
involuntary job separations.55  
 Exploiting the inter-state variation in the timing of courts recognition of at-will 
exceptions and using data from the U.S. Current Population Survey, I employed Difference-in-
Differences strategy to estimate the causal effect of at-will exceptions. I estimated aggregate and 
compositional effects of at-will exceptions on job loss and employment for workers with 
different racial and ethnic background, namely, non-Hispanic Whites, non-Hispanic Blacks, and 
Hispanics. The employment effect of these exceptions on workers with different educational 
attainment is also estimated. 
 While none of the at-will exceptions had a significant aggregate or compositional effect 
on job loss, I found that the implied contract and the public policy exceptions had a negative 
effect on aggregate employment in the medium-term. The implied contract exception is found to 
have a significant negative effect on employment of White and Hispanic workers but 
insignificant effect on employment of Black workers. For the public policy exception, I found a 
significant negative effect on employment of White and Hispanic workers but a positive effect 
on employment of Black workers.  
 When analyzing employment effects on workers with different educational attainment, I 
found a stronger employment reducing effect of the implied contract and public policy 
exceptions on less-educated White and Hispanic workers. On the other hand, while the implied 
                                                                                                                                                             
effects of at-will exceptions on workers in occupations with varying intensity of relationship-specific investment and 
skill. 
55
 Autor et al. (2007) find that the good faith and fair dealing exception had a negative effect on employment 




contract exception had insignificant differential employment effect (by educational attainment) 
on Black workers, it had a stronger employment increasing effect on less-educated Black 
workers. 
 The rest of the essay is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses selected precedent-
setting court cases. Section 3.3 describes data used in the empirical analysis. Section 3.4 outlines 
identification strategies. Section 3.5 discusses empirical findings on the effects of at-will 
employment exceptions on job loss and employment and Section 3.6 concludes the essay.  
3.2 Selected Precedent-setting Court Cases 
3.2.1 The Implied Contract Exception 
 In states that recognize the implied contract exception to at-will employment, an 
employee can bring a claim for wrongful discharge and breach of contract if an employer offered 
a contract of employment either explicitly or implicitly but terminated the contract before the 
expiration of and in violation of the contract. A promise of job security may result from oral 
assurances or information contained in employee handbooks and policy memorandum where the 
employer assured the employee of job security as long as performance is “acceptable”. With 
such representations made by the employer and in the absence of an explicit waiver, the 
employment relationship is no more at-will and the employer cannot unilaterally terminate the 
relationship except for “good cause” (Verkerke 1998).56  
 California is the first state to recognize the implied contract exception in the 1972 case 
Raymond Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc. After working as an income tax preparer and branch 
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 Firing for a “good cause” refers to employment terminations based on purely business needs such as poor 




manager for ten years, plaintiff, Mr. Drzewiecki, received a notice of termination of his initial 
employment contract and an offer of a new contract that heavily restricted activities of his branch 
and reduced his earnings. The defendant eventually fired Mr. Drzewiecki for refusing to sign the 
new employment contract in spite of the fact that plaintiff's initial employment contract stated 
that employment might be terminated only in the event of business misconducts.  
 The court found representations made by the defendant sufficient to create an implied 
contract of employment and, since the defendant did not present any evidence of misconduct, the 
court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and declared that "...we are not aware of any California 
decision which holds, squarely, that a contract for permanent type employment is terminable at 
the will of the employer if the employer has, by express language or clear implication, foreclosed 
his right to terminate except for cause." 
 
3.2.2 The Public Policy Exception 
 In states that recognize the public policy exception, courts find public policy in different 
sources and apply the public policy exception to a wide variety of employment termination 
situations (Willey 2007). This exception makes employers liable for tort damages if, for 
example, they discharge an employee for refusing to perform an illegal act on behalf of the 
employer, for reporting violations of the law or public policy by the employer, or for behaving in 
a way that is encouraged by public policy, such as reporting for jury duty or becoming a member 
of a labor union (Riner et al. 2003). 
 The development of the public policy exception started in the 1959 case Peter Petermann 
v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. 




refusing to commit perjury on behalf of the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that he was hired by 
the defendant's union as a business agent and his employment would last as long as his work was 
satisfactory. Mr. Petermann alleged that the defendant instructed him to make false statements in 
a testimony and discharged him after finding out that plaintiff provided truthful testimony. The 
court found the defendant guilty of wrongful discharge and argued that “[t]he presence of false 
testimony in any proceeding tends to interfere with the proper administration of public affairs 
and the administration of justice.” 57  
 In another 1985 precedent-setting court case in Missouri (Judy Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, 
Inc.), plaintiff Mrs. Boyle sued her employer for wrongfully discharging her in retaliation for 
reporting safety violations at her work place. Although plaintiff's service letter stated the reason 
for her discharge to be “arguing with her supervisor”, Mrs. Boyle maintained that the termination 
was due to her filing of complaints accusing the defendant of failing to test eye glasses it 
manufactured for break resistance (as required by law). The plaintiff also alleged that she 
repeatedly urged her employer to test the glasses and warned him that she would report the 
violations if he failed to take the necessary action. After weighing all evidences presented by 
both sides, Missouri court of appeals ruled in favor of the plaintiff by stating that “...where an 
employer has discharged at-will employee because that employee refused to violate the law...the 
employee has a cause of action in tort for damages for wrongful discharge.”58 
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3.2.3 The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Exception  
 Instead of narrowly prohibiting discharges based on an implied contract of employment 
or violation of a public policy, the good faith exception to at-will employment reads a covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing into every employment relationship. This exception represents the 
most significant departure from the general rule of at-will employment doctrine by requiring 
“just cause” for employment termination by the employer (Muhl, 2001).This exception protects 
workers from employment terminations made under “bad faith” such as firing a worker under the 
pretext of poor performance when the real reason is not performance-related but is due to 
employer's desire to avoid payment of anticipated financial benefits. 
 The development of the good faith exception started in New Hampshire in the 1974 case 
Olga Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.59 In this lawsuit, discharged at-will employee, Ms. Monge 
sued her employer for terminating her employment for allegedly refusing to accept a date with 
defendant's foreman who also used to harassed her. The defendant, on the other hand, claimed to 
have fired the plaintiff for being absent from work without notice. Jury found the defendant 
guilty of terminating Ms. Monge's employment under “bad faith” and ruled a verdict in the 
amount of 2,500 U.S. dollars.  
 In a 1977 court case in Massachusetts (Morville Fortune v. The National Cash Register 
Co.), plaintiff Mr. Fortune sued the defendant for terminating his employment without fully 
paying promised bonus. The plaintiff worked as a salesman under a written contract that 
specified his earnings consisting of a weekly salary and bonus and stated that bonus would 
depend, among other things, on the value of products sold to customers and stores assigned to the 
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plaintiff. The contract also stated that the defendant has the right to sell products to accounts and 
stores assigned to the plaintiff without paying any bonus, a right that would be exercised only on 
written notice. The defendant later fired the plaintiff without fully paying bonus on products sold 
under plaintiff's supervision. The court argued that “[defendant's] written contract contains an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a termination not made in good faith 
constitutes a breach of the contract.”60 
3.3 Data  
 I used two data sources to estimate the causal effect of at-will exceptions on employment 
and job loss. First, I used data on the taxonomy of the timing of states recognition of at-will 
exceptions developed by Autor et al. (2006). Table C1 in the appendix details the month and year 
of recognition of at-will employment exceptions based on this taxonomy and Table C2 
summarizes year and month of adoption of at-will employment exceptions for each adopting 
state. Nine states currently recognize all three exceptions, three states do not recognize at-will 
exceptions, and seven states recognize only one exception. The implied contract exception is 
currently recognized in 42 states and 69% of these states recognized it between 1975 and 1985. 
The public policy exception is currently recognized in 43 states and 65% of these states 
recognized it between 1975 and 1985. Only 11 states currently recognize the good faith and fair 
dealing exception and six of them recognized it between the years 1975 and 1985.61 I exploited 
this inter-state variation in the timing of courts recognition of at-will exceptions to identify labor 
market effects.  
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 Second, I used 22 years (1978-1999) of labor force data from the (basic monthly) Current 
Population Survey (CPS). Labor force data used for this analysis is for civilian and non-
institutional population of non-Hispanic Blacks (hereon “Blacks”), non-Hispanic Whites (hereon 
“Whites”), and Hispanics between the age of 18 and 64. Employment data used was for workers 
in the private or public (federal, state, and local) sector and does not include self-employed 
individuals. I aggregated employment data at state-by-month-by-demographic group and 
measured employment by employment-to-population ratio (of the respective demographic group) 
to account for inter-group differences in employment driven by changes in demographic 
composition. Average employment-to-population ratio for the sample period is 0.72 for the total 
sample and 0.74, 0.64, and 0.66 for Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics, respectively (Table C3). 
 I measure job loss by combining involuntary job separation due to layoffs and other non-
layoff reasons. Due to the redesigning of CPS questionnaire in January 1994 and subsequent 
changes in the wording and coding of interview questions of interest, I used four CPS questions 
to generate job loss data.62 I used two interview questions for the pre- and post-January 1994 
period to generate layoff data. The first pre-1994 period question is Why was…absent from work 
last week? This question was asked of all individuals who were either unemployed (and were 
looking for a job) or employed but not at work during the one week reference period. Responses 
were coded as: “own illness”, “on vacation”, “bad weather”, “labor dispute”, “new job to begin 
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within 30 days”, “temporary layoff (under 30 days)”, “indefinite layoff (30 days or more or no 
definite recall date)”, and “other”.  
 The second post-1993 period question is Monthly labor force status. This question was 
asked of all individuals and responses were coded as: “employed-at work”, “employed-absent”, 
“unemployed-on layoff”, “unemployed-looking”, “not in the labor force-retired”, “not in the 
labor force-disabled”, and “not in the labor force-other”. In this essay, I identified a pre-1994 
respondent as having lost her job due to layoff if response was either “temporary layoff (under 
30 days)” or “indefinite layoff (30 days or more or no definite recall date)”. I identified a post-
1993 respondent as having lost her job due to layoff if response was “unemployed-on layoff”.  
 I used two survey questions for the pre- and post-January 1994 survey period to generate 
job loss data. The first pre-1994 period interview question is Why did...start looking for work? 
This question was asked of all respondents who were unemployed in the one-week reference 
period for non-layoff reasons and responses were coded as: “lost job”, “quit job”, “left school”, 
“wanted temporary work”, and “other”. The second post-1993 period interview question is 
Reasons for unemployment. This question was asked of all respondents who were on layoff or 
were looking for a job and responses were coded as: “job loser/on layoff”, “other job loser”, 
“temporary job ended”, “job leaver”, “re-entrant”, and “new-entrant.” 
 In this essay, I identified a pre-1994 respondent as having lost her job involuntarily for 
non-layoff reasons if response was “lost job”. I identified a post-1993 respondent as having lost 
her job involuntarily for non-layoff reasons if response was “other job loser”. I constructed an 
aggregate measure of job loss combining layoff and involuntary job separation for non-layoff 




loss by job loss-to-population ratio.63 Average job loss-to-population ratio for non-layoff reasons 
(multiplied by 100) is 1.6 for the whole sample and 1.3, 3.2, and 2.1 for Whites, Blacks, and 
Hispanics, respectively. Average job loss-to-population ratio due to layoff (multiplied by 100) is 
0.73 for the whole sample and 0.68, 0.87, and 0.97 for Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics, 
respectively (Table C3).  
3.4 Statistical Models   
 I exploited inter-state variation in the timing of state courts recognition of at-will 
employment exceptions to identify labor market effects. Since each exception is recognized by 
more than one state, I have a case of multiple ‘natural experiments’ the effect of which can be 
analyzed using standard evaluation techniques. In this paper, I employ Difference-in-Differences 
(DD) technique that takes into account two peculiar features of the experiment. First, since the 
timing of states courts recognition of at-will exceptions is staggered over time, the before-after 
period for all adopters of a given at-will exception does not fall in the same calendar period. 
Second, since all but three states recognize at least one at-will exception, there are not enough 
observations from non-adopting states to serve as control to precisely estimate labor market 
effects.  
 To circumvent the first issue and for each at-will exception, I defined a before-after 
window period around the month (quarter) of adoption of each state. To circumvent the second 
issue, I follow Autor et al. (2006) and used observations from adopting states as control provided 
that state-month observations are outside a specific window period defined around the state's 
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month of adoption of an exception. Consider, for example, Ohio that recognized the public 
policy exception in March 1990. When estimating the effect of the implied contract exception 
through DD within 12 years window period (of 4 years before to 8 years after), I used state-
month observations from Ohio before March 1986 and after March 1998 as controls for early 
and late adopters of the implied contract exception, respectively. I estimated the labor market 
effect of each exception separately since these exceptions have different legal provisions. 
 To visually summarize pre- and post-adoption trends in employment and job loss in states 
that recognize these exceptions, I specify the distributed lag model in equation 3.4.1 in the spirit 
of Jacobson et al. (1993) and Wachter et al. (2008). For each at-will exception (E) and 
demographic group of interest, I define a window period of 12 years (48 months of lags and 96 
months of leds) around month (quarter) of adoption and estimate the dynamic Difference-in-
Differences model through weighted least squares estimator.64 
 
JR  SJ  TR 	 U VW
XY
WZ30
[JRW\]J  JR																							 3.4.1 
where  is a state index,  is an index for calendar period, and  is a time index (relative to 
month or quarter of adoption) such that  < 0 for all periods before adoption,  > 0 for all 
periods after adoption, and  = 0 for month (quarter) of adoption.  is the logarithm of aggregate 
employment-to-population ratio or job-loss-to-population ratio, \] is a treatment-control 
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indicator defined as follows: \] = 1 if  recognized E after December 1981 and before 
January 199265 and calendar period is within the 12 years window period defined around 's 
month of adoption. \] = 0 if  does not recognize at-will exceptions or  recognizes at-will 
exception but calendar period under consideration falls outside the 12 years window period 
defined around 's month of adoption. 
 [JRW  is a dummy variable that takes one when calendar period  is  periods before or after 
month (quarter) of adoption, SJ 's are a set of calendar month (quarter) fixed effects and capture 
the time pattern of ,	TR’s are a set of state fixed effects and capture the impact on  of 
permanent differences in observed and unobserved characteristics across states, and  is a 
random error term assumed to be uncorrelated across time and states and have a constant 
variance. An important assumption of the foregoing specification is that the effect of at-will 
exception E does not vary across periods. That is, the difference in  between calendar period  
and  -  for exception E recognized at calendar period  -  is assumed to be the same as the 
difference in  between ^ and ^ -  for E recognized at ^-  for all , ^ and	 . 
 The analytic model in equation 3.4.1 allows the effect of E to vary by calendar period 
relative to month (quarter) of adoption of E. For ease of visualization, I present plots of 
normalized coefficient estimates (V#W _ V), with 90 percent confidence intervals, against time 
defined in months (quarters) and relative to month (quarter) of adoption of E. For each E and 
calendar period , (V#W _ V) measures the percentage change in  in adopting states between 
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month of adoption and the 	R` 	month, relative to the change over time in  in control states. I 
use a uniformly weighted moving average smoother with 4 months of leads, 4 months of lags, 
and contemporaneous month (quarter) to smooth random bumps in . 
 As noted in Bertrand et al. (2004), Difference-in-Differences analysis with a shorter 
before-after period minimizes serial correlation and produces consistent estimates of standard 
errors of coefficients. I thus estimate compositional labor market effects of at-will exceptions by 
defining a relatively shorter before-after window period. As my baseline specification, I define 
five years window period (2 years before versus 3 years after) and estimate the triple-
differencing model in equation 3.4.2 (omitting subscripts) through weighted least squares 
estimator.66 
 
						  SJ  TR 	 a.\]N,1 	b.\]N,Nc(21  
		d.\]N,N]1  ef  "  3.4.2 
where \] is a treatment-control indicator that takes a value of one if  falls within the five 
years window period and zero for calendar periods from states: (1) that do not recognize at-will 
exceptions, or (2) that recognize at-will exceptions but  falls outside the 5 years window period 
defined around their month of adoption.67 , is a before-after indicator that takes one if  falls 
after adoption and within the window period defined and zero otherwise. \]N,Nc(2 is 
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a triple interaction term between \], ,, and an indicator for being black (c(21. 
\]N,N] is a triple interaction terms between \], ,, and an indicator for 
being Hispanic (]1, f is a vector of all the terms that make up the two triple interaction 
terms, SJ	 and TR 	 are as defined before, and "	is a random error term.68 Non-Hispanic White is 
the omitted category. 
 As a robustness check, I re-estimate equation 3.4.2 for two alternative before-after 
window periods. First, I define 7 years window period and compare changes in labor market 
outcomes from three years before to 4 years after adoption. Second, I define 9 years window 
period and compare changes in labor market outcomes from 4 years before to 5 years after 
adoption.69 For each at-will exception and before-after window period, I re-estimate equation 2 
by including region fixed effects (for Midwest/North Central, South, and West), region-specific 
linear time trend, and state-specific linear time trend.70 Standard error estimates from all 
regressions are adjusted using Huber-White correction and heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors are clustered at state level to account for intra-state error correlation of an unknown form.71 
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3.5 Empirical Results 
 In this section, I present estimation results on the effect of at-will employment exceptions 
on job loss (Section 3.5.1) and employment (Section 3.5.2). Employment effect estimates for 
workers with different educational attainment are presented in Section 3.5.3.  
3.5.1  Effects on Job Loss 
 Involuntary job separations can result from layoffs, “wrongful discharge”, firings for 
“good cause” (such as poor performance), or employer-induced quit.72 If at-will employment 
exceptions were binding, we would expect a decline in job separations of the kind that, after 
courts recognition of tort or contractual exceptions to at-will employment doctrine, would make 
employers liable for wrongful discharge lawsuit by disgruntled former employees. If at-will 
exceptions caused employers to substitute outright firing for other types of labor force 
adjustment techniques such as layoffs, as has been documented in other instances of firing 
restrictions, we would expect changes in other forms of involuntary job separations. 
 Figure 3.1 provides a visual summary of trends in job loss rates in a twelve-year event 
window defined around quarter of adoption of the implied contract exception. It shows a rise in 
aggregate job loss rate and job loss rate for White workers (Panels A and B). Event study plots in 
Panels C and D of Figure 3.1 do not show a noticeable trend in job loss rates for Black and 
Hispanic workers, although a declining trend is observed for the latter group several quarters 
after adoption of the implied contract exception  
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 Difference-in-Differences estimates of the effect of the implied contract exception on 
aggregate job loss are positive for all the three before-after window periods under consideration 
but are generally insignificant (Table 3.1, Panel A). Effect estimate for seven years window 
period, controlling for region fixed effects as well as state- and region-specific linear time trends, 
is positive and significant (at the 5% level) but is not robust to changes in the set of controls. I 
also do not find significant compositional effects on job loss rate on the three demographic 
groups of interest (Table 3.1, Panel B). 
 With regard to the public policy exception to at-will employment, Figure 3.2 shows no 
significant trend in aggregate as well as White and Black job loss rates after states recognition of 
the exception (Panels A, B, and C).  Although plot is highly oscillatory, Panel C suggests a rise 
in job loss rate for Hispanics. Simple Difference-in-Differences estimates also show a significant 
positive effect of the public policy exception on job loss rate for Hispanic workers. I found 59% 
increase in Hispanic job loss-to-population ratio both for seven years (from 12 quarters before to 
5th-16th quarters after) and nine years (from 16 quarters before to 5th-20th quarters after) 
window period (Table 3.2, Panel B, Columns 5-12).  
 This effect is equivalent to an increase in job loss-to-population ratio from 0.031 (sample 
average for Hispanics) to 0.05. As noted by Brugemann (2007), when employment protection is 
a protracted process subject to time delays, an increase in job loss is possible before a firing 
restriction is in place if firms start dismissing workers in anticipation of costly firings. This 
increase in Hispanic job loss rate merits further investigation. 
 By reading a covenant of good faith and fair dealing into all employment relationships, 




departure from the general rule of at-will employment. It is also argued to have posed the 
greatest increase in employer liability. I found that the good faith exception had insignificant 
effect on job loss rate (Figure 3.3 and Table 3.3). Coefficient estimates reported in Table 3.3 are 
highly unstable (in magnitude and significance) with changes in the before-after window period 
and controls. It is worth noting that identification of the effect of the good faith exception is 
based on a relatively small number of treatment observations from only 11 adopting states. 
3.5.2 Effects on Employment   
 For the most part, results in the previous section did not suggest a significant effect of at-
will employment exceptions on job loss. If anything, job loss for Hispanics seems to have 
increased in states that recognize the public policy exception. Depending on the effect of at-will 
exceptions on (potential or perceived) costs of hiring decisions, however, the stock of 
employment might have changed following states recognition of at-will exceptions. Event study 
plots in Figure 3.4 show a decline in aggregate employment-to-population ratio (Panel A) as well 
as that for Whites (Panel B) and Hispanics (Panel D) in states that recognize the implied contract 
exception. This declining trend in employment for Hispanics seems to have started several 
months earlier, however. Figure 3.4 (Panel C) show an insignificant change in employment-to-
population ratio for Blacks following states courts’ recognition of the implied contract exception.  
 Difference-in-Differences estimates of the employment effect of the implied contract 
exception corroborate employment trends in Figure 4 and show a significant negative effect over 
a longer before-after window period. For my preferred specification, I found 2%-3% reduction in 
aggregate employment-to-population ratio, depending on the before-after window period, in 




window period, for instance, aggregate employment-to-population ratio declined by 2% (from 36 
months before to 13th-48th months after) in states that recognize this exception. This negative 
effect on aggregate employment is comparable to results reported in Autor et al. (2006). 
 Compositional effect estimates for the three demographic groups suggest a negative 
employment effect of the implied contract exception for Whites and Hispanics but insignificant 
effect for Blacks. For both seven and nine years window periods, employment-to-population 
ratio for Whites declined by 5.6% - 7.9% (significant at the 1% level). Linear combination of 
coefficient estimates reported at the bottom of Table 4 show 4.6% - 5.7% (significant at the 10% 
level) reduction in employment-to-population ratio for Hispanics depending on the before-after 
window period (Table 3.4, Panel B). 
 With regard to the public policy exception, Figure 3.5 suggests negative trends in 
aggregate, White, and Hispanics employment-to-population ratios but a positive trend in 
employment-to-population ratio for Blacks in states that recognize the public policy exception. 
Similar to trends observed in states that recognize the implied contract exception, employment-
to-population ratio for Hispanics seems to have started several months before adoption of the 
public policy exception. Table 3.5 (Panel A) shows that although aggregate employment effect 
estimates are negative, point estimate is either insignificant (for 5 years window period) or only 
marginally significant (for 7 and 9 years window periods).  
 Table 3.5 (Panel B) shows compositional employment effects of the public policy 
exception with negative (positive) effect for Whites and Hispanics (Blacks). For all the three 
window periods under consideration and relative to its effect on employment-to-population ratio 




estimates are significant at the 1% level (for 7 and 9 years window periods) or at the 5% level 
(for 5 years window period). This differential employment effect on Black workers could have 
resulted from, for example, employment of a disproportionately higher fraction of Black workers 
in the temporary help services industry, an industry that has grown significantly faster over the 
years in which most states recognized at-will employment exceptions. Further research is 
necessary to establish if this was indeed the case, however.73  
 Finally, I did not find significant aggregate or compositional employment effects of the 
good faith and fair dealing exception to at-will employment. Figure 3.6 shows a negative pre-
adoption employment trends that continued through post-adoption period for the whole sample 
(Panel A) and for Whites (Panel B). Point estimates reported in Table 3.6 are not stable and 
change drastically (in magnitude and significance) when controlling for state-specific linear time 
trend suggesting possible state-level labor market trends. 
3.5.3 Employment Effects by Education Level 
 If firing restrictions encourage the use of tougher screening techniques to reduce the 
likelihood of hiring a “lemon”, heightened selectivity can make labor market entry more 
difficult. This can especially be the case for workers with lower observable productivity 
correlates (such as schooling and experience) or with productivity correlates that are perceived to 
be more noisy. As a result of Merit-based failure to hire and screening discrimination, across-the-
board firing restrictions can have differential effects on labor market outcomes of various groups 
of workers.  
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 In this section, I present estimates of the employment effect of implied contract and 
public policy exceptions for workers with at most high school diploma and for those with some 
college education for seven and nine years window periods. As summarized in Table C3, 
educational attainment in the sample by racial and ethnic background with a greater fraction of 
Blacks and Hispanics having at most high school diploma than college education and the 
opposite being true for Whites. Berman et al. (1994) noted that the distinction between Current 
Population Survey respondents with high school versus college education closely reflects the 
distinction between blue-collar versus white-collar occupation. As such, effect estimates by 
educational attainment can be understood as effect estimates on employment in occupations with 
varying level of skill intensity.  
 Figure 3.7 indicates differential employment trends for workers with varying level of 
educational attainment in states that recognize the implied contract exception. I found a stronger 
negative effect of implied contract exception on aggregate employment-to-population ratio for 
workers with at most high school diploma than for those with some college education. Estimates 
based on my preferred specification (controlling for region fixed effects as well as region- and 
state-specific linear time trends) show 2.5% reduction in aggregate employment for workers with 
at most high school diploma and insignificant effect for those with some college education from 
36 months before to 13th-48 months after adoption of the exception (Table 3.7, Panel A).  
 The employment reducing effect of the implied contract exception is also found to be 
stronger for White and Hispanic workers with at most high school diploma than for those, in the 
respective group, with some college education for seven years window period (Table 3.7, Panel 




educational attainment, I found a stronger employment increasing effect of the implied contract 
exception for Black workers with at most high school diploma than for those with some college 
education. Aggregate effect this exception on Black employment did not vary by educational 
attainment, however. These differential aggregate and compositional employment effects of the 
implied contract exception are robust to a wider before-after window period of 9 years (Table 
3.7, Columns 9-16).  
 For the public policy exception too, I found heterogeneous employment effects on 
workers with different educational attainment. For seven years window period, for example, the 
public policy exception had a significant positive effect on employment-to-population ratio of 
Black workers with at most high school diploma (significant at the 1% level) but insignificant 
effect (although positive) on Black workers with some college education (Table 3.8, Panel B, 
Columns 1- 8). The employment reducing effect of the public policy exception for Hispanic 
workers with at most high school diploma is found to be almost twice as large as that for workers 
with some college education (9.9% versus 4.2%). These differential effects for Black and 
Hispanic workers are robust to a longer before-after window period of nine years. A stronger 
employment reducing effect of firing restrictions on less-educated (less-skilled) workers has 
previously been documented (MacLeod and Nakavachara 2007, OECD 2004).  
3.6 Conclusion  
 Employment relationships in the United States have historically been governed by the 
common law doctrine of at-will employment where either party may terminate an employment 
relationship of indefinite duration at any time and for any reason. In the second half of the 20th 




that can be grouped into three broad categories: breach of contract (the implied contract 
exception), violation of public policy (the public policy exception), and breach of an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing (the good faith exception).    
 I estimated aggregate and compositional effects of these exceptions on job loss and 
employment for workers with different racial and ethnic background, namely, Whites, Blacks, 
and Hispanics. None of these exceptions had a significant aggregate or compositional effect on 
job loss. On the other hand, while the good faith exception had insignificant effect on 
employment, the implied contract and the public policy exceptions had a negative effect on 
aggregate employment, although point estimates of the effect of the latter at-will exception are 
only marginally significant. Insignificant effect on job loss coupled with a significant negative 
effect on aggregate employment of these two exceptions may suggest that they may have 
increased (potential or perceived) costs of hiring decisions.  
 The implied contract exception had a significant negative effect on employment of White 
and Hispanic workers but insignificant effect on Black workers. The public policy exception had 
a significant negative effect on employment of White and Hispanic workers but a positive effect 
on employment Black workers. When examining employment effect by educational attainment, a 
stronger employment reducing effect of the implied contract and public policy exceptions is 
found on less-educated White and Hispanic workers.  
 For Black workers, while the implied contract exception had insignificant differential 
employment effect by educational attainment, the public policy exception had a stronger 
employment increasing effect on less-educated workers than on those with some college 




average schooling but different racial background calls for further research to understand 








Notes: Job loss refers to involuntary job separation due to layoffs and other non-layoff reasons. Weighted least squares 
standard error estimates from all regressions are adjusted using Huber-White correction and are clustered at state level.  
 Figure 3.1 Trends in Job Loss-to-population Ratio in States that Recognize the Implied Contract Exception to at-will Employment 





Notes: Job loss refers to involuntary job separation due to layoffs and other non-layoff reasons. Weighted least squares standard 
error estimates from all regressions are adjusted using Huber-White correction and are clustered at state level.  
Figure 3.2 Trends in Job Loss-to-population Ratio in States that Recognize the Public Policy Exception to at-will Employment (4 years prior 





Figure 3.3 Trends in Job Loss-to-population Ratio in States that Recognize the Good Faith and Fair Dealing Exception to at-will 
Employment (4 years prior to 8 years after) 
Notes: Job loss refers to involuntary job separation due to layoffs and other non-layoff reasons. Weighted least squares standard 




Notes: Weighted least squares standard error estimates from all regressions are adjusted using Huber-White correction and 
are clustered at state level.  
Figure 3.4 Trends in Employment-to-population Ratio in States that Recognize the Implied Contract Exception to at-will 




Figure 3.5 Trends in Employment-to-population Ratio in States that Recognize the Public Policy Exception to at-will Employment 
(4 years prior to 8 years after) 
Notes: Weighted least squares standard error estimates from all regressions are adjusted using Huber-White correction and are 




Figure 3.6 Trends in Employment-to-population Ratio in States that Recognize the Good Faith and Fair Dealing Exception to 
at-will Employment (4 years prior to 8 years after) 
Notes: Weighted least squares standard error estimates from all regressions are adjusted using Huber-White correction and are 




Notes: Weighted least squares standard error estimates from all regressions are adjusted using Huber-White correction and are 
clustered at state level.  
Figure 3.7 Trends in Employment-to-population Ratio in States that Recognize the Implied Contract Exception to at-will 




Figure 3.8 Trends in Employment-to-population Ratio in States that Recognize the Public Policy Exception to at-will 
Employment: By Education Level (4 years prior to 8 years after) 
Notes: Weighted least squares standard error estimates from all regressions are adjusted using Huber-White correction and are 




        Table 3.1 Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Aggregate and Compositional Effects of the Implied Contract Exception on 
Job Loss for Alternative Before-After Window Periods 
Notes: Table 3.1 reports regression results for the implied contract exception. Dependent variable is the logarithm of job loss-to-population 
ratio. Region means regression controls for region fixed effects. RegionXTime means regression controls for region-specific linear time trend. 
RegionXTime means regression controls for state-specific linear time trend. Regressions in Panel A include Adopt, Post, state fixed effects, 
and quarter fixed effects. Regressions in Panel B include all terms that make up the two triple interaction terms, state fixed effects, and quarter 
fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.   * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%.  
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
AdoptxPost 0.026 0.026 0.015 0.026 0.154 0.154 0.159 0.356** 0.065 0.065 0.077 0.091
(0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.158) (0.115) (0.115) (0.108) (0.159) (0.105) (0.105) (0.096) (0.101)
Constant -6.747***-7.045***-7.031***-8.441*** -7.429***-7.261*** -7.310***-7.321*** -7.178***-7.406*** -7.448*** -7.103***
(0.061) (0.059) (0.077) (0.134) (0.295) (0.089) (0.115) (0.094) (0.089) (0.085) (0.119) (0.192)
R-Squared 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.81 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.81 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.81
Observations
AdoptxPost -0.103 -0.103 -0.112 -0.132 -0.074 -0.074 -0.068 0.001 -0.082 -0.082 -0.069 0.026
(0.111) (0.111) (0.114) (0.156) (0.135) (0.135) (0.131) (0.145) (0.161) (0.161) (0.158) (0.172)
AdoptxPostxBlack -0.067 -0.067 -0.061 -0.065 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.002 -0.042 -0.042 -0.043 -0.027
(0.090) (0.090) (0.091) (0.092) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.108) (0.120) (0.120) (0.121) (0.119)
AdoptxPostxHispanic 0.228 0.228 0.240 0.322 0.348 0.348 0.343 0.408 0.414 0.414 0.406 0.466
(0.225) (0.225) (0.224) (0.248) (0.249) (0.249) (0.247) (0.278) (0.303) (0.303) (0.303) (0.342)
Constant -5.815***-5.677***-5.699***-5.594*** -6.036***-5.936*** -6.010***-5.918*** -6.170***-6.159*** -6.213*** -5.714***
(0.077) (0.079) (0.095) (0.057) (0.096) (0.107) (0.127) (0.084) (0.133) (0.122) (0.133) (0.212)
R-Squared 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34
Observations
Region No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
RegionxTime No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
StatexTime No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
Linear Combination of Coefficient Estimates in Panel B (Prob.)
(AdoptxPost)+(AdoptxPostxBlack) 0.241 0.997 0.996
(AdoptxPost)+(AdoptxPostxHispanic) 0.425 0.066 0.032
877476587692
Panel B. Compositional Effects
Five years window period:                                                              
8 quarters before to 5th -12th quarters after
Sevenyearswindow period:                                                      
12 quarters before to 5th -16th quarters after
Nineyearswindow period:                
16 quarters before to 5th - 20th quarters after
2572 2561 2933





Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
AdoptxPost 0.107 0.107 0.131 0.089 -0.047 -0.047 -0.019 0.031 -0.060 -0.060 -0.012 -0.053
(0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.152) (0.092) (0.092) (0.099) (0.093) (0.104) (0.104) (0.110) (0.099)
Constant -7.413***-6.778***-6.729***-6.759*** -7.233*** -7.315*** -7.297*** -8.099*** -7.222*** -7.297*** -7.276*** -7.669***
(0.199) (0.056) (0.082) (0.083) (0.084) (0.078) (0.099) (0.260) (0.067) (0.064) (0.116) (0.162)
R-Squared 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.82 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.83
Observations
AdoptxPost -0.105 -0.105 -0.122 -0.127 -0.165 -0.165 -0.141 -0.057 -0.090 -0.090 -0.066 -0.073
(0.140) (0.140) (0.135) (0.205) (0.135) (0.135) (0.143) (0.174) (0.162) (0.162) (0.157) (0.173)
AdoptxPostxBlack 0.044 0.044 0.049 0.046 0.111 0.111 0.109 0.116 0.114 0.114 0.106 0.109
(0.105) (0.105) (0.106) (0.109) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.116)
AdoptxPostxHispanic 0.542* 0.542* 0.553* 0.579* 0.632** 0.632** 0.631** 0.642** 0.685** 0.685** 0.674** 0.658*
(0.310) (0.310) (0.311) (0.332) (0.312) (0.312) (0.304) (0.303) (0.341) (0.341) (0.335) (0.339)
Constant -5.769***-5.924***-5.978***-6.361*** -5.944*** -6.151*** -6.137*** -7.237*** -6.036*** -5.829*** -5.871*** -6.798***
(0.081) (0.154) (0.151) (0.285) (0.076) (0.167) (0.170) (0.352) (0.078) (0.126) (0.131) (0.242)
R-Squared 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38
Observations
Region No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
RegionxTime No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
StatexTime No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
Linear Combination of Coefficient Estimates in Panel B (Prob.)
(AdoptxPost)+(AdoptxPostxBlack) 0.666 0.714 0.839
(AdoptxPost)+(AdoptxPostxHispanic) 0.102 0.018 0.01
Five years window period:                                                              
8 quarters before to 5th -12th quarters after
Sevenyearswindow period:                                                      
12 quarters before to 5th -16th quarters after
Nineyears window period:                   
16 quarters before to 5th - 20th quarters after
Panel A. Aggregate Effects
776377128002
Panel B: Compositional Effects
259425792677
Notes: Table 3.2 reports regression results for the public policy exception. Dependent variable is the logarithm of job loss-to-population ratio. 
Region means regression controls for region fixed effects. RegionXTime means regression controls for region-specific linear time trend. 
RegionXTime means regression controls for state-specific linear time trend. Regressions in Panel A include Adopt, Post, state fixed effects, and 
quarter fixed effects. Regressions in Panel B include all terms that make up the two triple interaction terms, state fixed effects, and quarter fixed 
effects. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.   * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%.  
Table 3.2 Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Aggregate and Compositional Effects of the Public Policy Exception on Job Loss for Alternative 





  Notes: Table 3.3 reports regression results for the good faith exception. Dependent variable is the logarithm of job loss-to-population ratio. 
Region means regression controls for region fixed effects. RegionXTime means regression controls for region-specific linear time trend. 
RegionXTime means regression controls for state-specific linear time trend. Regressions in Panel A include Adopt, Post, state fixed effects, and 
quarter fixed effects. Regressions in Panel B include all terms that make up the two triple interaction terms, state fixed effects, and quarter fixed 
effects. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.   * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%.  
Table 3.3 Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Aggregate and Compositional Effects of the Good Faith and Fair Dealing Exception on Job 
Loss for Alternative Before-After Window Periods 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
AdoptxPost -0.237 -0.237 -0.174 -0.143 0.038 0.038 0.102 -0.331* 0.146* 0.146* 0.211** -0.218
(0.168) (0.168) (0.210) (0.260) (0.098) (0.098) (0.131) (0.178) (0.075) (0.075) (0.097) (0.170)
Constant -7.203*** -7.087*** -7.122*** -8.885*** -6.923*** -6.805*** -6.852*** -8.185*** -6.796*** -7.120*** -6.577*** -6.790***
(0.088) (0.083) (0.123) (0.256) (0.043) (0.039) (0.078) (0.185) (0.048) (0.110) (0.059) (0.252)
R-Squared 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.83 0.81 0.81 0.83 0.86 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.86
Observations
AdoptxPost -0.129 -0.129 -0.081 -0.081 -0.092 -0.092 0.003 -0.484** -0.026 -0.026 0.089 -0.338
(0.151) (0.151) (0.164) (0.214) (0.122) (0.122) (0.104) (0.187) (0.139) (0.139) (0.123) (0.232)
AdoptxPostxBlack -0.063 -0.063 -0.061 -0.050 0.120 0.120 0.130 0.124 0.125 0.125 0.141 0.144
(0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.096) (0.150) (0.150) (0.149) (0.134) (0.143) (0.143) (0.142) (0.125)
AdoptxPostxHispanic 0.376* 0.376* 0.381* 0.397* 0.793*** 0.793*** 0.780*** 0.829*** 0.625** 0.625** 0.613** 0.647**
(0.202) (0.202) (0.201) (0.205) (0.204) (0.204) (0.202) (0.214) (0.284) (0.284) (0.284) (0.284)
Constant -6.135*** -6.169*** -6.205*** -7.399*** -5.906*** -5.684*** -5.938*** -6.697*** -5.805*** -5.450*** -5.445*** -6.686***
(0.094) (0.078) (0.107) (0.287) (0.071) (0.052) (0.176) (0.260) (0.077) (0.055) (0.050) (0.283)
R-Squared 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.37
Observations
Region No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
RegionxTime No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
StatexTime No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
Linear Combination of Coefficient Estimates in Panel B (Prob.)
(AdoptxPost)+(AdoptxPostxBlack) 0.518 0.169 0.511
(AdoptxPost)+(AdoptxPostxHispanic) 0.227 0.061 0.173
Five years window period:                                                              
8 quarters before  to 5th -12th quarters after
Sevenyearswindow period:                                                      
12 quarters before to 5th -16th quarters after
Nine years window period:                 
16 quarters before to 5th - 20th quarters after
Panel A. Aggregate Effects
734170637515







Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
AdoptxPost -0.008 -0.011 -0.010 -0.008 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015** -0.021*** -0.016 -0.016 -0.019** -0.030***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009)
Constant -0.438***-0.430***-0.431***-0.455*** -0.445***-0.361***-0.356***-0.290*** -0.443***-0.305***-0.301***-0.391***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.015)
R-Squared 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.90 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.91 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.90
Observations
AdoptxPost -0.042* -0.042* -0.038* -0.025 -0.056** -0.056** -0.056** -0.062*** -0.060** -0.060** -0.063** -0.079***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023)
AdoptxPostxBlack 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.048 0.061* 0.061* 0.061* 0.062* 0.067* 0.067* 0.068* 0.068**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
AdoptxPostxHispanic 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.005 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.015 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.022
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039)
Constant -0.429***-0.385***-0.394***-0.307*** -0.411***-0.291***-0.292***-0.281*** -0.418***-0.307***-0.312***-0.423***
(0.014) (0.021) (0.019) (0.009) (0.021) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.022) (0.020) (0.017) (0.031)
R-Squared 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.69 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.68
Observations
Region No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
RegionxTime No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
StatexTime No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
Linear Combination of Coefficient Estimates in Panel B (Prob.)
(AdoptxPost)+(AdoptxPostxBlack) 0.371 0.991 0.664
(AdoptxPost)+(AdoptxPostxHispanic) 0.477 0.05 0.051
252212224622064
Five years window period:                                                              
24 months before to 13th-36th months after
Seven years window period:                                                      
36 months before to 13th-48th months after
Nineyearswindow period:               
48 months before to 13th-60th months after
Panel B: Compositional Effects
7511 7570 8569
Panel A: Aggregate Effects
 
Table 3.4 Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Aggregate and Compositional Effects of the Implied Contract Exception on Employment for 
Alternative Before-After Window Periods 
Notes: Table 3.4 reports regression results for the implied contract exception. Dependent variable is the logarithm of employment-to-
population ratio. Region means regression controls for region fixed effects. RegionXTime means regression controls for region-specific linear 
time trend. RegionXTime means regression controls for state-specific linear time trend. Regressions in Panel A include Adopt, Post, state 
fixed effects, and quarter fixed effects. Regressions in Panel B include all terms that make up the two triple interaction terms, state fixed 
effects, and quarter fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.   * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant 









Table 3.5 Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Aggregate and Compositional Effects of the Public Policy Exception on Employment for 
Alternative Before-After Window Periods 
Notes: Table 3.5 reports regression results for the public policy exception. Dependent variable is the logarithm of employment-to-
population ratio. Region means regression controls for region fixed effects. RegionXTime means regression controls for region-specific 
linear time trend. RegionXTime means regression controls for state-specific linear time trend. Regressions in Panel A include Adopt, 
Post, state fixed effects, and quarter fixed effects. Regressions in Panel B include all terms that make up the two triple interaction terms, 
state fixed effects, and quarter fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.   * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 
5%, *** Significant at 1%.  
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
AdoptxPost -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.009 -0.012* -0.015 -0.015 -0.022* -0.022**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Constant -0.469***-0.304***-0.306***-0.410*** -0.434***-0.291***-0.291***-0.241*** -0.426***-0.291***-0.296***-0.334***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.010) (0.018) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.028)
R-Squared 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.89 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.89 0.84 0.84 0.86 0.89
Observations
AdoptxPost -0.026 -0.026 -0.029 -0.020 -0.048* -0.048* -0.055** -0.048* -0.071***-0.071***-0.081***-0.079***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029)
AdoptxPostxBlack 0.071** 0.071** 0.071** 0.072** 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.093*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.101***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
AdoptxPostxHispanic -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.022 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.009
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Constant -0.452***-0.322***-0.336***-0.315*** -0.411***-0.285***-0.299***-0.252*** -0.415***-0.301***-0.315***-0.276***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.025) (0.031) (0.029) (0.016) (0.019) (0.024) (0.045)
R-Squared 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.66 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.65
Observations
Region No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
RegionxTime No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
StatexTime No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
Linear Combination of Coefficient Estimates in Panel B (Prob.)
(AdoptxPost)+(AdoptxPostxBlack) 0.029 0.072 0.379
(AdoptxPost)+(AdoptxPostxHispanic) 0.225 0.066 0.023
23096 22337 22367
759075927863
Five years window period:                                                              
24 months before to 13th-36th months after
Seven years window period:                                                      
36 months before to 13th-48th months after
Nineyearswindow period:                
48 months before to 13th-60th months after
Panel A: Aggregate Effects





    
 
Table 3.6 Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Aggregate and Compositional Effects of the Good Faith and Fair Dealing Exception on 
Employment for Alternative Before-After Window Periods 
Notes: Table 3.6 reports regression results for the good faith exception. Dependent variable is the logarithm of employment-to-population 
ratio. Region means regression controls for region fixed effects. RegionXTime means regression controls for region-specific linear time 
trend. RegionXTime means regression controls for state-specific linear time trend. Regressions in Panel A include Adopt, Post, state fixed 
effects, and quarter fixed effects. Regressions in Panel B include all terms that make up the two triple interaction terms, state fixed effects, 
and quarter fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.   * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 
1%.  
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
AdoptxPost 0.016 0.016 0.003 -0.006 -0.017* -0.017* -0.031** 0.016 -0.035** -0.035** -0.046** 0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.027)
Constant -0.433*** -0.297*** -0.294*** -0.342*** -0.443*** -0.308*** -0.305*** -0.247*** -0.466*** -0.363*** -0.389*** -0.295***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.021) (0.006) (0.009) (0.022) (0.029)
R-Squared 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.90 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.91 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.91
Observations
AdoptxPost 0.031 0.031 0.011 0.005 -0.024 -0.024 -0.047** 0.029 -0.045* -0.045* -0.063** 0.027
(0.028) (0.028) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.038)
AdoptxPostxBlack -0.042* -0.042* -0.042* -0.042* -0.049 -0.049 -0.052 -0.047 -0.024 -0.024 -0.025 -0.021
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031)
AdoptxPostxHispanic -0.068** -0.068** -0.069** -0.072** -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.014 0.005 0.005 0.006 -0.008
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037)
Constant -0.381*** -0.276*** -0.276*** -0.284*** -0.394*** -0.255*** -0.347*** -0.274*** -0.437*** -0.329*** -0.338*** -0.367***
(0.015) (0.005) (0.012) (0.009) (0.015) (0.008) (0.028) (0.008) (0.016) (0.007) (0.009) (0.052)
R-Squared 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.68 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.65
Observations
Region No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
RegionxTime No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
StatexTime No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
Linear Combination of Coefficient Estimates in Panel B (Prob.)
(AdoptxPost)+(AdoptxPostxBlack) 0.255 0.591 0.817
(AdoptxPost)+(AdoptxPostxHispanic) 0.002 0.600 0.547
Five years window period:                                              
24 months before to 13th-36th months after
Seven years window period:                                                      
36 months before to 13th-48th months after
Nine years window period:                 
48 months before to 13th-60th months after
Panel B: Compositional Effects
22158 20583 21153
716569817523







Explanatory Variable (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) (10) (11) (12) (14) (15) (16)
AdoptxPost -0.014 -0.016* -0.025*** -0.009 -0.009* -0.008 -0.018 -0.023** -0.038*** -0.012 -0.013** -0.016***
(0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -0.409***-0.403***-0.307*** -0.279***-0.267***-0.274*** -0.387***-0.381***-0.374*** -0.253***-0.243***-0.303***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.004) (0.006) (0.011)
R-Squared 0.81 0.83 0.87 0.71 0.73 0.77 0.81 0.83 0.86 0.72 0.73 0.77
Observations
AdoptxPost -0.064** -0.065** -0.071*** -0.029 -0.029 -0.022 -0.070** -0.073** -0.087*** -0.044** -0.047** -0.055***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.026) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
AdoptxPostxBlack 0.106** 0.106** 0.107** 0.039 0.039 0.040 0.110** 0.111** 0.111** 0.046** 0.047** 0.047**
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
AdoptxPostxHispanic -0.020 -0.020 -0.023 -0.017 -0.016 -0.023 -0.013 -0.012 -0.015 -0.017 -0.016 -0.021
(0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032)
Constant -0.412***-0.408***-0.302*** -0.246***-0.249***-0.259*** -0.320***-0.322***-0.461*** -0.234***-0.235***-0.341***
(0.029) (0.025) (0.016) (0.025) (0.024) (0.033) (0.021) (0.017) (0.034) (0.022) (0.021) (0.031)
R-Squared 0.59 0.59 0.61 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.39 0.39 0.41
Observations
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RegionxTime No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
StatexTime No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Linear Combination of Coefficient Estimates in Panel B (Prob.)
(AdoptxPost)+(AdoptxPostxBlack) 0.251 0.380 0.426 0.705
(AdoptxPost)+(AdoptxPostxHispanic) 0.002 0.011 0.005 0.001
Compositional Effects
21474 21482 24355 24398
Aggregate Effects
7570 7570 8569 8569
Panel B. Nine years window period: 4 years before to 13th-60th 
months after
Panel A. Seven years window period: 3 years before to 13th-48th 
months after
At most High School Diploma Some College Education At most High School Diploma Some College Education
Table 3.7 Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Aggregate and Compositional Employment Effects of the Implied Contract Exception: By 
Education Level 
Notes: Table 3.7 reports regression results for the implied contract exception for workers with different education level. Dependent variable is 
the logarithm of employment-to-population ratio. Region means regression controls for region fixed effects. RegionXTime means regression 
controls for region-specific linear time trend. RegionXTime means regression controls for state-specific linear time trend. Regressions in 
Panel A include Adopt, Post, state fixed effects, and quarter fixed effects. Regressions in Panel B include all terms that make up the two triple 
interaction terms, state fixed effects, and quarter fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.   * Significant at 10%, ** 







Table 3.8 Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Aggregate and Compositional Employment Effects of the Public Policy Exception: By 
Education Level 
Notes: Table 3.8 reports regression results for the public policy exception for workers with different education level. Dependent variable is the 
logarithm of employment-to-population ratio. Region means regression controls for region fixed effects. RegionXTime means regression 
controls for region-specific linear time trend. RegionXTime means regression controls for state-specific linear time trend. Regressions in Panel 
A include Adopt, Post, state fixed effects, and quarter fixed effects. Regressions in Panel B include all terms that make up the two triple 
interaction terms, state fixed effects, and quarter fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.   * Significant at 10%, ** 
Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%.  
Explanatory Variable (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) (10) (11) (12) (14) (15) (16)
AdoptxPost -0.014 -0.017 -0.018* -0.008 -0.006 -0.003 -0.021* -0.032** -0.028** -0.015** -0.016* -0.016***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006)
Constant -0.332*** -0.331*** -0.243*** -0.221*** -0.214*** -0.213*** -0.314*** -0.323*** -0.354*** -0.253*** -0.250*** -0.326***
(0.005) (0.014) (0.025) (0.005) (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.015) (0.041) (0.006) (0.007) (0.018)
R-Squared 0.79 0.80 0.85 0.70 0.71 0.75 0.79 0.81 0.85 0.71 0.72 0.76
Observations
AdoptxPost -0.064** -0.071** -0.057* -0.019 -0.024 -0.036 -0.088*** -0.099*** -0.088*** -0.043** -0.049** -0.071***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018)
AdoptxPostxBlack 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.145*** 0.051* 0.051* 0.052* 0.157*** 0.158*** 0.157*** 0.059** 0.060** 0.060**
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
AdoptxPostxHispanic -0.041 -0.040 -0.043 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.031 -0.029 -0.030 0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.050) (0.049) (0.047) (0.035) (0.034) (0.033) (0.051) (0.049) (0.049) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Constant -0.329*** -0.340*** 0.182*** -0.225*** -0.234*** -0.385*** -0.323*** -0.339*** -0.320*** -0.249*** -0.257*** -0.392***
(0.014) (0.020) (0.033) (0.014) (0.020) (0.028) (0.019) (0.025) (0.053) (0.037) (0.039) (0.041)
R-Squared 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.32 0.32 0.34
Observations
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RegionxTime No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
StatexTime No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Linear Combination of Coefficient Estimates in Panel B (Prob.)
(AdoptxPost)+(AdoptxPostxBlack) 0.002 0.542 0.014 0.473
(AdoptxPost)+(AdoptxPostxHispanic) 0.003 0.052 0.001 0.002
21597 21613 21657 21657
7592 7592 7590 7590
Panel A. Seven years window period: 36 months before to 13th-48th 
months after
Panel B. Nine years window period: 48 months before to 13th-60th 
months after
At most High School Diploma Some College Education
Compositional Effects





Chapter 4 .  Conclusion  
4.1 HIV Testing: Determinants and Effects 
 Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS) pose a major development and health policy challenge in many low- and middle-income 
countries. AIDS caused considerable human sufferings and had major implications on countries’ 
labor force, health care system, and public spending to mention a few. An estimated 33.4 million 
people had HIV in 2008, a year in which 2 million died of AIDS-related illnesses and 2.7 million 
were newly infected with HIV. Two-thirds of all the people living with HIV are in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, where unprotected heterosexual contact and mother-to-child are the main routes of HIV 
transmission (WHO/UNAIDS/UNICEF 2009).  
 Voluntary HIV counseling and testing is one of the key health policy responses to the 
AIDS epidemic. Besides forming the gateway for care, treatment and support for persons in 
need, it is often argued that knowledge of one’s HIV status may lead to positive (sexual) 
behavioral changes. Testing is an important element of World Health Organization's goal of 
‘universal access to prevention, care, and treatment’ and the Millennium Development Goal of 
‘Combatting HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and Other Diseases’. Especially with the rolling-out of free or 




innovative testing service delivery models have been introduced to promote testing. One of the 
largest commitments to fight global AIDS epidemic so far, the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan 
for AIDS Relief, encourages and supports nations to “dramatically expand HIV counseling and 
testing services.”74 
 Chapters 1 and 2 provided empirical evidence on the causal effect of incentives and 
information on HIV testing decision and on the subsequent effect of testing on HIV infection 
expectations and sexual behavior. The empirical analysis in these essays was based on 
experimental data collected from an economically- and educationally-disadvantaged setting in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  As part of the field experiment, study participants were randomly assigned 
into either one of three treatment groups and a control group. The first treatment group was 
offered HIV education through door-to-door visit. The second treatment group was offered HIV 
education and free voluntary home-based HIV counseling and testing. The third treatment group 
was offered HIV education and cash incentives for learning their HIV status in local testing 
clinic. Two follow-up surveys were conducted around three and months after intervention and all 
                                                 
74
 The President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR/Emergency Plan) was a commitment of 15 billion 





study subjects who completed follow-up interviews were offered up to ten pieces of free male 
condoms. Before completing the field work, we offered half of all study participants free home-
based HIV counseling and testing and the other half cash incentives for learning their HIV status 
at a local HIV testing clinic.  
 Results presented in Chapter 1 show a substantial improvement in HIV/AIDS-related 
knowledge for subject offered HIV education but only a modest increase in HIV testing uptake. 
This gap between HIV/AIDS-knowledge and testing uptake is indicative of the importance of 
other factors, other than information literacy, in affecting testing decision. When information is 
combined with easier access to testing service, through home-based provision or cash incentive, 
testing uptake increased significantly (by about eight times the increase in uptake for subjects 
offered only HIV education). 
 Considering the setting in which the study was conducting (both an economically- and 
educationally-disadvantaged setting), these findings imply the considerable effect that cost 
consideration has on individuals’ decision to learn their HIV status. This in turn highlights the 
need to accompany HIV testing promotion campaigns with efforts to improve access to testing 
services if we were to achieve the goal of universal access to HIV counseling and testing and 




 With regard to the effect of testing, results presented in Chapter 2 showed that while 
HIV-negative testers did not update their prior beliefs of HIV infection, HIV-positive testers 
revised their belief upwards during the three months after learning their HIV infection status. 
This short-term effect for HIV-positive testers tends to have dissipated over time, however. Our 
results also did not provide strong evidence that knowledge of one’s HIV status causes a positive 
sexual behavioral change, especially for HIV-negative testers.  
 Empirical results in Chapter 3, especially for HIV-positive testers, should be interpreted 
cautiously due to the relatively small number of observations. Additional researcher is warranted 
in high HIV-prevalence settings involving large number of HIV-positive testers to identify 
externally valid parameter estimates. Considering the evidence presented in Section 1.2 on HIV 
testing rate in Ethiopia, the fact that almost one in five subjects in the control group reported 
learning their HIV status may suggest spillover effects and self-reporting error. I was not, 
unfortunately, able to examine and disentangle potential role of these two with the data I had.   
4.2 Effect of Wrongful Discharge Protections  
 While the need for income protection and other efficiency objectives (such as reduced 
labor turnover and loss of relationship-specific investments) justify employment protection of 




incentives made employment protection an important cause for concern among economists and 
non-economists alike. Differences in the stringency of employment protection laws are often 
held responsible for differential performance of European and U.S. labor markets (Nickell 1997, 
Belot 2007). Across-the-board firing restrictions in a heterogeneous and imperfect labor market 
can have differential effects on labor market outcome of different groups of workers with 
distributional implications. 
 Chapter 3 analyzed the effect of wrongful discharge protections adopted by U.S. state 
courts on employment and job loss for workers with different ethnicity, race, and education 
level. While none of the wrongful discharge protections had a significant effect on involuntary 
job separation, I found some evidence of compositional employment effect. Specifically, while 
the implied contract and public policy exceptions to at-will employment had a negative effect on 
employment of White and Hispanic workers, the public policy exception had a positive effect on 
employment of Black workers. The employment effect of these two exceptions was found to be 
stronger for workers with at most high school diploma.  
 For the implied contract exception, a negative effect on the stock of employment and an 
insignificant effect on firing rate suggest that this exception might have had a negative effect on 




exception, coupled with their insignificant effect on firing rates, also implies that these 
exceptions might have had a differential effect on firing rate of workers with different race, 
ethnicity, and education level. These findings merit further research to better understand 
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Appendix A. Appendix to Chapter 1 
A. Sampling Technique for Korea Ethiopia Yonsei Family Planning (KEYKP) Survey 
The Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia divided all Kebeles (villages) in Ethiopia into 
clusters of households, known as Enumeration Areas (EAs). Each EA contains 150 to 200 
households (on average) and sampling for nationwide surveys (such as the Ethiopian 
Demographic and Health Survey) is based on sampling of EAs. Based on this classification, the 
23 rural Kebeles in Hetosa are composed of 108 EAs. Since there was no ready-made list of 
households in the district, KEYFP team prepared a household list with help from Kebeles 
leaders. Of the 23 rural Kebeles, 6 EAs were selected using probability proportional to size 
method and one urban Kebeles (of the two urban Kebeles) was selected using lottery.  
Table A1 shows EAs selected for KEYFP survey. PPS was used give each EA an equal 
chance of selection, given the inter-Kebeles variation in the number of EAs. Using Kebeles and 
EA map and with help from Kebeles leaders and informants, KEYFP survey team demarcated 
borders of the 6 EAs in advance and identified all households in the area. All households in four 
of the EAs, 60% of households in two EAs, and 14% of households in the one urban Kebeles (of 
a total of 2696 households) were randomly selected. This rural-urban sample composition was to 




were of interest in each sample KEYFP household: adult females aged 20 to 49 (ever-married or 
never-married), adult males aged 20 to 59 (ever-married or never-married), and adolescents aged 
15 to 19 (male or female). In households with more than one eligible member per group, one was 





Table A1. Sampling Frame for KEYFP Survey 
Kebele name EA serial number 
Select every 
18th EA starting 
at the 13th EA 
Anole Salen 1 2 3                 
Gurda Busa 4 5 6 7               
Deyea Debisis 8 9 10 11 12             
Hate Andole 13 14 15 16 17 18         13 
Dawi Titicha 19 20 21 22               
Wule Argi 23 24                   
Teru 25 26                   
Hurtuma Dem 27                     
Denisa 28 29                   
Jango Klinsa 30 31 32 33             31 
Tede Leman 34 35 36 37               
Gonde Finchan 38 39 40 41 42             
Shaki Sherara 43 44 45 46 47             
Sero Anseto 48 49 50 51 52 53         49 
Guche Habe 54 55 56 57 58             
Boru Lenche 59 60 61 62 63             
Boneya Edo 64 65 66 67 68 69         67 
Oda Jela 70 71 72 73               
Boru Chilalo 74 75 76 77 78 79 80         
Debeya Adere 81 82 83 84 85 86         85 
Jawi Chilalo 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94       
Harbe Adamoc 95 96 97 98               
Sibu Abadr 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 103 
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 50% of G1 (N=96) 
Home-based testing 
 50% of G1 (N=96) 
Cash Incentive 













50% of G2 (N=96) 
Cash Incentive 





50% of G3 (N=96) 
Home-based testing 
50% of G3 (N=96) 
Cash Incentive 













Note: KEYFP means Korea Ethiopia Yonsei Family Planning, N means number of households 




B. Outline of Topics Addressed During HIV/AIDS Information Session 
HIV/AIDS-related information was compiled from the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (USA) (http://www.cdc.gov), the Center for Communications Programs (Johns 
Hopkins University) http://www.jhuccp.org/), and the Ethiopian AIDS Resource Center 
(http://www.etharc.org/). Information on HIV/AIDS-related issues in the study area was 
compiled from various unpublished reports of Arsi zone and Hetosa district health bureaus. The 
following is an outline of issues addressed during the information session. 
• What is HIV? What is AIDS?  
• How is HIV transmitted? Not transmitted? 
• How can one reduce the chance of HIV infection?  
• What is HIV prevalence rate in Ethiopia, in Hetosa district, and among different 
demographic groups? 
• What are the advantages (and potential problems) of getting an HIV test, especially for 
pregnant women?  
• What are the options for getting an HIV test in and around Hetosa district? 




• What are the recent developments in Ethiopia with regard to access to AIDS and other 
medications that can reduce the risk of mother-to-child HIV transmission?  









KEY FP survey 
(N=1009, n=1850) 
Randomized KEY FP households 
(N=959, n=1658) 
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Received only HIV/AIDS 
education n=67 (19.6%) 
Received both HIV/AIDS 
education and Home-
based testing 
 n=220 (64.5%) 
Received only HIV/AIDS 
education n=79 (24%) 
Received both HIV/AIDS 




up interview  
n=294 (89%) 
Received at least 
















 n=574 (87%) 




Note. KEYFP means Korea Ethiopia Yonsei Family Planning, “N” means number of 




Table A3. Summary of Baseline Characteristics at First Round Randomization (By Research Group) 
Know medications to reduce the 
chance of mother-to-child 
transmission during pregnancy 0.473 0.490 -0.004 -0.031 -0.051 0.027 0.047 0.020 
Sexually active 0.866 0.866 0.002 -0.016 0.012 0.019 -0.010 -0.028 
Observations 1652 657 984 997 985 667 655 668 
  
 
  Research Group 
All Control 
Control        
versus             
HIV 
Education 
Control                      
versus                            
Home-based 
testing 
Control                      
versus                            
Cash 
incentive 
HIV education       




education              




testing                      
versus                            
Cash incentive 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Age 31.48 31.64 0.137 0.208 -1.142 -0.070 1.280 1.350* 
Male 0.512 0.533 -0.071** -0.006 -0.027 -0.065* -0.044 0.020 
Married 0.738 0.741 0.002 -0.021 0.003 0.023 -0.001 -0.023 
Engaged in economic activity 0.803 0.826 -0.013 -0.059** -0.043 0.046 0.030 -0.016 
Education level 
 Illiterate 0.340 0.335 0.002 0.015 0.010 -0.014 -0.008 0.005 
Grades 1 to 6 0.372 0.402 -0.050 -0.055* -0.042 0.005 -0.008 -0.013 
Grades 7 to 8 0.162 0.134 0.065*** 0.031 0.046* 0.034 0.019 -0.015 
Religion 
 Orthodox Christian 0.605 0.642 -0.043 -0.045 -0.097*** 0.002 0.054 0.051 
Muslim 0.378 0.341 0.029 0.050 0.104*** -0.021 -0.075* -0.054 
HIV/AIDS-Related Knowledge 
 Know HIV testing center 0.610 0.594 0.027 0.024 0.028 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 
Know about mother-to-child 




         
 Age at first sexual intercourse 16.55 16.61 -0.164 -0.365 0.266 0.201 -0.431* -0.632** 
Used condom at first sex 0.0634 0.0690 0.009 -0.007 -0.031* 0.016 0.040** 0.024 
Perception of riskiness of sexual encounters† 
Very safe 0.618 0.617 -0.011 -0.004 0.022 -0.007 -0.033 -0.026 
Somewhat safe 0.284 0.281 -0.003 -0.001 0.017 -0.002 -0.020 -0.018 
Somewhat or very unsafe 0.0979 0.102 0.014 0.005 -0.039* 0.009 0.054** 0.045* 
Observations 1430 569 853 858 857 573 572 577 
 Relationship with first sexual partner 
 Spouse/Fiancé 0.367 0.372 -0.057 -0.002 0.029 -0.055 -0.086 -0.031 
Live-in boyfriend/girlfriend 0.0908 0.0931 -0.008 0.019 -0.023 -0.027 0.014 0.041 
Non live-in boyfriend/girlfriend 0.340 0.359 -0.028 -0.009 -0.056 -0.019 0.028 0.047 
Casual acquaintance 0.125 0.100 0.031 0.012 0.083** 0.019 -0.052 -0.071* 
Commercial sex worker 0.0766 0.0759 0.063** -0.020 -0.034 0.083** 0.096*** 0.014 
Used condom at first sex with a non-
primary partner‡ 0.0171 0.0174 0.029* -0.010 -0.017 0.039** 0.046*** 0.007 









  Research Group 
All Control 
Control        
versus             
HIV 
Education 
Control                      
versus                            
Home-based 
testing 
Control                      
versus                            
Cash 
incentive 
HIV education       




education              




testing                      
versus                            
Cash incentive 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Notes: Table A3 reports means of selected baseline variables. Columns 1-2 show summary for the whole sample for subjects initially assigned to 
control group, respectively. Columns 3 - 8 report mean differences (and significance levels for difference of mean tests) between research groups 
with different treatment status during first round randomization. 
† 
Perception of riskiness of sexual encounters is based on baseline question: 
“Given your sexual behavior in the past, how safe do you think have your sexual encounters been?”  
‡ 
A non-primary partner refers to a 
commercial sex worker or someone with whom the respondent had a casual acquaintance. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** 
Significant at 1%.  








Control                    
versus                         
HIV 
Education 
Control                      
versus                            
Home-based 
testing 
Control                      
versus                        
Cash 
incentive 
HIV education              




education              




testing                     
versus                            
Cash incentive 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Age 31.74 31.86 0.267 0.156 -1.022 0.110 1.289 1.179 
Male 0.519 0.537 -0.056 0.001 -0.032 -0.056 -0.024 0.032 
Married 0.761 0.774 -0.013 -0.038 -0.011 0.025 -0.002 -0.027 
Engaged in economic activity 0.805 0.830 -0.011 -0.061** -0.050* 0.050 0.039 -0.011 
Education level 
 Illiterate 0.339 0.332 -0.001 0.010 0.028 -0.011 -0.028 -0.017 
Grades 1 to 6 0.380 0.414 -0.045 -0.059* -0.061* 0.014 0.016 0.003 
Grades 7 to 8 0.158 0.126 0.058** 0.043* 0.053** 0.015 0.005 -0.010 
Religion 
 Orthodox Christian 0.611 0.651 -0.040 -0.055 -0.102*** 0.015 0.062 0.047 
Muslim 0.373 0.332 0.034 0.059* 0.109*** -0.026 -0.075* -0.050 
HIV/AIDS-Related Knowledge 
 Know HIV testing center 0.610 0.596 0.021 0.035 0.010 -0.014 0.011 0.025 
Know about mother-to-child transmission 
during pregnancy 0.687 0.700 -0.041 -0.026 0.005 -0.016 -0.046 -0.031 
Know medications to reduce the chance 
of mother-to-child transmission during 
pregnancy 0.471 0.502 -0.027 -0.059* -0.064* 0.031 0.037 0.006 
Sexually active 0.874 0.870 0.014 -0.013 0.021 0.027 -0.008 -0.035 
Observations 1465 570 863 877 865 600 588 602 
 Perception of  riskiness of sexual encounters 
Very safe 0.628 0.637 -0.027 -0.010 -0.010 -0.017 -0.017 0.000 
Somewhat safe 0.281 0.270 0.008 0.007 0.038 0.000 -0.030 -0.030 
Somewhat or very unsafe 0.0913 0.0927 0.019 0.002 -0.028 0.017 0.047* 0.030 
Age at first sexual intercourse 16.56 16.63 -0.222 -0.297 0.203 0.074 -0.425 -0.500* 
Used condom at first sex 0.0605 0.0589 0.023 0.006 -0.021 0.017 0.044** 0.027 
Observations 1281 496 755 759 759 522 522 526 
 







Control                    
versus                         
HIV 
Education 
Control                      
versus                            
Home-based 
testing 
Control                      
versus                        
Cash 
incentive 
HIV education              




education              




testing                     
versus                            
Cash incentive 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Relationship with first sexual partner  
 Spouse/Fiancé 0.374 0.400 -0.107** -0.023 -0.002 -0.084 -0.106* -0.022 
Live-in boyfriend/girlfriend 0.0865 0.0824 -0.001 0.033 -0.012 -0.034 0.011 0.045 
Non live-in boyfriend/girlfriend 0.332 0.341 0.000 -0.010 -0.036 0.011 0.037 0.026 
Casual acquaintance 0.129 0.106 0.032 0.010 0.074** 0.023 -0.041 -0.064 
Commercial sex worker 0.0786 0.0706 0.076** -0.009 -0.024 0.085** 0.099*** 0.015 
Used condom at first sex with a non-
primary partner 0.0174 0.0158 0.033* -0.008 -0.016 0.041** 0.049** 0.008 
Observations 634 255 376 383 381 253 251 258 
 Notes: Table A4 reports means of selected baseline variables for subjects who completed first round follow-up interview, along with 
significance levels for difference of mean tests for groups with different treatment status during first round randomization. Panel A summarizes 













HIV education Home-based  Cash incentive Control 
All Home-based 
testing                 
versus                    
Cash incentive 
Home-based 
testing                 
versus                    
Cash incentive 
Home-based 
testing                 
versus                    
Cash incentive 
Home-based 
testing                 
versus                    
Cash incentive 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age 31.48 -1.155 0.357 0.074 0.535 
Male 0.512 0.053 -0.051 -0.037 -0.010 
Married 0.738 0.008 0.042 -0.024 0.029 
Engaged in economic activity 0.803 0.012 0.001 0.065 -0.023 
Education level 
 
Illiterate 0.340 -0.023 0.079 -0.035 -0.021 
Grades 1 to 6 0.372 0.008 -0.081 0.007 0.029 
Grades 7 to 8 0.162 -0.024 -0.010 -0.003 -0.039 
Religion 
 Orthodox Christian 0.605 0.128** -0.013 0.077 -0.019 
Muslim 0.378 -0.103* 0.002 -0.083 0.009 
HIV/AIDS-Related Knowledge 
 
Know HIV testing center 0.610 0.036 0.062 0.018 -0.069* 
Know about mother-to-child 
transmission during pregnancy 0.689 0.047 0.018 0.136*** 0.040 
Know medications to reduce 
the chance of mother-to-child 
transmission during pregnancy 0.473 0.040 -0.048 -0.058 -0.023 
Sexually active 0.866 0.010 0.037 0.006 -0.004 
Observations 1652 327 340 328 657 
 Age at first sexual intercourse 16.55 0.499 -0.614 0.861** 0.093 
Used condom at first sex 0.0634 -0.018 -0.052* -0.023 -0.000 
Perception of riskiness of sexual encounters† 
Very safe 0.618 -0.054 0.068 -0.091 -0.005 
Somewhat safe 0.284 0.038 0.014 0.122** 0.023 
Somewhat or very unsafe 0.0979 0.016 -0.081** -0.031 -0.018 
Observations 1430 284 289 288 569 
 Relationship with first sexual partner  
Spouse/Fiancé 0.367 -0.105 -0.089 0.014 0.084 
Live-in boyfriend/girlfriend 0.0908 0.031 0.014 0.028 -0.031 
Non live-in boyfriend/girlfriend 0.340 0.016 0.040 -0.014 0.015 
Casual acquaintance 0.125 0.084 -0.014 0.000 -0.086** 
Commercial sex worker 0.0766 -0.026 0.049 -0.028 0.017 
Used condom at first sex with a 
non-primary partner‡ 0.0171 -0.009 -0.015 0.000 -0.020 
Observations 703 130 143 142 288 
Notes: Table A5 reports means of selected baseline variables for subjects randomized into different research 
groups during second round intervention. Column 1 shows summary for the whole sample while Columns 2-5 
show mean differences (and significance levels for difference of mean tests) between subgroups with different 
treatment assignment during two rounds of interventions. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.  






























Appendix B. Appendix to Chapter 2  
 
Table B1.  Intention to treat effect Estimates of the Effect of Testing on HIV Infection Expectations around Three and Eight Months after Testing 
 
Dependent variable equals minus one if HIV infection 
expectation is "None", zero if it is "Small", and one if 
it is "High" 
 Dependent variable equals minus one if 
HIV infection expectation decreases 
between first and second follow-up, zero if 
it remained the same, and one if it 
increased First Follow-up Second Follow-up 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HIV education 0.039 0.046 -0.007 0.008 -0.056 -0.044 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.045) (0.045) (0.068) (0.068) 
Home-based testing 0.029 0.034 -0.044 -0.040 -0.101 -0.106* 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.063) (0.063) 
Cash incentive -0.035 -0.036 -0.012 0.009 0.011 0.037 
(0.039) (0.038) (0.042) (0.042) (0.059) (0.060) 
Constant -0.626*** -0.780*** -0.593*** -0.687*** 0.046 0.177 
(0.024) (0.183) (0.025) (0.191) (0.036) (0.297) 
R-Squared 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.05 




Notes: Table B1 shows intention to treat effect estimates on HIV infection expectations. Regressions in even columns control for village fixed 
effects and all covariates listed under Table 1.1. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** 









Dependent variable equals minus one if HIV 
infection expectation is "None", zero if it is "Small", 
and one if it is "High" 
Dependent variable is the change in 
HIV infection expectations between 
first and second follow-up [-2, 2] 
First Follow-up Second Follow-up 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Home-based testing 0.100 0.101 -0.053 -0.076 -0.216 -0.246* 
(0.080) (0.081) (0.090) (0.089) (0.135) (0.138) 
Cash incentive 0.060 0.076 -0.071 -0.042 -0.118 -0.110 
(0.076) (0.075) (0.086) (0.085) (0.117) (0.115) 
HIV positive 0.064 0.036 -0.276 -0.144 -0.618* -0.489* 
(0.282) (0.233) (0.198) (0.231) (0.317) (0.266) 
HIV negative 0.047 0.044 -0.084 -0.044 -0.082 -0.036 
(0.055) (0.057) (0.066) (0.066) (0.087) (0.088) 
Home-based testing X HIV positive 1.500*** 1.537*** 0.453 0.473 -0.684 -0.663 
(0.289) (0.242) (0.469) (0.435) (0.533) (0.465) 
Home-based testing X HIV negative -0.152 -0.140 -0.009 0.037 0.187 0.218 
(0.093) (0.095) (0.104) (0.103) (0.160) (0.163) 
Cash incentive X HIV negative -0.135 -0.164* 0.068 0.074 0.167 0.212 
(0.091) (0.091) (0.102) (0.099) (0.142) (0.140) 
Constant -0.664*** -0.686*** -0.524*** -0.714*** 0.118 0.084 
(0.048) (0.223) (0.059) (0.226) (0.076) (0.327) 
R-Squared 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.07 
Observations 1148 997 899 
Notes: Table B2 shows ordinary least squares estimates of the effect of testing on HIV infection expectations. Regressions in even columns 
control for village fixed effects and all covariates listed under Table 1.1. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.    
* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. 
Table B2.  Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of the Effect of Testing on HIV Infection Expectations around Three and Eight Months 




Appendix C. Appendix to Chapter 3 
Table C1 Precedent-Setting Court Cases 
State Public Policy Implied Contract Good Faith 
Alabama  Hoffman-LaRoche v. Campbell, 
512 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987 July). 
 
Alaska Knight v. American 
Guard & Alert, 714 
P.2d 788 (Alaska 
1986 February).  
Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical 
Surgical Group, 663 P.2d 958 
(Alaska 1983 May). 
Mitford v. Lasala, 666 
P.2d 1000 (Alaska 
1983 May). 
Arizona Wagenseller v. 
Scottsdale Memorial 
Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 
(Ariz. 1985 June). 
Leikvold v. Valley View 
Community Hosp., 688 P.2d 201 
(Ariz. App. 1983 June), vacated, 
688 P.2d 170 (Ariz. 1984). 
Wagenseller v. 
Scottsdale Memorial 
Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 
(Ariz. 1985 June). 
Arkansas MBM Co. v. Counce, 
596 S.W.2d 681 (Ark. 
1980 March). 
Jackson v. Kinark Corp., 669 
S.W.2d 898 (Ark. 1984 June).  
 
California Petermann v. Int’l 
Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, 344 P.2d 
25 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1959 September). 
Drzewiecki v. H&R Block, 101 
Cal. Rptr. 169 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1972 March). 
Cleary v. American 
Airlines, 168 Cal. 
Rptr. 722 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1980 October), 
modified to remove 
tort damages by Foley 
v. Interactive Data 
Corp., 765 P.2d 373 
(Cal. 1988). 
Colorado Winther v. DEC Int’l 
Inc., 625 F. Supp. 100 
(D. Colo. 1985 
September).  
Brooks v. TWA, 574 F. Supp. 
805 (D. Colo. 1983 October).  
 
Connecticut Sheets v. Teddy’s 
Frosted Foods, 427 
A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980 
January).  
Finley v. Aetna Life, 499 A.2d 64 
(Conn. Ct. App. 1985 October), 
reversed on other grounds, 520 
A.2d 208 (Conn. 1987) 
(upholding implied contract 
exception)  
Magnan v. Anaconda 
Indus., 429 A.2d 492 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 
1980 June), reversed 
on other grounds, 479 
A.2d 781 (Conn. 
1984).  
Delaware Henze v. Alloy 
Surfaces (Del. 1992 
March).  
 Merril v. Crothall-
American, 606 A.2d 





State Public Policy Implied Contract Good Faith 
Florida    
Georgia    
Hawaii Parnar v. Americana 
hotels, 652 P.2d 625 
(Haw. 1982 October). 
Kinoshita v. Canadian Pacific 
Airlines, 724 P.2d 110 (Haw. 
1986 August). 
 
Idaho Jackson v. Minidoka 
Irrigation District, 563 
P.2d 54 (Idaho 1977 
April). 
Jackson v. Minidoka, 563 P.2d 54 
(Idaho 1977 April). 
Metcalf v. 
Intermountain Gas. 
Co., 778 P.2d 744 
(Idaho 1989 August). 
Illinois Kelsay v. Motorola, 
384 N.E.2d 353 (Ill. 
1978 December). 
Carter v. Kaskaskia Community 
Action Agency, 322 N.E.2d 574 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1974 December).  
 
Indiana Frampton v. Central 
Indiana Gas Co, 297 
N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973 
May). 
Romak v. Public Service Co., 511 
N.E.2d 1024 (Ind. 1987 August). 
 
Iowa Northrup v. Farmland 
Ind., 372 N.W.2d 193 
(Iowa 1985 July). 
Young v. Cedar County Work 
Activity Center, 418 N.W.2d 844 
(Iowa 1987 November). 
 
Kansas Murphy v. City of 
Topeka, 630 P.2d 186 
(Kan. Ct. App. 1981 
June). 
Allegri v. Providence-St. 
Margaret Health Center, 684 P.2d 
1031 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984 
August). 
 
Kentucky Firestone Textile Co. 
v. Meadows, 666 
S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983 
November). 
Shah v. American Synthetic 
Rubber Co., 655 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 
1983 August).  
 
Louisiana   Barbe v. A.A. Harmon 
& Co, 705 So. 2d 1210 
(La. 1998 January).  
Maine  Terrio v. Millinocket Community 
Hospital, 379 A.2d 135 (Me. 
1977 November).  
 
Maryland Adler v. American 
Standard Corp., 432 
A.2d 464 (Md. 1981 
July). 
Staggs v. Blue Cross, 486 A.2d 
798 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. 






State Public Policy Implied Contract Good Faith 
Massachusetts McKinney v. National 
Dairy Council, 491 F. 
Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 
1980 May).  
Hobson v. McLean Hospital 
Corp., 522 N.E.2d 975 (Mass. 
1988 May).  
Fortune v. National 
Cash Register Co., 364 
N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 
1977 July). 
Michigan Sventko v. Kroger, 
245 N.W.2d 151 
(Mich. 1976 June). 
Toussaint v. Blue Cross, 292 
N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980 June). 
 
Minnesota Phipps v. Clark Oil & 
Refining Co., 396 
N.W.2d 588 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1986 
November), aff’d 408 
N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 
1987). 
Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 
333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983 
April). 
 
Mississippi Laws v. Aetna 
Finance Co., 667 F. 
Supp. 342 (N.D. Miss. 
1987 July).  
Bobbitt v. The Orchard, Ltd., 603 
So. 2d 356 (Miss. 1992 June). 
 
Missouri Boyle v. Vista 
Eyewear, 700 S.W.2d 
859 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1985 November). 
Arie v. Intertherm, 648 S.W.2d 
142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983 January).  
Exception overturned by Johnson 
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 
S.W.2d 661 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1988 
February).  
 
Montana Keneally v. Sterling 
Orgain, 606 P.2d 127 
(Mont. 1980 January). 
Montana Wrongful Discharge 
from Employment Act, Mont. 
Code Ann. 39-2-901 to 914 (1987 
June). 
Gates v. Life of 
Montana Insurance 
Co., 638 P.2d 1063 
(Mont. 1982 January). 
Nebraska Ambroz v. 
Cornhusker Square, 
416 N.W.2d 510 
(Neb. 1987 
November). 
Morris v. Lutheran Medical 
Center, 340 N.W.2d 388 (Neb. 
1983 November). 
 
Nevada Hansen v. Harrah’s, 
675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 
1984 January). 
Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 
668 P.2d 261 (Nev. 1983 
August). 
K-Mart Corp. v. 
Ponsock, 732 P.2d 





State Public Policy Implied Contract Good Faith 
New Hampshire Monge v. Beebe 
Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 
549 (N.H. 1974 
February) (only 
contract damages); 
Cloutier v. A&P, 436 
A.2d 1140 (New 
Hamp. 1981) (allows 
tort damages). 
Panto v. Moore Business Forms, 
547 A.2d 260 (N.H. 1988 
August). 
Monge v. Beebe 
Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 
549 (N.H. 1974 
February).  Eliminated 
as separate cause of 
action in Howard v. 
Dorr Woolen Co., 414 
A.2d 1273 (N.H. 1980 
May).. 
New Jersey Pierce v. Ortho 
Pharm. Corp., 417 
A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980 
July). 
Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, 
Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985 
May). 
 
New Mexico Vigil v. Arzola, 699 
P.2d 613 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1983 July), 
reversed on other 
grounds, 687 P.2d 
1038 (N.M. 1984). 
Forrester v. Parker, 606 P.2d 191 
(N.M. 1980 February). 
 
New York None Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 
N.E.2d 441(N.Y. 1982 
November). 
 
North Carolina Sides v. Duke Univ., 
328 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1985 May). 
  
North Dakota Krein v. Marian 
Manor Nursing Home, 
415 N.W.2d 793 
(N.D. 1987 
November). 
Hammond v. North Dakota State 
Personnel Bd., 345 N.W.2d 359 





State Public Policy Implied Contract Good Faith 
Ohio Adopted, Goodspeed 
v. Airborne Express, 
Inc., 121 L.R.R.M. 
(BNA) 3216 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1985 February); 
rejected, Phung v. 
Waste Management 
Inc., 491 N.E.2d 1114 
(Ohio 1986 April); 
adopted, Greely v. 
Miami Valley 
Maintenance 
Contractors, Inc., 551 
N.E.2d 981 (Ohio 
1990 March). 
West v. Roadway Express, In.c, 
115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4553 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1982 April). 
 
Oklahoma Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 
770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 
1989 February). 
Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 
524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976 
December).  
adopted, Hall v. 
Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 713 P.2d 
1027 (Okla. 1985 
May); rejected, Burk 
v. K-Mart Corp., 770 
P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989 
February).  
Oregon Nees v. Hocks, 536 
P.2d 512 (1975 June). 
Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald 
Publ. Co., 576 P.2d 356 (Ore. 
1978 March). 
 
Pennsylvania Geary v. United States 
Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 
174 (Pa. 1974 March).  
  
Rhode Island None.    
South Carolina Ludwick v. This 
Minute of Carolina, 
Inc., 337 S.E.2d 213 
(S.C. 1985 
November). 
Small v. Springs Industries, Inc., 
357 S.E.2d 452 (S.C. 1987 June). 
 
South Dakota Johnson v. Kreiser’s 
Inc., 433 N.W.2d 225 
(S.D. 1988 December) 
(contract damages).  
Osterkamp v. Alkota Mfg, Inc., 






State Public Policy Implied Contract Good Faith 
Tennessee Clanton v. Clain-
Sloan Co., 677 
S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 
1984 August). 
Hamby v. Genesco Inc., 627 
S.W.2d 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981 
November).  
 
Texas Sabine Pilot Serv. Inc. 
v. Hauck, 672 S.W.2d 
322 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1984 June), affirmed, 
687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 
1985). 
Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 690 
S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985 
April).  
 
Utah Berube v. Fashion 
Centre, 771 P.2d 1033 
(Utah 1989 March). 
Rose v. Allied Development, 719 
P.2d 83 (Utah 1986 May).  
 
Vermont Payne v. Rozendaal, 
520 A.2d 586 (Vt. 
1986 September).  
Sherman v. Rutland Hospital, Inc. 
500 A.2d 230 (Vt. 1985 August).  
 
Virginia Bowman v. State 
Bank of Keysville, 
331 S.E.2d 797 (Va. 
1985 June). 
Frazier v. Colonial Williamsburg 
Foundation, 574 F. Supp. 318 
(E.D. Va. 1983 September).  
 
Washington Thompson v. St. 
Regis Paper Co., 685 
P.2d 1081 (Wash. 
1984 July).  
Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 
568 P.2d 764 (Wash. 1977 
August). 
 
West Virginia Harless v. First 
National Bank, 246 
S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 
1978 July). 
Cook v. Heck’s Inc., 342 S.E.2d 
453 (W. Va. 1986 April). 
 
Wisconsin Ward v. Frito-Lay, 
Inc., 290 N.W.2d 536 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1980 
January).  
Ferraro v. Koelsch, 368 N.W.2d 
666 (Wis. 1985 June). 
 
Wyoming Griess v. Consolidated 
Freightways, 776 P.2d 
752 (Wyo. 1989 July).  
Mobil Coal Producing Inc., v. 
Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985 
August). 
Wilder v. Cody 
Country Chamber of 
Commerce, 868 P.2d 
211 (Wyo. 1994 
January). 

















Alabama Jul-87    
Alaska May-83 Feb-86 May-83  
Arizona Jun-83 Jun-85 Jun-85  
Arkansas Jun-84 Mar-80   
California Mar-72 Sep-59 Oct-80  
Colorado Oct-83 Sep-85   
Connecticut Oct-85 Jan-80 Jun-80  
Delaware  Mar-92 Apr-92  
Florida     
Georgia     
Hawaii Aug-86 Oct-82   
Idaho Apr-77 Apr-77 Aug-89  
Illinois Dec-74 Dec-78   
Indiana Aug-87 May-73   
Iowa Nov-87 Jul-85   
Kansas Aug-84 Jun-81   
Kentucky Aug-83 Nov-83   
Louisiana   Jan-98  
Maine Nov-77    
Maryland Jan-85 Jul-81   
Massachusetts May-88 May-80 Jul-77  
Michigan Jun-80 Jun-76   
Minnesota Apr-83 Nov-86   
Mississippi Jun-92 Jul-87   
Missouri Jan-83 Nov-85  
IC ended in 
Feb-88 














Nebraska Nov-83 Nov-87   
Nevada Aug-83 Jan-84 Feb-87  
New Hampshire Aug-88 Feb-74 Feb-74 
GF ended in 
May-1980 
New Jersey May-85 Jul-80   
New Mexico Feb-80 Jul-83   
New York Nov-82    
North Carolina  May-85   
North Dakota Feb-84 Nov-87   
Ohio Apr-82 Mar-90   
Oklahoma Dec-76 Feb-89 May-85 
GF ended in 
Feb-1989 
Oregon Mar-78 Jun-75   
Pennsylvania  Mar-74   
Rhode Island     
South Carolina Jun-87 Nov-85   
South Dakota Apr-83 Dec-88   
Tennessee Nov-81 Aug-84   
Texas Apr-85 Jun-84   
Utah May-86 Mar-89   
Vermont Aug-85 Sep-86   
Virginia Sep-83 Jun-85   
Washington Aug-77 Jul-84   
West Virginia Apr-86 Jul-78   
Wisconsin Jun-85 Jan-80   











Notes: The mean of labor market outcomes are weighted by Current Population Survey 
sampling weights. White refers to non-Hispanic White and Black refers to non-Hispanic 
Black. Employment-to-population ratio, layoff-to-population ratio, and fired-to-
population ratio are computed by dividing the respective state-level labor market 
aggregates by total state population (of the respective group). A person is said to have 
been fired if she involuntarily lost her job for non-layoff reasons.  
Table C3. Sample Summary (Current Population Survey Basic Monthly (1978-1999) 








18 to 39 years old 56.05 2.90
40 to 64 years old 43.95 2.91



























Employment-to-Population Ratio (%) 
Layoff-to-Population Ratio (%)
Fired-to-Population Ratio (%)
Race/Ethinicity
Sex
Schooling
